SCIENCE

A WEEKLY JOURNAL DEVOTED TO THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE, PUBLISHING THE OFFICIAL NOTICES AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE.

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*ADDRESS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE BRITISH ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE.**

THE first thought in the minds of all of us to-night is that since we met last year the great Queen, in whose reign nearly all the meetings of the British Association have been held, has passed to her rest.

To sovereigns most honors and dignities come as of right; but for some of them is reserved the supreme honor of an old age softened by the love and benedictions of millions; of a path to the grave, not only magnificent, but watered by the tears both of their nearest and dearest, and of those who, at the most, have only seen them from afar.

This honor Queen Victoria won. All the world knows by what great abilities, by what patient labor, by what infinite tact and kindliness, the late Queen gained both the respect of the rulers of nations and the affection of her own subjects.

Her reign, glorious in many respects, was remarkable, outside these islands, for the growth of the Empire; within and without them, for the drawing nearer of the Crown and the people in mutual trust; while, during her lifetime, the developments of science and of scientific industry have altered the habits and the thoughts of the whole civilized world.

The representatives of science have already expressed in more formal ways their sorrow at the death of Queen Victoria, and the loyalty and confident hope for the future with which they welcome the accession of King Edward. But none the less, I feel

* Glasgow meeting, 1901.

sure that at this, the first meeting of the British Association held in his reign, I am only expressing the universal opinion of all our members when I say that no group of the King's subjects trusts more implicitly than we do in the ability, skill and judgment which His Majesty has already shown in the exercise of the powers and duties of his august office; that none sympathize more deeply with the sorrows which two great nations have shared with their sovereigns; and that none cry with more fervor, 'Long live the King!'

But this meeting of the British Association is not only remarkable as being the first in a new reign. It is also the first in the new century. It is held in Glasgow at a time when your International Exhibition has in a special sense attracted the attention of the world to your city, and when the recent celebration of the ninth jubilee of your University has shown how deeply the prosperity of the present is rooted in the past. What wonder, then, if I take the chair to which you have called me with some misgivings? Born and bred in the south, I am to preside over a meeting held in the largest city of Scotland. As your chosen mouthpiece I am to speak to you of science when we stand at the parting of the centuries, and when the achievements of the past and present, and the promise of the future, demand an interpreter with gifts of knowledge and divination to which I cannot pretend. Lastly, I am president of the British Association as a disciple in the home of the master, as a physicist in a city which a physicist has made forever famous. Whatever the future may have in store for Glasgow, whether your enterprise is still to add wharf to wharf, factory to factory and street to street, or whether some unforeseen 'tide in the affairs of men' is to sweep energy and success elsewhere, fifty-three years in the history of your city will never be forgotten while civilization lasts.

More than half a century ago, a mere lad was the first to compel the British Association to listen to the teaching Joule, and to accept the law of the conservation of energy. Now, alike in the most difficult mathematics and in the conception of the most ingenious apparatus, in the daring of his speculations and in the soundness of his engineering, William Thomson, Lord Kelvin, is regarded as a leader by the science and industry of the whole world.

It is the less necessary to dwell at length upon all that he has done, for Lord Kelvin has not been without honor in his own country. Many of us, who meet here to-night, met last in Glasgow when the University and city had invited representatives of all nations to celebrate the jubilee of his professorship. For those two or three days learning was surrounded with a pomp seldom to be seen outside a palace. The strange middle-age costumes of all the chief universities of the world were jostling here, the outward signs that those who were themselves distinguished in the study of Nature had gathered to do honor to one of the most distinguished of them all.

Lord Kelvin's achievements were then described in addresses in every tongue, and therefore I will only remind you that we, assembled here to-night, owe him a heavy debt of gratitude; for the fact that the British Association enters on the twentieth century conscious of a work to do and of the vigor to do it is largely due to his constant presence at its meetings and to the support he has so ungrudgingly given. We have learned to know not only the work of our great leader, but the man himself; and I count myself happy because in his life-long home, under the walls of the university he served so well, and at a meeting of the Association which his genius has so often illuminated, I am allowed, as your President, to assure him in your name of the admiration, respect, nay, of the affection, in which we all hold him.

I have already mentioned a number of circumstances which make our meeting this year noteworthy; to these I must add that for the first time we have a Section for Education, and the importance of this new departure, due largely to the energy of Professor Armstrong, is emphasized by the fact that the Chair of that Section will be occupied by the Vice-President of the Committee of Council on Education—Sir John Gorst. I will not attempt to forecast the proceedings of the new Section. Education is passing through a transitional stage. The recent debates in Parliament; the great gifts of Mr. Carnegie; the discussion as to university organization in the north of England; the reconstitution of the University of London; the increasing importance attached to the application of knowledge both to the investigation of nature and to the purposes of industry, are all evidence of the growing conviction that without advance in education we cannot retain our position among the nations of the world. If the British Association can provide a platform on which these matters may be discussed in a scientific but practical spirit, free from the misrepresentations of the hustings and the exaggerations of the partisan, it will contribute in no slight measure to the national welfare.

But amid the old and new activities of our meeting the undertone of sadness, which is never absent from such gatherings, will be painfully apparent to many of us at Glasgow. The life-work of Professor Tait has ended amid the gloom of the war-cloud. A bullet, fired thousands of miles away, struck him to the heart, so that in their deaths the father and the brave son, whom he loved so well, were not long divided. Within the last year, too, America has lost Rowland; Viriamu Jones, who did yeoman's service for education and for science, has succumbed to a long and painful illness; and one who last year at Bradford seconded the proposal that I should be your president at Glasgow, and who would unquestionably have occupied this chair before long had he been spared to do so, has unexpectedly been called away. A few months ago we had no reason to doubt that George Francis FitzGerald had many years of health and work before him. He had gained in a remarkable way not only the admiration of the scientific world, but the affection of his friends, and we shall miss sadly one whom we all cared for, and who, we hoped, might yet add largely to the achievements which had made him famous.

THE SCIENCE OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

Turning from these sad thoughts to the retrospect of the century which has so lately ended, I have found it to be impossible to free myself from the influence of the moment and to avoid, even if it were desirable to avoid, the inclination to look backward from the standpoint of to-day.

Two years ago Sir Michael Foster dealt with the work of the century as a whole. Last year Sir William Turner discussed in greater detail the growth of a single branch of science. A third and humbler task remains, *viz.*, to fix our attention on some of the hypotheses and assumptions on which the fabric of modern theoretical science has been built, and to inquire whether the foundations have been so 'well and truly' laid that they may be trusted to sustain the mighty superstructure which is being raised upon them.

