to put upon paper the rather searching register of replies.

The narrowest scope of inquiry, to be of any value, must embrace three generations; but the results will be far more reliable when they cover four. The latter would relate to at least thirty-six persons, which Mr. Galton reckons as follows: "On the side of the contributor there are his two parents, four grand-parents, an average of three uncles and aunts on each of the two sides, three brothers or sisters, and himself: this makes sixteen persons. There is another set of sixteen for the relatives of his wife in the same degrees. Lastly, I allow an average of four children." A single family register of this size, therefore, at least involves the filling-out of nearly thirty-six of the schedules, which will be no light task, even with the most favorable opportunities of obtaining information. The persons whom Mr. Galton anticipates will assist him the most are young physicians, married and with children. In case the grand-parents are living, their field of information will naturally be very wide. Partly as an inducement to men of this class to undertake such a task, partly as a pecuniary return for the time which it must necessarily occupy, a series of prizes will be offered, amounting, altogether, to £500, including, probably, ten prizes of £25 each, and others not to exceed £50 nor fall short of £5. The returns are to be sent with mottoes, but no signature; the name and address to be enclosed in a separate envelope bearing the motto. The merit of the returns will be estimated by the clearness and exhaustiveness of statement, the number of generations treated of, and the appendix (see beyond).

The returns asked for are in abstract as follows: 1. A separate and full biological history of each member of the family in the direct line of ascent; 2. A very brief statement of the main biological facts in the lives of members of the collateral lines of ascent, that is, of the uncles and aunts, great-uncles and great-aunts, etc.; 3. A full description of the main sources of information for 1 and 2; 4. An appendix which will include an analysis of the medical history of the family, showing the peculiarities which have, and have not, been transmitted, and their identical or changed form. All communications to be addressed to Francis Galton, 42 Rutland Gate, London (S. W.), England.

Mr. Galton has reduced the collection of statistics to a fine art, having arranged this schedule with the greatest ingenuity. The near and remote relationships are indicated by simple symbols; and, by means of horizontal and transverse columns, the required facts can be condensed into an astonishingly small space. Each schedule is intended to cover six periods in the life of the person described, from childhood to late in life, and at each of these periods to give a statement of, *A*, conditions of life; *B*, personal description; *C*, medical life-history. Under *A* are such topics as town or country residence, and sanitary influences generally. Under *B* are descriptions of feature and physique, of habits of work and muscular force and quickness, keenness of sight and dexterity, artistic and allied capacities, peculiarities of character and temperament. Under *C* are diseases, accidents, malformations, age at death, etc. Other facts solicited are, order of birth, age at marriage, number and sex of children. All this is upon one side of a double sheet, and relates to one person in the direct line of ascent. Upon the reverse of the sheet, similar inquiries are made in the collateral lines, or among the brothers and sisters of the person described.

Mr. Galton believes that the interest in each family register will increase rapidly as the investigation goes on, and family histories will result of far more accuracy than could be collected in any less methodical system. The scheme is so much more comprehensive than any thing which has preceded it, that it certainly promises us a much deeper insight into the laws of heredity than we have at present. The moral value of this, and, in fact, of much of the life-work of this author, lies in the dissemination of the stern truth, which is as old as the Mosaic law, that the character of the next generation depends, perhaps, less than we are apt to think upon the education and training we prepare for them, and more upon the life-conduct of the present and the preceding generations.

HENRY F. OSBORN.

MAUDSLEY'S BODY AND WILL.

Body and will: being an essay concerning will in its metaphysical, physiological, and pathological aspects. By HENRY MAUDSLEY, M.D. London, *Kegan Paul, Trench, & Co.*, 1883. 8+333 p. 8°.

