

It is handsomely printed in the English language, and presents very many points of interest.

We learn from it that the Teikoku Daigaku, or Imperial university, was organized March 1, 1886, by an imperial ordinance. The former Tōkyō university and the college of engineering are merged in the present institution. The university is under the control of the minister of state for education, and depends for its revenue on annual allowances from the treasury of the imperial government. The offices of the university, the library, the colleges of law, medicine, literature, and science, the hospital attached to the college of medicine, and the dormitories of these four colleges, — all the university, in fact, except the college of engineering, which has its temporary location elsewhere, — are situated on extensive grounds near Tōkyō. In the ordinance founding the university, its object is declared to be "the teaching of such arts and sciences as are required for the purposes of the state, and the prosecution of original investigations in such arts and sciences." The president of the university is assisted by a board of councillors, who have charge of the curricula of studies and the promotion of the interests of the university and those of each college. These councillors are selected from the professors by the minister of education, each college being entitled to two. Their term of service is five years. Each college has a director or dean chosen from its professors. The academic year extends, as is usual with us, from September until June, and consists of three terms. Admission to the first-year class is only granted to such students as have completed the course in one of the high middle schools, or can pass an examination instituted by the university authorities. The marking system is in force, and elaborate rules for its regulation are given. There is also a system of elective studies, and a large number of scholarships are provided for deserving and needy students.

In connection with the medical college, a hospital is provided for the admission of such patients as may be deemed instructive cases in medical and surgical practice and investigation. The hospital contains five wards and two hundred and sixteen beds in all. Scientific investigations into the nature of 'kakke,' an endemic disease peculiar to Japan, are carried on here continually. The library — which contains 180,000 volumes — and museums are extensive and well arranged, and there is a special observatory for the study of earthquake phenomena. The general results of these observations are published from time to time in English and Japanese. There is also a botanic garden and a marine biological laboratory.

The university has now 540 students, of whom 183 are law students, 204 medical, 81 in the college of engineering, 23 in the college of literature, and 30 in the college of science. The curriculum is surprisingly comprehensive, and the announcements of courses closely resemble those of a German university. The corps of professors and lecturers includes a number of Europeans and Americans, as well as many natives who have obtained degrees either in this country or in Europe. Among the universities and colleges represented by graduates on the faculty are those of Berlin, Paris, London, Strasburg, Leipzig, Erlangen, Heidelberg, Dublin, Göttingen, Freiberg, Glasgow, St. Andrews, Edinburgh, and Munich in Europe, and Columbia, Yale, Harvard, Johns Hopkins, Michigan, Cornell, Hamilton, Amherst, and Stevens institute in this country.

ALEXANDER'S PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY.

So much of the philosophical writing of the day is either barren repetition or empty rhetoric, that it is something of a surprise to find a book on pure philosophy, written by a man who not only has a definite end in view, but who knows what that end is; and who, to reach that end, has not found it necessary to get together a laborious treatise on the human mind or a huge encyclopaedia of ethical science. In one hundred and seventy pages, Professor Alexander has given us a little work of real timeliness and value. For clearness and profundity of thought, deftness of presentation, and lucidity of style, Professor Alexander's book is not surpassed by any philosophical work of similar scope in the language. We are gratified to miss in it cumbrous terminologies, involved sentences, and inapposite illustrations. It is so simple, frank, and straightforward, that it will appeal to a large class of thoughtful men who are accustomed to sneer at philosophy and its devotees.

The various chapters are themselves so tersely worded, that any summary of them that would be just and at the same time much shorter than the chapters themselves, is impossible.

The opening chapter, 'The difficulties of philosophy,' strikes the keynote of the book. The author shows that many so-called philosophical difficulties are not difficulties at all, but simple fictions, originated by ignorant or superficial persons, who set them forth 'as lightly as they tell an after-dinner story.' Professor Alexander very justly refuses to spend his time in criticising such

Some problems of philosophy. By ARCHIBALD ALEXANDER, Ph.D. New York, Scribner. 16°.

views, and remarks that "a man who has not learned the alphabet is usually deficient in a knowledge of grammar. A surgeon who does not know anatomy is not likely to inspire confidence. The philosophical dilettante who plunges into the solution of problems of great importance without scientific preparation may be left to the task of 'drawing out leviathan with a hook,' and one need not be disturbed if his unsuccessful efforts lead him to the conclusion that 'metaphysics' is obscure, useless, and irreligious." The author then takes up the three ways of viewing metaphysical questions, — the sceptical, the dogmatic, and the critical, — describes each, and implicitly accepts for himself the latter method and the stand-point of Kant. In fact, Professor Alexander's thought is interesting as illustrating a 'return to Kant' which does not necessarily imply a return to Hegel.