The moment is opportune. The three chief conceptions which for many years have dominated physical as distinct from biological science have been the theories of the existence of atoms, of the mechanical nature of heat, and of the existence of the ether.

Dalton's atomic theory was first given to the world by a Glasgow professor—Thomas Thomson—in the year 1807, Dalton having communicated it to him in 1804. Rumford's and Davy's experiments on the nature of heat were published in 1798 and 1799 respectively; and the celebrated Bakerian Lecture, in which Thomas Young established the undulatory theory by explaining the interference of light, appeared in the *Philosophical Transactions* in 1801. The keynotes of the physical science of the nineteenth century were thus struck, as the century began, by four of our fellow-countrymen, one of whom—Sir Benjamin Thompson, Count Rumford—preferred exile from the land of his birth to the loss of his birthright as a British citizen.

DOUBTS AS TO SCIENTIFIC THEORIES.

It is well known that of late doubts have arisen as to whether the atomic theory, with which the mechanical theory of heat is closely bound up, and the theory of the existence of an ether have not served their purpose, and whether the time has not come to reconsider them.

The facts that Professor Poincaré, addressing a congress of physicists in Paris, and Professor Poynting, addressing the Physical Section of the Association, have recently discussed the true meaning of our scientific methods of interpretation; that Dr. James Ward has lately delivered an attack of great power on many positions which eminent scientific men have occupied; and that the approaching end of the nineteenth century led Professor Hæckel to define in a more popular manner his own very definite views as to the solution of the 'Riddle of the Universe,' are perhaps a sufficient justification of an attempt to lay before you the difficulties which surround some of these questions.

To keep the discussion within reasonable limits I shall illustrate the principles under review by means of the atomic theory, with comparatively little reference to the ether, and we may also at first confine our attention to inanimate objects.

THE CONSTRUCTION OF A MODEL OF NATURE.

A natural philosopher, to use the old phrase, even if only possessed of a most superficial knowledge, would attempt to bring some order into the results of his observation of nature by grouping together statements with regard to phenomena which are obviously related. The aim of modern science goes far beyond this. It not only shows that many phenomena are related which at first sight have little or nothing in common, but, in so doing, also attempts to explain the relationship.

Without spending time on a discussion of the meaning of the word 'explanation,' it is sufficient to say that our efforts to establish relationships between phenomena often take the form of attempting to prove that, if a limited number of assumptions are granted as to the constitution of matter, or as to the existence of quasi material entities, such as caloric, electricity and the ether, a wide range of observed facts falls into order as a necessary consequence of the assumptions. The question at issue is whether the hypotheses which are at the base of the scientific theories now most generally accepted are to be regarded as accurate descriptions of the constitution of the universe around us, or merely as convenient fictions.

Convenient fictions be it observed, for even if they are fictions they are not useless. From the practical point of view it is a matter of secondary importance whether our theories and assumptions are correct, if only they guide us to results which are in accord with facts. The whole fabric of scientific theory may be regarded merely as a gigantic 'aid to memory'; as a means for producing apparent order out of disorder by codifying the observed facts and laws in accordance with an artificial system, and thus arranging our knowledge under a comparatively small number of heads. The simplification introduced by a scheme which, however imperfect it may be, enables us to argue from a few first principles, makes theories of practical use. By means of them we can foresee the results of combinations of causes which would otherwise elude us. We can predict future events, and can even attempt to argue back from the present to the unknown past.

But it is possible that these advantages might be attained by means of axioms, assumptions and theories based on very false ideas. A person who thought that a river was really a streak of blue paint might learn as much about its direction from a map as one who knew it as it is. It is thus conceivable that we might be able, not indeed to construct, but to imagine, something more than a mere map or diagram, something which might even be called a working model of inanimate objects, which was nevertheless very unlike the realities of nature. Of course, the agreement between the action of the model and the behavior of the things it was designed to represent would probably be imperfect, unless the one were a facsimile of the other; but it is conceivable that the correlation of natural phenomena could be imitated, with a large measure of success, by means of an imaginary machine which shared with a map or diagram the characteristic that it was in many ways unlike the things it represented, but might be compared to a model in that the behavior of the things represented could be predicted from that of the corresponding parts of the machine.

We might even go a step further. If the laws of the working of the model could be expressed by abstractions, as, for example, by mathematical formulæ, then, when the formulæ were obtained, the model might be discarded, as probably unlike that which it was made to imitate, as a mere aid in the construction of equations, to be thrown aside when the perfect structure of mathematical symbols was erected.

If this course were adopted we should have given up the attempt to know more of the nature of the objects which surround us than can be gained by direct observation, but might nevertheless have learned how these objects would behave under given circumstances.

We should have abandoned the hope of a physical explanation of the properties of inanimate nature, but should have secured a mathematical description of her operations.

There is no doubt that this is the easiest path to follow. Criticism is avoided if we admit from the first that we cannot go below the surface; cannot know anything about the constitution of material bodies; but must be content with formulating a description of their behavior by means of laws of nature expressed by equations.

But if this is to be the end of the study of nature, it is evident that the construction of the model is not an essential part of the process. The model is used merely as an aid to thinking; and if the relations of phenomena can be investigated without it, so much the better. The highest form of theory—it may be said—the widest kind of generalization, is that which has given up the attempt to form clear mental pictures of the constitution of matter, which expresses the facts and the laws by language and symbols which lead to results that are true, whatever be our view as to the real nature of the objects with which we deal. From this point of view the atomic theory becomes not so much false as unnecessary; it may be regarded as an attempt to give an unnatural precision to ideas which are and must be vague.

Thus, when Rumford found that the

mere friction of metals produced heat in unlimited quantity, and argued that heat was therefore a mode of motion, he formed a clear mental picture of what he believed to be occurring. But his experiments may be quoted as proving only that energy can be supplied to a body in indefinite quantity, and when supplied by doing work against friction it appears in the form of heat.

By using this phraseology we exchange a vivid conception of moving atoms for a colorless statement as to heat energy, the real nature of which we do not attempt to define; and methods which thus evade the problem of the nature of the things which the symbols in our equations represent have been prosecuted with striking success, at all events within the range of a limited class of phenomena. A great school of chemists, building upon the thermodynamics of Willard Gibbs and the intuition of Van't Hoff, have shown with wonderful skill that, if a sufficient number of the data of experiment are assumed, it is possible, by the aid of thermodynamics, to trace the form of the relations between many physical and chemical phenomena without the help of the atomic theory.