CONSIDERED with respect to its announced purpose, this book is one of the most unfortunate and disappointing that we have ever seen bearing the name of an able man on the titlepage. The purpose, as set forth on the titlepage and in the preface, seems indeed a noble one. Of will, in its pathological aspect at least, Dr. Maudsley has, one would suppose, the best possible right to speak. And we all have so much to learn about all its aspects, that we come to the book, even after previous experience of the author's eccentricities, with hope of getting some real instruction. That the freedom of the will is to be discussed, we learn without fear: for, old as the topic is, an ingenious man may have something new to say about it; and a straightforward statement of the doctrine of determinism, made from the physiological point of view, may well be useful and instructive, even if it should fail to be new. But, with much more interest than he feels in the promised wrangle over the freedom of the will, the student of psychology looks forward to what is promised in the preface, where Dr. Maudsley tells us that he has long been engaged in dealing with "concrete minds, that must be observed, studied, and managed;" that he has been trying to find out "why individuals feel, think, and do as they do, how they may be actuated to feel, think, and do differently, and in what way best to deal with them so as to do one's duty to one's self and them." In consequence, he says, "I have no choice but to leave the barren heights of speculation for the plains on which men live and move and have their being." He desires, then, "to bring home to mental philosophers the necessity of taking serious account of a class of facts and thoughts which, though they are

not philosophy, may claim not to be ignored by philosophy.'' All this means, if it means any thing, that we may expect from Dr. Maudsley some results of his experience with the laws of human will, some concrete psychology, —such, for instance, as, in case of certain phenomena of sensation and memory, Mr. Galton has given us, in the book that we lately reviewed on 'Human faculty.' Mr. Galton's work has been confined mainly to the lower phenomena of mind. How great the gain, if we can get scientific research to give us correspondingly fruitful results about the higher phenomena of mind! We hope, of course, for nothing final, or as yet very exact, in this field: but Dr. Maudsley will surely offer us something; and his announcement is just such as a sober observer of a special class of facts might be expected to make, in case he had found out something well worth telling. As for the author's denunciation of speculation, we need not be haters of philosophy to overlook or pardon that. The most enthusiastic student of general philosophy ought to admit freely the vast importance to him, also, of just such concrete study of mind as Dr. Maudsley announces; and if Dr. Maudsley has found the heights of speculation barren, then surely he will keep off them, and will tell us what he has to tell so much the better. We reserve, then, our own right to study general philosophy if we find it fruitful; and we just now follow him eagerly to the green pastures of concrete psychology, where he is to give us the result of special study.

We are doomed to bitter disappointment. The book consists of three parts. The first, on 'Will in its metaphysical aspects,' fills ninety-eight pages, and contains a restatement of the bare commonplaces of modern thought on the relation of mind and organism, a like restatement of the oldest and most commonplace of the deterministic arguments, a barren criticism of the oldest and most commonplace arguments for free will, and finally, scattered throughout this discussion in all sorts of wearisome digressions, a string of purely speculative reflections, so confused, so full of contradiction, so ill expressed, that they would be unworthy to pass as the thesis of a fairly instructed student of philosophy in his second year's work.

The second part of the book (pp. 99–232, with four pages of notes) opens far more promisingly, with a good chapter on the 'Physiological basis of will.' But thereafter, at once the discussion sinks back into its native confusion. We are to learn about the 'physiological, sociological, and evolutional relations' of the will; and we have a series of the commonplaces of recent discussion, together with another mass of confused speculations, as full as before of digressions. Mr. Spencer, who is not named, is yet several times referred to very severely as a dangerous speculator; but the most obscure expressions of Mr. Spencer's worst moments are bright sunlight to the gloom of these long and tedious sentences, and his speculations are surely as likely to be good as his rival's.

The third part, at last, on 'Will in its pathological relations,' leads us into the light once more. Here, at least, we have a few concrete instances brought together, and generalizations made from facts, and plainly stated. But how little we learn! The space left is short; and the author's lucid interval ends with the beginning of the last chapter, which he entitles 'What will be the end thereof?' and which he devotes to speculations on the way in which human life will degenerate before its final cessation on this planet.

And so, of the whole, only about one hundred pages, or less than one-third of the book, may be considered as having any real relation to the implied promise of the preface. The rest is simply the 'barren speculation' which we were to avoid, or else it is repetition in obscure language of what has many times been said in clear language.

