It is my conviction that the hypothesis of pangenesis, both in its original form and in all its subsequent modifications, has been definitely set aside. In its place we have the theory that the nature of the germ, i.e., of the impregnated ovum of each species, is the same over and over, not because there is in each case a similar collocation of gemmules or plastidules, but because the chromatine perpetuates itself, so that the same kind of chromatine is found in the one generation as in the generations preceding it and following it. The child is like the parents, because its organization is regulated by not merely similar, but by some of the same, chromatine as that of the parents. Perhaps, instead of chromatine we ought to say, in order to avoid an unjustifiable explicitness, nuclear substance.

When it is recalled that heredity is one of the fundamental phenomena of life, and that hitherto we have seen no hopeful way leading to its comprehension, we can understand the delight with which biologists welcome the new theory and its rich promises.

Charles Sedgwick Minot.

ROSMINI'S PSYCHOLOGY.

This is the sixth volume of the translation which Rosmini's English disciples have undertaken to make of his principal writings, — a labor of devotion surely, not only by reason of the mere pains involved, but in view of the probable thanklessness of the English-reading public for whose sake they are all taken. When one thinks of the mere quantity of labor which Rosmini accomplished in his not long life, one cannot refuse to him the title of being one of the very small number of intellectual giants of the world. He is of the race of the Aristotles, the St. Thomases, the Leibnitzes, the Kants, and the Hegels. The mere cogitative energy of him, too, is fully equal to theirs. Every page he writes is filled with thinking as hard, subtle, and original as theirs; and his style is as clear and flowing as theirs is usually the reverse. His learning is prodigious too. In short, he is a miracle of intellectual force, compared with whom a mere reviewer's mind is as a midge against an elephant. But Rosmini is a dead giant, and the reviewer can have it his own way with him, because he is alive, and writes for readers taught by all their Lockian and Protestant education to treat the kind of thing that Rosmini represents - thoroughgoing, concatenated, and systematic ontologizing and theologizing by the conceptions of principle and term, substance and essence and act — as 'scholastic jargon,' and so to

Psychology. By Antonio Rosmini Serbati. Vol. ii, London, Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1885. 8°.

close their ears. Scholastic jargon, too, it seems to this reviewer; only he has a bad conscience about saying it so shortly, and therewith turning Rosmini over to the disdain of many of our native philistines who at bottom are spiritually unfit to loosen his shee. The last word has not yet been said about scholasticism. We are all scholastics without knowing it, so sure as we talk of things and acts and essence and force. But we don't elaborate our scholasticism, because Locke taught us that to do so led to no practical use. only practical gain which accrues to a scholastic from his elaboration of what we all believe, is what Rosmini calls "the experience in himself of a kind of jubilation and felicity, which is so peculiar as to be unlike any other feeling and to bear testimony to its infinite source." This is the rapture of all intellectual order and harmony; but our race would willingly part with it, if only thereby it could buy a new way of peeling potatoes, or of teaching children how to read. We renounce one thing, scholasticism another. not that the distinctions made by Rosmini and other scholastics are false. On the contrary, they seem for the most part true. They are one way of seeing and naming the facts of life. But they are sterile: we can deduce from them no immediate practical receipts. To peel potatoes, we must look at other aspects of the world than substantiality and accidentality and the distinction between immanent and transient acts. Many are the aspects of every bit of reality, and all are equally true. But each carries us a different way. By a succession of accidents modern critics and men of science have stumbled on the aspects which lead to the ways of foreseeing and handling particular material events. Together, these aspects form the armament of the scientific and positivistic view of life, a hodge-podge of which we moderns are very proud, but of which, great as the practical fruits are, the speculative dignity leaves much to be desired. Maybe some disciple of Rosmini may show a path down from his categories to the practical details of life. It were sad that such strenuous and in many ways such exquisite thinking as his should be among the mere superfluities of human history. W. J.

CLERKE'S HISTORY OF ASTRONOMY.

This is in some respects a remarkable book, and takes its place at once in importance beside Grant's 'History of physical astronomy,' which it in a measure supplements. No clearer indication

A popular history of astronomy during the nineteenth century. By Agnes M. Clerke. Edinburgh, Black, 1885.