But this method deals only with matter as our coarse senses know it; it does not pretend to penetrate beneath the surface.

It is therefore with the greatest respect for its authors, and with a full recognition of the enormous power of the weapons employed, that I venture to assert that the exposition of such a system of tactics cannot be regarded as the last word of science in the struggle for the truth.

Whether we grapple with them, or whether we shirk them; however much or however little we can accomplish without answering them, the questions still force themselves upon us: Is matter what it seems to be? Is interplanetary space full or empty? Can we argue back from the direct impressions of our senses to things which we cannot directly perceive; from the phenomena displayed by matter to the constitution of matter itself?

It is these questions which we are discussing to-night, and we may therefore, as far as the present address is concerned, put aside, once for all, methods of scientific exposition in which an attempt to form a mental picture of the constitution of matter is practically abandoned, and devote ourselves to the inquiries whether the effort to form such a picture is legitimate, and whether we have any reason to believe that the sketch which science has already drawn is to some extent a copy, and not a mere diagram, of the truth.

SUCCESSIVE STEPS IN THE ANALYSIS OF MATTER.

In dealing, then, with the question of the constitution of matter and the possibility of representing it accurately, we may grant at once that the ultimate nature of things is, and must remain, unknown; but it does not follow that immediately below the complexities of the superficial phenomena which affect our senses there may not be a simpler machinery of the existence of which we can obtain evidence, indirect indeed but conclusive.

The fact that the apparent unity which we call the atmosphere can be resolved into a number of different gases is admitted; though the ultimate nature of oxygen, nitrogen, argon, carbonic acid and water vapor is as unintelligible as that of air as a whole, so that the analysis of air may be said to have substituted many incomprehensibles for one.

Nobody, however, looks at the question from this point of view. It is recognized that an investigation into the proximate constitution of things may be useful and successful, even if their ultimate nature is beyond our ken.

Nor need the analysis stop at the first step. Water vapor and carbonic acid, themselves constituents of the atmosphere, are in turn resolved into their elements, hydrogen, oxygen and carbon, which, without a formal discussion of the criteria of reality, we may safely say are as real as air itself.

Now at what point must this analysis stop if we are to avoid crossing the boundary between fact and fiction? Is there any fundamental difference between resolving air into a mixture of gases and resolving an elementary gas into a mixture of atoms and ether?

There are those who cry halt at the point at which we divide a gas into molecules, and their first objection seems to be that molecules and atoms cannot be directly perceived, cannot be seen or handled, and are mere conceptions, which have their uses, but cannot be regarded as realities.

It is easiest to reply to this objection by an illustration.

The rings of Saturn appear to be continuous masses separated by circular rifts. This is the phenomenon which is observed through a telescope. By no known means can we ever approach or handle the rings; yet everybody who understands the evidence now believes that they are not what they appear to be, but consist of minute moonlets, closely packed indeed, but separate the one from the other.

In the first place Maxwell proved mathematically that if a Saturnian ring were a continuous solid or fluid mass it would be unstable and would necessarily break into fragments. In the next place, if it were possible for the ring to revolve like a solid body, the inmost parts would move slowest, while a satellite moves faster the nearer it is to a planet. Now spectroscopic observation, based on the beautiful method of Sir W. Huggins, shows not only that the inner portions of the ring move the more rapidly, but that the actual velocities of the outer and inner edges are in close accord with the theoretical velocities of satellites at like distances from the planet.

This and a hundred similar cases prove that it is possible to obtain convincing evidence of the constitution of bodies between whose separate parts we cannot directly distinguish, and I take it that a physicist who believes in the reality of atoms thinks that he has as good reason for dividing an apparently continuous gas into molecules as he has for dividing the apparently continuous Saturnian rings into satellites. If he is wrong it is not the fact that molecules and satellites alike cannot be handled and cannot be seen as individuals that constitutes the difference between the two cases.

It may, however, be urged that atoms and the ether are alleged to have properties different from those of matter in bulk, of which alone our senses take direct cognizance, and that therefore it is impossible to prove their existence by evidence of the same cogency as that which may prove the existence of a newly discovered variety of matter or of a portion of matter too small or too distant to be seen.

This point is so important that it requires full discussion, but in dealing with it, it is necessary to distinguish carefully between the validity of the arguments which support the earlier and more fundamental propositions of the theory; and the evidence brought forward to justify mere speculative applications of its doctrines which might be abandoned without discarding the theory itself. The proof of the theory must be carried out step by step.

The first step is concerned wholly with some of the most general properties of matter, and consists in the proof that those properties are either absolutely unintelligible, or that, in the case of matter of all kinds, we are subject to an illusion similar to that, the results of which we admit in the case of Saturn's rings, clouds, smoke, and a number of similar instances. The believer in the atomic theory asserts that matter exists in a particular state; that it consists of parts which are separate and distinct the one from the other, and as such are capable of independent movements.

Up to this point no question arises as to whether the separate parts are, like grains of sand, mere fragments of matter; or whether, though they are the bricks of which matter is built, they have, as individuals, properties different from those of masses of matter large enough to be directly perceived. If they are mere fragments of ordinary matter, they cannot be used as aids in explaining those qualities of matter which they themselves share.

We cannot explain things by things themselves. If it be true that the properties of matter are the product of an underlying machinery, that machinery cannot itself have the properties which it produces, and must, to that extent at all events, differ from matter in bulk as it is directly presented to the senses.

If, however, we can succeed in showing that if the separate parts have a limited number of properties (different, it may be, from those of matter in bulk), the many and complicated properties of matter can, to a considerable extent, be explained as consequences of the constitution of these separate parts; we shall have succeeded in establishing, with regard to quantitative properties, a simplification similar to that which the chemist has established with regard to varieties of matter. The many will have been reduced to the few.

The proofs of the physical reality of the entities discovered by means of the two analyses must necessarily be different. The chemist can actually produce the elementary constituents into which he has resolved a compound mass. No physicist or chemist can produce a single atom separated from all its fellows, and show that it possesses the elementary qualities he assigns to it. The cogency of the evidence for any suggested constitution of atoms must vary with the number of facts which the hypothesis that they possess that constitution explains.