But we must illustrate, for we are aware that a man of Dr. Maudsley's reputation might be expected to do better than we have here represented him as doing. First, then, as to the 'barren speculation.' Surely, if a man desires to let questions alone, he can very easily do so. Yet Dr. Maudsley goes out of his way, in the first part, to write a chapter on the 'Authority of consciousness.' He goes out of his way, we say; for, in so far as concerns his problem of the freedom of the will, the authority of consciousness might have been very briefly and specially treated. But, once having determined to take up the question generally, Dr. Maudsley runs on in this wise. Self-consciousness, he first tells us, is no more immediate knowledge than is the knowledge of external objects through the senses; since the latter knowledge consists of states of consciousness, as well as does the former. This, of course, is Kant's famous 'Refutation of idealism' in a nutshell. But now, both of these kinds of knowledge being knowledge of facts that are in consciousness, we ask what the truth of this consciousness is, or how we shall test its truth. We learn something about this matter farther on, on p. 41, where we find that

"there is no rule to distinguish between true and false but the common judgment of mankind," that (p. 42) "the truth of one age is the fable of the next," and that "the common mind of the race in me" — "common sense, which is more sensible than any individual in all cases (save in the exceptional case of a pre-eminently gifted person of genius)" — is the warrant to which we appeal for the truth of all our beliefs. This would look very much as if, in case one is not a pre-eminently gifted person of genius, one must be unable to know whether either he himself or the external world exists, unless he first discover that 'the common judgment of mankind' agrees with him that both do exist. This is a curious reversal of the familiar fashion of reasoning; since the 'mankind' to whom one is to appeal, surely belongs to the external world, to whose existence its 'common judgment' is to testify. Yet we must be doing Dr. Maudsley wrong. One must not take every statement so exactly. His real theory is expressed on p. 45. Here it is: "Every thing which we know is a synthesis of object and subject. . . . Neither *matter in itself* nor *mind in itself* are words that have any meaning. . . . The hypothesis of an external world is a good working hypothesis within all human experience: but to ask whether the external world exists apart from all human experience is about as sensible a question as to ask whether the shadow belongs to the sun or to the man's body; for what an extraordinarily perverse and futile ingenuity it is to attempt to think any thing outside human consciousness. . . . *To say there is an absolute* [the italics are ours], *and to call it the unknowable, is it a whit more philosophical than* it would be for a bluebottle-fly to call its extra-relational the unbuzzable?" P. 46 goes on to say, "A separation of subject and object cannot ever be the starting-point of a philosophy that is not a self-foolery." P. 47 adds, that what Berkeley called an idea "is a synthesis, the *ego* and *non-ego* necessary correlate." All this is perfectly clear by itself, much clearer than the text in which it is embedded; and the sense of it is, of course, pure phenomenism, such as Schopenhauer expressed in his '*kein objekt ohne subjekt.*' Matter is for consciousness, and consciousness is of objects. Spencer's unknowable is nonsense, — a product of perverse ingenuity, worthy of bluebottle-flies. One must not attempt to think of any thing outside of human cousciousness; and so we have a doctrine.

No, not at all. Dr. Maudsley does not mean this. P. 51 is not far from p. 47; and yet, on p. 51, the author assures us that "the external world as it is in itself may not be in the least like what we conceive it through our modes of perception and forms of thought." On pp. 52 and 53, Dr. Maudsley outdoes this contradiction by bringing the two contradictories face to face on the same open page, and affirming them both at once with childlike simplicity. "I don't want to think the *thing in itself*. . . . If it is out of me, it does not exist for me, cannot possibly be more than a nonsensical word in any expression of me; and for me to think it out of me, as it is in itself, would be annihilation of myself." But all this, says Dr. Maudsley, teaches him that there *is* a great deal outside of his perception, 'a real world external to me,' of which, however, he can say nothing. So Spencer's rejected unknowable returns: the mind is necessarily obliged to think what it cannot possibly think, to believe in what it perceives to be nonsense, and to assert in one sentence that 'self and the world cannot be thought apart,' and, in the next sentence, that the real external world is so far beyond self that self is wholly unable to make any assertion, save that it exists.

Now, this is not a collection of statements found in various authors, and brought together by Dr. Maudsley for the sake of illustrating the 'barrenness' of the subject. On the contrary, these are his own views. He himself chooses to write a chapter on this topic. He is bringing home to the philosophers something that they need to know. He is dealing with "doctrines arrived at by the positive methods of observation and induction." If not, what does the preface mean? and what has the innocent reader done, that he should be trifled with in this intolerable way? But if in reality Dr. Maudsley is expounding doctrines arrived at by the methods of observation and induction, these doctrines ought not to change nature with every new paragraph. These statements are deliberate and repeated, they are made with much show of earnestness; and yet they are a series of contradictions, and leave the reader feeling as if some one had been trying to make a fool of him. As for this doctrine, that it is "perverse and futile to think of any thing outside of human consciousness" (p. 45), how does Dr. Maudsley venture thus solemnly to propound it and enlarge upon it, when elsewhere, and not far off, he repeatedly insists upon the view that human consciousness is inexplicable, save on the basis of an *unconscious* mental life, which can *never be exhaustively known* at all? Is the relation of author and reader one that involves no responsibilities?