In the seventeen brief chapters which follow, the author formulates according to the critical method some of the most important philosophical difficulties as they appear to him. He does not do this with the intention of prejudicing any particular answer to each, but rather, we suspect, to show that "a year's study of a text-book of mental philosophy is *not* all that is necessary to put a man *en rapport* with the state of thought in the present." Professor Alexander's use of the formal logic is excellent, and serves to show what a formidable weapon that much-decried science may become in the hands of an experienced craftsman. In no instance, although disjunctions, dilemmas, syllogisms, and enthymemes occur on almost every page, have we come upon any logical slip or fallacy, though unquestionably specific points in the various arguments may be disputed on psychological or metaphysical grounds.

As an example of the author's method, we quote the conclusion (p. 38) of his chapter on 'The problem of the ultimate nature of matter:' "It is impossible, so far as we know, to separate the fact of force and the fact of causality. One is not found without the other. Wherever there is an effect, there is a manifestation of force. Wherever there is a cause, there is an exercise of force. When, therefore, we attempt to explain matter by referring to force, we are obliged to explain force by referring to causality; and in explaining causality we cannot refer to material phenomena, but are obliged to fall back on the *a priori* law of causality, which is not given by experience."

On the question of the place of physiological psychology, the author speaks plainly, and, it seems to us, with sound common sense. He remarks (p. 63) that "there are two common mistakes, — one, the denunciation of physiological

methods by men who have never seen a ganglion-cell; the other, the denunciation of subjective methods by men who have never given an hour to introspection. It does not appear to be necessary, however, that a knowledge of one set of facts should be incompatible with knowledge of the other set. A combination of the two is the ideal psychology."

It is interesting to find Professor Alexander proving (pp. 64, 65) that "it is possible that it is rational to accept what is irrational because it is more rational to trust the authority for what is thought to be irrational than to place our own reason above such an authority." The admission of this conclusion into the arena of scientific debate would be an effectual blow to those self-sufficient investigators who find as many criteria of truth as there are minds.

We should be glad to point out several other portions of this book that we conceive to be the most interesting, but lack of space forbids this. On the argument by which the author tries to show the atheistic meaning of pantheism (p. 121), however, two points of possible criticism suggest themselves. In showing, that, if a plurality of principles is admitted, pantheism, which admits but one principle, falls, Professor Alexander says, "The existence of human persons with conflicting purposes cannot be explained without asserting (on the pantheistic hypothesis, of course) that there is opposition between the parts of God, i.e., a plurality of principles." Would not the same argument prove that the human *ego* is plural? For we certainly find conflicting motives and principles in our own minds. Again, may not the opposition spoken of be only apparent, and the result of our insufficient insight or lack of knowledge? May it not be a part of a real and higher harmony of which our limited faculties are not cognizant?

At the conclusion of the same argument (p. 122), Professor Alexander, having already shown, that, if the pantheistic God is either material or ideal, atheism is the logical consequence, adds, "If the universe, i.e., God, is both material and ideal, then, in so far as God is material, the objection urged as to materialistic pantheism is applicable; and in so far as God is ideal, the objection urged against idealistic pantheism is applicable." Is this treatment by partition valid? Is it possible to separate a compound, and reason about its various constituents as separate entities or qualities, and not as parts of another and more complex whole? It seems to us not. We cannot say that water, in so far as it is oxygen, will do thus and so, and, in so far as it is hydrogen, will do something else. Water is a new compound, and it develops new properties as water, which are not

represented by adding together the properties of oxygen and hydrogen. Suppose, then, that the assumed combination of material and ideal in God give a new set of properties: are they given recognition in this treatment by partition? We are not impugning in any way Professor Alexander's conclusion, but simply stating some objections that have occurred to us as to his method of reaching it.