Let us take, then, two steps in their proper order, and inquire, first, whether there is valid ground for believing that all matter is made up of discrete parts; and secondly, whether we can have any knowledge of the constitution or properties which those parts possess.

THE COARSE-GRAINEDNESS OF MATTER.

Matter in bulk appears to be continuous. Such substances as water or air appear to the ordinary observer to be perfectly uniform in all their properties and qualities, in all their parts.

The hasty conclusion that these bodies are really uniform is, nevertheless, unthinkable.

In the first place the phenomena of diffusion afford conclusive proof that matter when apparently quiescent is in fact in a state of internal commotion. I need not recapitulate the familiar evidence to prove that gases and many liquids when placed in communication interpenetrate or diffuse into each other; or that air, in contact with a surface of water, gradually becomes laden with water vapor, while the atmospheric gases in turn mingle with the water. Such phenomena are not exhibited by liquids and gases alone, nor by solids at high temperatures only. Sir W. Roberts-Austen has placed pieces of gold and lead in contact at a temperature of 18° C. After four years the gold had traveled into the lead to such an extent that not only were the two metals united, but, on analysis, appreciable quantities of the gold were detected even at a distance of more than 5 millimeters from the common surface, while within a distance of three-quarters of a millimeter from the surface gold had penetrated into the lead to the extent of 1 oz. 6 dwts. per ton, an amount which could have been profitably extracted.

Whether it is or is not possible to devise any other intelligible account of the cause of such phenomena, it is certain that a simple and adequate explanation is found in the hypothesis that matter consists of discrete parts in a state of motion, which can penetrate into the spaces between the corresponding parts of the surrounding bodies.

The hypothesis thus framed is also the one which affords a rational explanation of other simple and well-known facts. If matter is regarded as a continuous medium the phenomena of expansion are unintelligible. There is, apparently, no limit to the expansion of matter, or, to fix our attention on one kind of matter, let us say to the expansion of a gas; but it is inconceivable that a continuous material which fills or is present in every part of a given space could also be present in every part of a space a million times as great. Such a statement might be made of a mathematical abstraction; it cannot be true of any real substance or thing. If, however, matter consists of discrete particles, separated from each other either by empty space or by something different from themselves, we can at once understand that expansion and contraction may be nothing more than the mutual separation or approach of these particles.

Again, no clear mental picture can be formed of the phenomena of heat unless we suppose that heat is a mode of motion. In the words of Rumford, "it is extremely difficult, if not quite impossible, to form any distinct idea of anything capable of being excited and communicated in the manner the heat was excited and communicated in [his] experiment [on friction] except it be motion."* And if heat be motion, there can be no doubt that it is the fundamental particles of matter which are moving. For the motion is not visible, is not motion of the body as a whole, while diffusion, which is a movement of matter, goes on more quickly as the temperature rises, thereby proving that the internal motions have become more rapid, which is exactly the result which would follow if these were the movements which constitute sensible heat.

*Phil. Trans., 1798, p. 99.

Combining, then, the phenomena of diffusion, expansion and heat, it is not too much to say that no hypotheses which make them intelligible have ever been framed other than those which are at the basis of the atomic theory.

Many other considerations also point to the same conclusion. Many years ago Lord Kelvin gave independent arguments, based on the properties of gases, on the constitutions of the surfaces of liquids, and on the electric properties of metals, all of which indicate that matter is, to use his own phrase, coarse-grained—that it is not identical in constitution throughout, but that adjacent minute parts are distinguishable from each other by being either of different natures or in different states.

And here it is necessary to insist that all these fundamental proofs are independent of the nature of the particles or granules into which matter must be divided.

The particles, for instance, need not be different in kind from the medium which surrounds and separates them. It would suffice if they were what may be called singular parts of the medium itself, differing from the rest only in some peculiar state of internal motion or of distortion, or, by being in some other way earmarked as distinct individuals. The view that the constitution of matter is atomic may and does receive support from theories in which definite assumptions are made as to the constitution of the atoms; but when, as is often the case, these assumptions introduce new and more recondite difficulties, it must be remembered that the fundamental hypothesis—that matter consists of discrete parts, capable of independent motions—is forced upon us by facts and arguments which are altogether independent of what the nature and properties of these separate parts may be.

As a matter of history the two theories, which are not by any means mutually exclusive, that atoms are particles which can be treated as distinct in kind from the medium which surrounds them, and that they are parts of that medium existing in a special state, have both played a large part in the theoretical development of the atomic hypothesis. The atoms of Waterston, Clausius and Maxwell were particles. The vortex-atoms of Lord Kelvin, and the strain-atoms (if I may call them so) suggested by Mr. Larmor, are states of a primary medium which constitutes a physical connection between them, and through which their mutual actions arise and are transmitted.

PROPERTIES OF THE BASIS OF MATTER.

It is easy to show that, whichever alternative be adopted, we are dealing with something, whether we consider it under the guise of separate particles or of differentiated portions of the medium, which has properties different from those of matter in bulk.

For if the basis of matter had the same constitution as matter, the irregular heat movements could hardly be maintained either against the viscosity of the medium or the frittering away of energy of motion which would occur during the collisions between the particles. Thus, even in the case in which a hot body is prevented from losing heat to surrounding objects, its sensible heat should spontaneously decay by a process of self-cooling. No such phenomenon is known, and though on this, as on all other points, the limits of our knowledge are fixed by the uncertainty of experiment, we are compelled to admit that, to all appearance, the fundamental medium, if it exists, is unlike a material medium, in that it is non-viscous; and that the particles, if they exist, are so constituted that energy is not frittered away when they collide. In either case we are dealing with something different from matter itself in the sense that, though it is the basis of matter, it is not identical in all its properties with matter.

The idea therefore that entities exist possessing properties different from those of matter in bulk is not introduced at the end of a long and recondite investigation to explain facts with which none but experts are acquainted. It is forced upon us at the very threshold of our study of nature. Either the properties of matter in bulk cannot be referred to any simpler structure, or that simpler structure must have properties different from those of matter in bulk as we directly knew it—properties which can only be inferred from the results which they produce.

No *à priori* argument against the possibility of our discovering the existence of quasi-material substances, which are nevertheless different from matter, can prove the negative proposition that such substances cannot exist. It is not a self-evident truth that no substance other than ordinary matter can have an existence as real as that of matter itself. It is not axiomatic that matter cannot be composed of parts whose properties are different from those of the whole. To assert that even if such substances and such parts exist no evidence, however cogent, could convince us of their existence is to beg the whole question at issue; to decide the cause before it has been heard.