Were not this confusion of statement typical, we should not insist upon it. But throughout the book one finds, if not always such flat contradictions, still a certain slipperiness and uncertainty about nearly every general doctrine that the author chooses to express, on all but the most concrete matters of fact. If he says a thing, you know not when or how soon he will withdraw it, wholly, or bit by bit. He thinks, for instance, that the belief in the vanity of all things, or pessimism, is a 'malady of self-consciousness,' a sign of mental decay; but he adds, that the 'central truth of all religions' is a conviction of the utter vanity of all things, and himself seems in great measure a pessimist. Pure Christianity teaches the noblest virtues, — those, for instance, of self-sacrifice; but the only test of virtue is the experience and common sense of mankind; and these teach us that pure Christianity, put in practice without stint, would render society impossible, since society depends upon conflicts and selfishness even now. The noblest virtues are therefore those that are rejected when the only test of virtue is applied. And so we are led on.

The same tendency appears in the very style of the book. When the author has a definite opinion, he likes to conceal it from you under manifold cloaks of language. He dislikes Spencer's doctrine, that organic evolution is 'progressive adaptation to the environment.' This, he says, is too vague and one-sided a statement. His own statement avoids all vagueness by saying that (p. 137) "an organism and its medium, when they have reached a certain fitness of one to the other and hit upon the happy concurrence of conditions, combine, so to speak, to make a new start, the initial step of a more complex organism;" that is, the organism evolves by evolution, and the evolution is caused by just those conditions that bring it to pass. Our author expands this thought, which he intends as an important complement to the doctrine of natural selection, over quite a number of pages. But that, in the famous words of the Duchess in Alice's Adventures, is not half so bad as our author can do if he tries. Religion he defines (on p. 208) as 'the deep fusing feeling of human solidarity.' Certain beliefs common among men are described (p. 198) as "the imaginative interpretations of an instinct springing into consciousness from the upward striving impulse which, immanent in man as part and crown of organic nature, ever throbs in his heart as the inspiration of hope." Thus our author knows of an instinct that springs from an impulse, which impulse is immanent in a crown, and at the same time strives upwards, and throbs in a heart as an inspiration. All this means, not mere carelessness of style, but a more serious error, else we should not have mentioned it here. It means haziness of thought; it means that our author can write many words in succession without knowing, in any adequate way, what they mean.

Our author's fashion of discussing things of which he is ignorant receives a crowning illustration in his last chapter; and, remote as the topic is from the main subject, we must mention this illustration here, because such matters are important to any student who is seeking a trustworthy guide. In this last chapter Dr. Maudsley has much to say of certain modern tendencies that he considers unhealthy. Of these, one is the excessive display of grief for the dead, which he thinks is growing among us. "Nobody of the least note dies but we are told with clamor of grief . . . that the most amiable . . . the best of men has been taken from us." But nobody, says Dr. Maudsley, is worth all this. "Contrast this modern incontinence of emotion with the calm, chaste, and manly simplicity of Homer; as we observe it, for example, in his description of the death of Achilles." Then follows a page of blank verse, which, of course, is offered to us as somebody's translation of the cited passage from Homer. Now, Dr. Maudsley was not obliged to say any thing about Homer, much less to quote him. He has gone out of his way to tell us, with an air of easily carried learning, what 'we see' in Homer. When a man thus pretends to quote the father of song, whose poems are at hand in all sorts of translations in any library, and to quote him especially for the sake of illustrating a certain important point, a reader supposes, of course, that the quotation will at least be a fairly accurate expression of something that Homer said. But, in fact, nothing resembling the passage quoted is to be found anywhere in Homer. These verses are not even so much as a remote imitation of any thing Homeric that bears upon Achilles. We ourselves are unable to identify them, but their tone is distinctly very modern; and we have little doubt that their author is now alive, or has very recently died.[1] But this is not all. To complete the blunder, Dr. Maudsley, in