The concluding chapter, on the 'Doctrine of cause and effect,' is both the longest and most finished in the book. It is a concise and admirable summary of the historical aspect of the doctrine of causation from the pre-Socratic philosophers to Mill and Spencer, and a profoundly suggestive indication of the true theory of cause and effect. All of Professor Alexander's work is thoroughly well done, and we regret to see that not a few typographical errors have crept into an otherwise model piece of book-making. We trust that the book will have a wide circulation, for it will be found an excellent mental tonic as well as an emphatic protest against the philosophical dilettantism now so current. N. M. B.

A NEW EDITION OF JUVENAL.

AN edition of Juvenal that should be sufficiently practical for the college class-room, while embodying the latest results of classical research and criticism, has for several years been greatly needed. It is therefore with interest that one turns to the present work in the hope of finding a happy medium between the too fine-spun commentary of Simcox and the too rudimentary treatment adopted by Hardy.

Apart from the typography, the book is a disappointment. The notes contain nothing whatever that is new, being too evidently condensed and simplified from Mayor, and are so desultory and ill-assorted as not even to deserve credit for judicious selection and arrangement. Moreover, real difficulties, both of syntax and exegesis, are passed over, while an inordinate amount of space is given to the elucidation of matters that ought to be familiar to any intelligent school-boy. How meagre are the grammatical notes, may be seen from the fact that on the 171 lines of the first satire there are but two; on the 322 lines of the seventh, with its fourteen pages of commentary, there are but two; and on the 365 lines of the tenth there is only one. When the editors do venture to elucidate some syntactical peculiarity, it is always one that would seem to need no com-

ment whatsoever: as, for instance, the vivid use of the imperfect subjunctive in vii. 69, 70; or the *by no means* extraordinary employment of the indicative in x. 123; while peculiarities like the metrical *quis* in xii. 48, and the implied *ut* from *ne* in xvi. 9, are still untouched. But, on the other hand, there is a superabundance of commentary like the following on xvi. 14:— "*Grandes magna ad subsellia*: the bench had to be ponderous to support its huge occupant."

An important feature of this edition is the professedly idiomatic translations sprinkled through every page. These are not intended to be paraphrases, for they are enclosed in quotation-marks; and, besides, a paraphrase is elsewhere prefixed to each satire. One instance of this extraordinary rendering will probably suffice. Satire vii. 36 is *translated*, "Now hear the rich man's tricks. To avoid subscribing to you, he poses as a fellow-poet, and trusts to the maxim that 'dog does not eat dog.'"

The editors have very commendably refrained from the absurd expurgation that disfigures so many college editions of Juvenal. Excessive expurgation only excites prurient curiosity; while it so emasculates the author as to make it quite impossible for the reader to claim any real acquaintance with Juvenal as he is, or to understand the bitterness and the motive of his *saeva indignatio*, from the perusal of these fragments of the scattered poet.

The introductions, the summary of a paper by Professor Nettleship, and a brief account of the Codex Pithoeanus, are interesting; but why discuss the Codex Pithoeanus in a work of so elementary a character as this last edition of Rome's greatest satirist? H. T. PECK.

EDWARDS'S DIFFERENTIAL CALCULUS.

A NEW text-book on the differential calculus comes from the press of Macmillan & Co. It resembles, in size and appearance, the well-known works of Todhunter and Williamson. An exceedingly satisfactory introductory treatment is secured by a close adherence to one point of view, that of limiting ratios. The symbols *dy* and *dx* are not used apart, nor the meaning of such a use explained, until the formulas of partial differentiation in chapter vi. prevent any further postponement. In this way, however, there is lost the advantage of exhibiting the variety of original conception and breadth of foundation distinguishing this branch of mathematics, — an advantage,

Differential calculus, with applications and numerous examples. By JOSEPH EDWARDS, M.A. New York, Macmillan. 8°.

Thirteen satires of Juvenal: with introduction and notes. By C. H. PEARSON, M.A., and HERBERT A. STRONG, M.A., LL.D. Oxford, Clarendon pr. 12°.