We must therefore adhere to the standpoint adopted by most scientific men, *viz.*, that the question of the existence of ultra-physical entities, such as atoms and the ether, is to be settled by the evidence, and must not be ruled out as inadmissible on *à priori* grounds.

On the other hand, it is impossible to deny that, if the mere entry on the search for the concealed causes of physical phenomena is not a trespass on ground we have no right to explore, it is at all events the beginning of a dangerous journey.

The wraiths of phlogiston, caloric, luminiferous corpuscles and a crowd of other phantoms haunt the investigator, and as the grim host vanishes into nothingness he cannot but wonder if his own conceptions of atoms and of the ether

'shall dissolve,
And, like this insubstantial pageant faded,
Leave not a wrack behind.'

But though science, like Bunyan's hero, has sometimes had to pass through the 'Valley of Humiliation,' the spectres which meet it there are not really dangerous if they are boldly faced. The facts that mistakes have been made, that theories have been propounded, and for a time accepted, which later investigations have disproved, do not necessarily discredit the method adopted. In scientific theories, as in the world around us, there is a survival of the fittest, and Dr. James Ward's unsympathetic account of the blunders of those whose work, after all, has shed glory on the nineteenth century, might *mutatis mutandis* stand for a description of the history of the advance of civilization. "The story of the progress so far," he tells us, "is briefly this: Divergence between theory and fact one part of the way, the wreckage of abandoned fictions for the rest, with an unattainable goal of phenomenal nihilism and ultra-physical mechanism beyond." *

* James Ward, 'Naturalism and Agnosticism,' Vol. I., p. 153.

"The path of progress," says Professor Karl Pearson, "is strewn with the wreck of nations. Traces are everywhere to be seen of the hecatombs of inferior races, and of victims who found not the narrow way to the greater perfection. Yet these dead peoples are, in very truth, the stepping-stones on which mankind has arisen to the higher intellectual and deeper emotional life of to-day." *

It is only necessary to add that the progress of society is directed towards an unattainable goal of universal contentment, to make the parallel complete.

And so, in the one case as in the other, we may leave 'the dead to bury their dead.' The question before us is not whether we too may not be trusting to false ideas, erroneous experiments, evanescent theories. No doubt we are; but, without making an insolent claim to be better than our fathers, we may fairly contend that, amid much that is uncertain and temporary, some of the fundamental conceptions, the root-ideas of science are so grounded on reason and fact that we cannot but regard them as an aspect of the very truth.

Enough has, perhaps, now been said on this point for my immediate purpose. The argument as to the constitution of matter could be developed further in the manner I have hitherto adopted, *viz.*, by series of propositions, the proof of each of which is based upon a few crucial phenomena. In particular, if matter is divided into moving granules or particles, the phenomenon of cohesion proves that there must be mutual actions between them analogous to those which take place between large masses of matter, and which we ascribe to force, thereby indicating the regular, unvarying operation of active machinery which we have not yet the means of adequately understanding. For the moment, I do not wish

* Karl Pearson, 'National Life from the Standpoint of Science,' p. 62.

to extend the line of reasoning that has been followed. My main object is to show that the notion of the existence of ultra-physical entities and the leading outlines of the atomic theory are forced upon us at the beginning of our study of nature, not only by *à priori* considerations, but in the attempt to comprehend the results of even the simplest observation. These outlines cannot be effaced by the difficulties which undoubtedly arise in filling up the picture. The cogency of the proof that matter is coarse-grained is in no way affected by the fact that we may have grave doubts as to the nature of the granules. Nay, it is of the first importance to recognize that, though the fundamental assumptions of the atomic theory receive overwhelming support from a number of more detailed arguments, they are themselves almost of the nature of axioms, in that the simplest phenomena are unintelligible if they are abandoned.

THE RANGE OF THE ATOMIC THEORY.

It would be most unfair, however, to the atomic theory to represent it as depending on one line of reasoning only, or to treat its evidence as bounded by the very general propositions I have discussed.

It is true that as the range of the theory is extended the fundamental conception that matter is granular must be expanded and filled in by supplementary hypotheses as to the constitution of the granules. It may also be admitted that no complete or wholly satisfactory description of that constitution can as yet be given; that perfection has not yet been attained here or in any other branch of science; but the number of facts which can be accounted for by the theory is very large compared with the number of additional hypotheses which are introduced; and the cumulative weight of the additional evidence obtained by the study of details is such as to add greatly to the strength of the conviction that, in its leading outlines, the theory is true.

It was originally suggested by the facts of chemistry, and though, as we have seen, a school of chemists now thrusts it into the background, it is none the less true, in the words of Dr. Thorpe, that 'every great advance in chemical knowledge during the last ninety years finds its interpretation in [Dalton's] theory.' *

The principal mechanical and thermal properties of gases have been explained, and in a large part discovered, by the aid of the atomic theory; and, though there are outstanding difficulties, they are, for the most part, related to the nature of the atoms and molecules, and do not affect the question as to whether they exist.

The fact that different kinds of light all travel at the same speed in interplanetary space, while they move at different rates in matter, is explained if matter is coarse-grained. But to attempt to sum up all this evidence would be to recite a text-book on physics. It must suffice to say that it is enormous in extent and varied in character, and that the atomic theory imparts a unity to all the physical sciences which has been attained in no other way.

I must, however, give a couple of instances of the wonderful success which has been achieved in the explanation of physical phenomena by the theory we are considering, and I select them because they are in harmony with the line of argument I have been pursuing.

When a piece of iron is magnetized its behavior is different according as the magnetic force applied to it is weak, moderate or strong. When a certain limit is passed the iron behaves as a non-magnetic substance to all further additions on magnetic force. With strong forces it does and with very weak forces it does not remain mag-

* Thorpe, 'Essays on Historical Chemistry,' 1849, p. 368.

netized when the force ceases to act. Professor Ewing has imitated all the minute details of these complicated properties by an arrangement of small isolated compass needles to represent the molecules. It may fairly be said that as far as this particular set of phenomena is concerned a most instructive working model based on the molecular theory has not only been imagined but constructed.