[1] A classical friend, to whom we submitted Dr. Maudsley's quotation after we had written the above, assures us that the passage nearest to this one in ancient poetry is the death of Achilles as described in Quintus Smyrnaeus III., and that Quintus's description itself differs in so many important points from that of Dr. Maudsley's Homer as to make the latter not even a fair imitation of any ancient model.

this reference to Homer, has unwittingly chosen the worst possible illustration for his purpose, quite apart from his supposed quotation: for Homer does indeed tell us, in one passage (in the last book of the Odyssey), about the death of Achilles; but that passage informs us of a seventeen-days mourning of gods and men over the hero, with funeral ceremonies of extraordinary splendor, that would have done the dead man's heart good if he could only have been there to see. Nobody doubts Homer's simplicity, but Dr. Maudsley wholly misapprehends what it means. How he could have been so deceived in his quotation, we cannot guess; but such gratuitous blunders show us what to expect of a man that can make them.

If we have little space left to refer to our author's discussion of matters that he is eminently competent to discuss, that is not our fault. On the pathology of the will we receive instruction in the brief space before spoken of. Of heredity of mental disease we here find some illustrations, but we learn nothing new about the obscure subject of the actual laws that govern heredity. As to mental disease and its phenomena, Dr. Maudsley insists with considerable emphasis upon his view that the will, and in particular the most developed activity of the will, as seen in the moral consciousness of the civilized man, is the least stable, because the highest and latest element of man's mind, and must therefore show the signs of decay and disease soonest. This, he assures us, is actually the case. He illustrates his position by means of a good many instances of certain forms of mental disease. The view is not absolutely novel, and Dr. Maudsley has described most of the facts before. But all this is well worth telling, and would have made a useful essay if the rest of the book had reached the fire instead of the printer. As it is, this part of the book is the only one from which a student of such psychology as Dr. Maudsley so well describes in his preface can learn any thing of importance that is in any sense novel.

Our task in reading and reviewing has been no pleasant one. With Dr. Maudsley we hope for a psychology of 'concrete minds,' that may teach us "why individuals feel, think, and do as they do, how they may be actuated to think, feel, and do differently, and in what way best to deal with them so as to do one's duty to one's self and them" We see in the humblest experimental researches conscientiously conducted, in every observation of the mental pathologist, in every advance in nervous physiology, in every new discovery in animal psychology, and, let us freely add, in every fruitful philosophic research into the deeper problems of thought, in all these things, not only aids, but necessary conditions of the approach to the great end thus defined. But we also see in vague rambling disquisitions *de omnibus rebus*, such as nearly fill this book; in efforts at philosophy by a man who is confessedly and very manifestly unable to understand philosophic terms, who ignores the history of thought, and who insists upon writing pages of contradictory statements, — in all this we see, not advance, but serious injury. And when not only the book is such as it is, but also the author is a man whose position and previous services command respect, and who is therefore able to call the attention of busy students to whatever he may choose to publish upon the subject, — then we say that such conduct is a serious breach of the privileges of authorship, and we wish to raise a decided protest against it. For the rest we have no quarrel with the author's determinism, nor with his materialistic basis for mental science, so long as he confines both the doctrines to their only proper sphere; that is, employs them as regulative principles in discussing and explaining the facts of experience. We quarrel only with his confused and purposeless fashion of discussion.

NOTES AND NEWS.

— The report of the committee of the Geodetic association was presented at a general meeting of the conference, Oct. 23, at Rome, and was adopted after an animated debate. The report favors the universal adoption of the Greenwich meridian, and also recommends, as the point of departure of the universal hour and cosmopolitan dates, the mean noon of Greenwich. The conference hopes, that, if the whole world agrees to the unification of longitudes and hours by accepting the Greenwich meridian, England will advance the unification of weights and measures by joining the metrical convention of 1875. The government of Italy will be requested to officially communicate the foregoing action of the conference to all nations.

— In the October number of the *Harvard university bulletin*, further instalments are given of the geographical index to the maps in *Petermann's mittheilungen*, by Mr. Bliss, and of Mr. Winsor's 'Bibliography of Ptolemy's geography,' containing important notes on early American cartography. Mr. Winsor also commences an account, of which six pages are printed in the present number, of the Kohl collection of early maps in the Department of state at Washington, prefacing it with a brief account of Dr. Kohl's labors.

In the official portion of the bulletin, we find the following appointments gazetted: Arthur Searle as