The next illustration is no less striking. We may liken a crowd of molecules to a fog; but while the fog is admitted by everybody to be made up of separate globules of water, the critics of scientific method are sometimes apt to regard the molecules as mere fictions of the imagination. If, however, we could throw the molecules of a highly rarefied gas into such a state that vapor condensed on them, so that each became the center of a water-drop, till the host of invisible molecules was, as it were, magnified by accretion into a visible mist, surely no stronger proof of their reality could be desired. Yet there is every reason to believe that something very like this has been accomplished by Mr. C. T. R. Wilson and Professor J. J. Thomson.

It is known that it is comparatively difficult to produce a fog in damp air if the mixture consists of air and water-vapor alone. The presence of particles of very fine dust facilitates the process. It is evident that the vapor condenses on the dust particles and that a nucleus of some kind is necessary on which each drop may form. But electrified particles also act as nuclei; for if a highly charged body from which electricity is escaping be placed near a steam jet, the steam condenses; and a cloud is also formed in dust-free air more easily than would otherwise be the case if electricity is discharged into it.

Again, according to accepted theory, when a current of electricity flows through a gas some of the atoms are divided into parts which carry positive and negative charges as they move in opposite directions, and unless this breaking-up occurs a gas does not conduct electricity. But a gas can be made a conductor merely by allowing the Röntgen rays or the radiation given off by uranium to fall upon it. A careful study of the facts shows that it is probable that some of the atoms have been broken up by the radiation, and that their oppositely electrified parts are scattered among their unaltered fellows. Such a gas is said to be ionized.

Thus by these two distinct lines of argument we come to the conclusions: 1st, that the presence of electrified particles promotes the formation of mist, and 2d, that in an ionized gas such electrified particles are provided by the breaking-up of atoms.

The two conclusions will mutually support each other if it can be shown that a mist is easily formed in ionized air. This was tested by Mr. Wilson, who showed that in such air mist is formed as though nuclei were present, and thus in the cloud we have visible evidence of the presence of the divided atoms. If then we cannot handle the individual molecules we have at least some reason to believe that a method is known of seizing individuals, or parts of individuals, which are in a special state, and of wrapping other matter round them till each one is the center of a discrete particle of a visible fog.

I have purposely chosen this illustration, because the explanation is based on a theory—that of ionization—which is at present subjected to hostile criticism. It assumes that an electrical current is nothing more than the movement of charges of electricity. But magnets placed near to an electric current tend to set themselves at right angles to its direction; a fact on which the construction of telegraphic instruments is based. Hence if the theory be true, a similar effect ought to be produced by a moving charge of electricity. This experiment was tried many years ago in the laboratory of Helmholtz by Rowland, who caused a charged disc to spin rapidly near a magnet. The result was in accord with the theory; the magnet moved as though acted upon by an electric current. Of late, however, M. Crémieu has investigated the matter afresh, and has obtained results which, according to his interpretation, were inconsistent with that of Rowland.

M. Crémieu's results are already the subject of controversy,* and are, I believe, likely to be discussed in the Section of Physics. This is not the occasion to enter upon a critical discussion of the question at issue, and I refer to it only to point out that though, if M. Crémieu's result were upheld, our views as to electricity would have to be modified, the foundations of the atomic theory would not be shaken.

It is, however, from the theory of ions that the most far-reaching speculations of science have recently received unexpected support. The dream that matter of all kinds will some day be proved to be fundamentally the same has survived many shocks. The opinion is consistent with the great generalization that the properties of elements are a periodic function of their atomic weights. Sir Norman Lockyer has long been a prominent exponent of the view that the spectra of the stars indicate the reduction of our so-called elements to simpler forms, and now Professor J. J. Thomson believes that we can break off from an atom a part, the mass of which is not more than one-thousandth of the whole, and that these corpuscles, as he has named them, are the carriers of the negative charge in an electric current. If atoms are thus complex, not only is the *à priori* probability increased that the different structures which we call elements may all be built of similar bricks, but the discovery by Lenard that the ease with which the corpuscles penetrate different bodies depends only on the density of the obstacles, and not on their chemical constitution, is held by Professor Thomson to be 'a strong confirmation of the view that the atoms of the elementary substances are made up of simpler parts, all of which are alike.'* On the present occasion, however, we are occupied rather with the foundations than with these ultimate ramifications of the atomic theory; and having shown how wide its range is, I must, to a certain extent, retrace my steps and return to the main line of my argument.

THE PROPERTIES OF ATOMS AND MOLECULES.

For if it be granted that the evidence that matter is coarse-grained and is formed of separate atoms and molecules is too strong to be resisted, it may still be contended that we can know little or nothing of the sizes and properties of the molecules.

It must be admitted that though the fundamental postulates are always the same, different aspects of the theory, which have not in all cases been successfully combined, have to be developed when it is applied to different problems; but in spite of this there is little doubt that we have some fairly accurate knowledge of molecular motions and magnitudes.

If a liquid is stretched into a very thin film, such as a soap bubble, we should expect indications of a change in its properties when the thickness of the film is not a very large multiple of the average distance between two neighboring molecules. In 1890 Sohncke † detected evidence of such a

* See *Phil. Mag.*, July, 1901, p. 144; and *Johns Hopkins University Circulars*, XX., No. 152, May–June, 1901, p. 78.

* For the most recent account of this subject see an article on 'Bodies Smaller than Atoms,' by Professor J. J. Thomson in the *Popular Science Monthly* (The Science Press), August, 1901.

† *Wied. Ann.*, 1890, XL., pp. 345–355.

change in films of average thickness of 106 millionths of a millimeter ($\mu\mu$), and quite recently Rudolph Weber found it in an oil-film when the thickness was 115 $\mu\mu$.*

Taking the mean of these numbers and combining the results of different variants of the theory we may conclude that a film should become unstable and tend to rupture spontaneously somewhere between the thicknesses of 110 and 55 $\mu\mu$, and Professor Reinold and I found by experiment that this instability is actually exhibited between the thicknesses of 96 and 45 $\mu\mu$.† There can therefore be little doubt that the first approach to molecular magnitude is signalled when the thickness of a film is somewhat less than 100 $\mu\mu$, or 4 millionths of an inch.

Thirteen years ago I had the honor of laying before the Chemical Society a résumé of what was then known on these subjects,‡ and I must refer to that lecture or to the most recent edition of O. E. Meyer's work on the kinetic theory of gases § for the evidence that various independent lines of argument enable us to estimate quantities very much less than 4 millionths of an inch, which is perhaps from 500 to 1,000 times greater than the magnitude which, in the present state of our knowledge, we can best describe as the diameter of a molecule.

Confining our attention, however, to the larger quantities, I will give one example to show how strong is the cumulative force of the evidence as to our knowledge of the magnitudes of molecular quantities.

We have every reason to believe that though the molecules in a gas frequently collide with each other, yet in the case of the more perfect gases the time occupied in collisions is small compared with that in which each molecule travels undisturbed by its fellows. The average distance traveled between two successive encounters is called the mean free path, and, for the reason just given, the question of the magnitude of this distance can be attacked without any precise knowledge of what a molecule is, or of what happens during an encounter.

Thus the mean free path can be determined, by the aid of the theory, either from the viscosity of the gas or from the thermal conductivity. Using figures given in the latest work on the subject,* and dealing with one gas only, as a fair sample of the rest, the lengths of the mean free path of hydrogen as determined by these two independent methods differ only by about 3 per cent. Further, the mean of the values which I gave in the lecture already referred to differed only by about 6 per cent. from the best modern result, so that no great change has been introduced during the last thirteen years.

It may, however, be argued that these concordant values are all obtained by means of the same theory, and that a common error may affect them all. In particular, some critics have of late been inclined to discredit the atomic theory by pointing out that the strong statements which have sometimes been made as to the equality, among themselves, of atoms or molecules of the same kind may not be justified, as the equality may be that of averages only, and be consistent with a considerable variation in the sizes of individuals.

Allowing this argument more weight than it perhaps deserves, it is easy to show that it cannot affect seriously our knowledge of the length of the mean free path.

Professor George Darwin † has handled the problem of a mixture of unequal spher-

* *Annalen der Physik*, 1901, IV., pp. 706–721.

† *Phil. Trans.*, 1893, 184, pp. 505–529.

‡ *Chem. Soc. Trans.*, LIII., March, 1888, pp. 222–262.

§ 'Kinetic Theory of Gases,' O. E. Meyer, 1899. Translated by R. E. Baynes.

* Meyer's 'Kinetic Theory of Gases' (see above).

† *Phil. Trans.*, 180.

ical bodies in the particular case in which the sizes are distributed according to the law of errors, which would involve far greater inequalities than can occur among atoms. Without discussing the precise details of his problem it is sufficient to say that in the case considered by him the length of the mean free path is $\frac{7}{11}$ of what it would be if the particles were equal. Hence were the inequalities of atoms as great as in this extreme case, the reduction of the mean free path in hydrogen could only be from 185 to 119 $\mu\mu$; but they must be far less, and therefore the error, if any, due to this cause could not approach this amount. It is probably inappreciable.

Such examples might be multiplied but the one I have selected is perhaps sufficient to illustrate my point, *viz.*, that considerable and fairly accurate knowledge can be obtained as to molecular quantities by the aid of theories the details of which are provisional, and are admittedly capable of improvement.

IS THE MODEL UNIQUE?

But the argument that a correct result may sometimes be obtained by reasoning on imperfect hypotheses raises the question as to whether another danger may not be imminent. To be satisfactory our model of nature must be unique, and it must be impossible to imagine any other which agrees equally well with the facts of experiment. If a large number of hypotheses could be framed with equal claims to validity, that fact would alone raise grave doubts as to whether it were possible to distinguish between the true and the false. Thus Professor Poincaré has shown that an infinite number of dynamical explanations can be found for any phenomenon which satisfies certain conditions. But though this consideration warns us against the too ready acceptance of explanations of isolated phenomena, it has no weight against a theory which embraces so vast a number of facts as those included by the atomic theory. It does not follow that, because a number of solutions are all formally dynamical, they are therefore all equally admissible. The pressure of a gas may be explained as the result of a shower of blows delivered by molecules, or by a repulsion between the various parts of a continuous medium. Both solutions are expressed in dynamical language; but one is, and the other is not, compatible with the observed phenomena of expansion. The atomic theory must hold the field until another can be found which is not inferior as an explanation of the fundamental difficulties as to the constitution of matter, and is, at the same time, not less comprehensive.

On the whole, then, the question as to whether we are attempting to solve a problem which has an infinite number of solutions may be put aside until one solution has been found which is satisfactory in all its details. We are in a sufficient difficulty about that to make the rivalry of a second of the same type very improbable.

THE PHENOMENA OF LIFE.

But it may be asked—nay, it has been asked—may not the type of our theories be radically changed? If this question does not merely imply a certain distrust in our own powers of reasoning, it should be supported by some indication of the kind of change which is conceivable.

Perhaps the chief objection which can be brought against physical theories is that they deal only with the inanimate side of nature, and largely ignore the phenomena of life. It is therefore in this direction, if in any, that a change of type may be expected. I do not propose to enter at length upon so difficult a question, but, however we may explain or explain away the characteristics of life, the argument for the truth of the atomic theory would only be affected if it could be shown that living matter does not possess the thermal and mechanical properties, to explain which the atomic theory has been framed. This is so notoriously not the case that there is the gravest doubt whether life can in any way interfere with the action within the organism of the laws of matter in bulk belonging to the domain of mechanics, physics, and chemistry.

Probably the most cautious opinion that could now be expressed on this question is that, in spite of some outstanding difficulties which have recently given rise to what is called Neovitalism, there is no conclusive evidence that living matter can suspend or modify any of the natural laws which would affect it if it were to cease to live. It is possible that though subject to these laws the organism while living may be able to employ, or even to direct, their action within itself for its own benefit, just as it unquestionably does make use of the processes of external nature for its own purposes; but if this be so, the seat of the controlling influence is so withdrawn from view that on the one hand its very existence may be denied, while, on the other hand, Professor Haeckel, following Vogt, has recently asserted that "matter and ether are not dead, and only moved by extrinsic force; but they are endowed with sensation and will; they experience an inclination for condensation, a dislike for strain; they strive after the one and struggle against the other."*

But neither unproved assertions of this kind nor the more refined attempts that have been made by others to bring the phenomena of life and of dead matter under a common formula touch the evidence for the atomic theory. The question as to whether matter consists of elements capable of independent motion is prior to and independent of the further questions as to what these elements are, and whether they are alive or dead.

The physicist, if he keeps to his business, asserts, as the bases of the atomic theory, nothing more than that he who declines to admit that matter consists of separate moving parts must regard many of the simplest phenomena as irreconcilable and unintelligible, in spite of the fact that means of reconciling them are known to everybody, in spite of the fact that the reconciling theory gives a general correlation of an enormous number of phenomena in every branch of science, and that the outstanding difficulties are connected, not so much with the fundamental hypotheses that matter is composed of distinguishable entities which are capable of separate motions as with the much more difficult problem of what these entities are.

On these grounds the physicist may believe that, though he cannot handle or see them, the atoms and molecules are as real as the ice crystals in a cirrus cloud which he cannot reach; as real as the unseen members of a meteoric swarm whose death-glow is lost in the sunshine, or which sweep past us, unentangled, in the night.

If the confidence that his methods are weapons with which he can fight his way to the truth were taken from the scientific explorer, the paralysis which overcomes those who believe that they are engaged in a hopeless task would fall upon him.

Physiology has specially flourished since physiologists have believed that it is possible to master the physics and chemistry of the framework of living things, and since they have abandoned the attitude of those who placed in the foreground the doctrine of the vital force. To supporters of that doctrine the principle of life was not a hidden directing power which could perhaps whisper an order that the flood-gates of reservoirs of energy should now be opened

* 'Riddle of the Universe' (English translation), 1900, p. 380.

and now closed, and could, at the most, work only under immutable conditions to which the living and dead must alike submit. On the contrary, their vital force pervaded the organism in all its parts. It was an active and energetic opponent of the laws of physics and chemistry. It maintained its own existence not by obeying but by defying them; and though destined to be finally overcome in the separate campaigns of which each individual living creature is the scene, yet like some guerilla chieftain it was defeated here only to reappear there with unabated confidence and apparently undiminished force.

This attitude of mind checked the advance of knowledge. Difficulty could be evaded by a verbal formula of explanation which in fact explained nothing. If the mechanical, or physical, or chemical causes of a phenomenon did not lie obviously upon the surface, the investigator was tempted to forego the toil of searching for them below; it was easier to say that the vital force was the cause of the discrepancy, and that it was hopeless to attempt to account for the action of a principle which was incomprehensible in its nature.

For the physicist the danger is no less serious though it lies in a somewhat different direction. At present he is checked in his theories by the necessity of making them agree with a comparatively small number of fundamental hypotheses. If this check were removed his fancy might run riot in the wildest speculations, which would be held to be legitimate if only they led to formulæ in harmony with facts. But the very habit of regarding the end as everything, and the means by which it was attained as unimportant, would prevent the discovery of those fragments of truth which can only be uncovered by the painful process of trying to make inconsistent theories agree, and using all facts, however remote, as the tests of our central generalization.

"Science," said Helmholtz, "Science, whose very object it is to comprehend Nature, must start with the assumption that Nature is comprehensible." And again: "The first principle of the investigator of Nature is to assume that Nature is intelligible to us, since otherwise it would be foolish to attempt the investigation at all." These axioms do not assume that all the secrets of the universe will ultimately be laid bare, but that a search for them is hopeless if we undertake the quest with the conviction that it will be in vain. As applied to life they do not deny that in living matter something may be hidden which neither physics nor chemistry can explain, but they assert that the action of physical and chemical forces in living bodies can never be understood, if at every difficulty and at every check in our investigations we desist from further attempts in the belief that the laws of physics and chemistry have been interfered with by an incomprehensible vital force. As applied to physics and chemistry they do not mean that all the phenomena of life and death will ultimately be included in some simple and self-sufficing mechanical theory; they do mean that we are not to sit down contented with paradoxes such as that the same thing can fill both a large space and a little one; that matter can act where it is not, and the like, if by some reasonable hypothesis, capable of being tested by experiment, we can avoid the acceptance of these absurdities. Something will have been gained if the more obvious difficulties are removed, even if we have to admit that in the background there is much that we cannot grasp.

THE LIMITS OF PHYSICAL THEORIES.

And this brings me to my last point. It is a mistake to treat physical theories in general, and the atomic theory in particular, as though they were parts of a scheme which has failed if it leaves anything unexplained, which must be carried on indefinitely on exactly the same principles, whether the ultimate results are, or are not, repugnant to common sense.

Physical theories begin at the surface with phenomena which directly affect our senses. When they are used in the attempt to penetrate deeper into the secrets of nature it is more than probable that they will meet with insuperable barriers, but this fact does not demonstrate that the fundamental assumptions are false, and the question as to whether any particular obstacle will be forever insuperable can rarely be answered with certainty.

Those who belittle the ideas which have of late governed the advance of scientific theory too often assume that there is no alternative between the opposing assertions that atoms and the ether are mere figments of the scientific imagination, or that, on the other hand, a mechanical theory of the atoms and of the ether, which is now confessedly imperfect, would, if it could be perfected, give us a full and adequate representation of the underlying realities.

For my own part I believe that there is a *via media*.

A man peering into a darkened room, and describing what he thinks he sees, may be right as to the general outline of the objects he discerns, wrong as to their nature and their precise forms. In his description fact and fancy may be blended, and it may be difficult to say where the one ends and the other begins; but even the fancies will not be worthless if they are based on a fragment of truth, which will prevent the explorer from walking into a looking-glass or stumbling over the furniture. He who saw 'men as trees walking' had at least a perception of the fundamental fact that something was in motion around him.

And so, at the beginning of the twentieth century, we are neither forced to abandon the claim to have penetrated below the surface of nature, nor have we, with all our searching, torn the veil of mystery from the world around us.

The range of our speculations is limited both in space and time: in space, for we have no right to claim, as is sometimes done, a knowledge of the 'infinite universe'; in time, for the cumulative effects of actions which might pass undetected in the short span of years of which we have knowledge, may, if continued long enough, modify our most profound generalizations. If some such theory as the vortex-atom theory were true, the faintest trace of viscosity in the primordial medium would ultimately destroy matter of every kind. It is thus a duty to state what we believe we know in the most cautious terms, but it is equally a duty not to yield to mere vague doubts as to whether we can know anything.

If no other conception of matter is possible than that it consists of distinct physical units—and no other conception has been formulated which does not blur what are otherwise clear and definite outlines—if it is certain, as it is, that vibrations travel through space which cannot be propagated by matter, the two foundations of physical theory are well and truly laid. It may be granted that we have not yet framed a consistent image either of the nature of the atoms or of the ether in which they exist; but I have tried to show that in spite of the tentative nature of some of our theories, in spite of many outstanding difficulties, the atomic theory unifies so many facts, simplifies so much that is complicated, that we have a right to insist—at all events till an equally intelligible rival hypothesis is produced—that the main structure of our theory is true; that atoms are not merely helps to puzzled mathematicians, but physical realities.

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