Proletarianization in Western Europe and India: concepts and methods

Jan Lucassen
International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam
(jlu@iisg.nl)

The Rise, Organization, and Institutional Framework of Factor Markets
Workshop Global Economic History Network (GEHN)
Utrecht 23-25 June 2005

ROUGH DRAFT 15 June 2005

PLEASE DO NOT QUOTE

Table of Contents:

1. Preliminary remarks

The theme of this conference is the rise, organization, and institutional framework of factor markets which for the factor 'labour' boils down to the questions precisely where and when and under what circumstances 'the rise of wage labour' has taken place. More in particular this problem is related to two sets of sub-questions. The first sub-question regards the ownership of, the right to, and the transfer of labour. According to the organizers >[f]or labour markets these include facilities for job training and education, formal and informal rules for hiring and firing, and instruments for the monitoring of labourers'. The second sub-question regards the relationship between political structures and the development of the labour market.[1]

For conceptual as well as for practical reasons I will concentrate on two parts of the world: Western Europe and Asia, in particular India. The choice to compare such contrasting parts of the world like Europe and Asia does not need elaborate explanations for this conference, which seems to take place in the shadow of the debate on *The Great Diverge*. Nevertheless, I want to point to the differences that according to some authors exist between labour markets in Europe and the rest of the world. David Eltis is very outspoken on this point: 'group or corporate rights have been the global norm, a norm from which Western Europe diverged in the Early Modern Period because property rights [Y], especially those in human labor, [Y] were vested in the individual in Europe rather than the group.=[2] Europeans not only organised chattel slavery for productive purposes in the Americas (the topic of Eltis' book) but also increasingly relied on 'the peculiar institution (in global terms) of waged labor'.[3] Characteristic was the movement of labourers within and beyond the subcontinent with considerable ease relative to anywhere else.

Eltis is an excellent specialist in labour migrations and labour relations in the Atlantic world, but B fortunately for this conference B it still remains to be seen whether India really meets the 'global' characteristics of Eltis. The Indian case in the period after 1500 is worthwhile studying for a number of reasons. India and Europe did not differ extremely in surface, populations size and even (for most of the time) in urbanization rates, besides both subcontinents of the Eurasian land-mass counted a fair number of different polities, were monetized, and were integrated in world economics B India also independently from European trade for a long time. Comparisons between Europe and India also offer an alternative to the ones made by Eltis and are promising because the Indian caste system seems to be a good example of labour relations vested in group instead of in individual rights. Last but not least for this country much relevant work has been done which is readily accessible, not the least in the *Indian Economic and Social History Review*.[4]

The assumptions of scholars who study the labour market seem to diverge into two opposite directions.[5] Social and in particular labour historians using the concept of proletarianization tend to stress the negative aspects of the process, i.e. the growing dependence and alienation of weak wage labourers, victims of the exploitation by strong employers. Economic historians to the contrary see the development of markets, including the

[1] Quoted from the *Revised preliminary programme* of this conference, 12 May 2005.
[2] Eltis 2000, 18-23; quotations on 21.
[3] Eltis 2000, 18.
[4] I am well aware of my limitations, stemming from the combined facts that I am a social and not economic historian, and that most of my life I have studied European history, while being a novice in Indian history.
[5] See also Grantham 1994, 1 and 3.

labour market, as 'a crucial element in the long-term growth of economies', in particular because of the chances for 'technological change and specialization'.[6] These differences go back at least to the diverging opinions of the classical authors in the period between Adam Smith and Karl Marx. I will refrain from even summarizing the arguments - both the most extreme formulations and the numerous intermediate positions that have been taken - but at the outset it is important to point to these diverging approaches.

Notwithstanding these differences in interpretation and in the assessment of the consequences of proletarianisation both social or labour historians and economic historians are interested in methods to determine to what degree people are and were dependent on wage labour.[7] This question will be at the heart of the paper. For wide-ranging comparisons like this one, conceptual and methodological discussions should precede any presentation of results. In fact, as will be shown, for the time being such discussions may be even more important than the results.

2. Two concepts: proletarianization and labour market[8]

To start with it is necessary to define 'labour' more precisely. Let us depart from the broadest possible view on human activities as Chris and Charles Tilly do: 'Work includes any human effort adding use value to goods and services. However much their performers may enjoy or loathe the effort, conversation, song, decoration, pornography, table-setting, gardening, house-cleaning, and repair of broken toys, all involve work to the increase that they increase satisfactions their consumers gain from them. Prior to the twentieth century, a vast majority of the world's workers performed the bulk of their work in other settings than salaried jobs as we know them today. Even today, over the world as a whole, most work takes place outside of regular jobs. Only a prejudice bred by Western capitalism and its industrial labour markets fixes on strenuous effort expended for money payment outside the home as "real work", relegating other efforts to amusement, crime and mere housekeeping.' And they add: 'Despite the rise of takeouts, fast foods, and restaurant eating, unpaid preparation of meals probably constitutes the largest single block of time among all types of work, paid or unpaid, that today's Americans do.' We may easily apply this statement to the rest of the world, now and in the past.[9] In order to do so and to take the step from work to labour and to proletarianization we will have to make the following set of distinctions.

First: between work and other activities. A consistent, but more formal set of definitions within the logics of economic history is provided by Kristoffel Lieten and his colleagues who define labour as all gainful activities that fit into the System of National Accounts (SNA). In general these are legal activities, but it could also be perfectly defended to include illegal gainful activities like theft, smuggling and prostitution. In the framework of their discussion of household activities and child labour they additionally discern the so-called 'extended SNA activities' encompassing food, fuel, and fodder collection for home consumption as well as the 'non-SNA activities' encompassing domestic work, taking care of children, siblings etc.[10]

[6] Quoted from the *Revised preliminary programme* of this conference, 12 May 2005; cf. Grantham 1994, 2.
[7] Van der Linden and Lucassen 1999.
[8] I use the more common 'proletarianization', although also the simpler form 'proletarization' exists (e.g. Briefs 1937, 222).
[9] Tilly and Tilly 1998, 22-23; cf. Van der Linden 1997, 519, Van der Linden and Lucassen 1999, 8-9, Thomas 1999, xiii-xxiii.
[10] Lieten, Srivastava and Thorat 2004, 18 summarises these distinctions in a very useful way.

These two categories often are lumped together under the heading 'reproductive work', in contrast to 'productive work' which in this perception coincides with SNA activities. All other human activities fall either under education or relaxation.

Second, in order to discuss proletarianization we have to make distinctions within the category of gainful activities between employers and self-employed without personnel on the one hand and the 'real' labourers on the other. The two former categories can be lumped together under the heading 'entrepreneurial'.

A third distinctions is necessary to define the proletarian and therefore proletarianization in the classical sense, e.g. as described by Charles Tilly: 'people who work for wages, using means of production over whose disposition they have little or no control'.[11] Therefore we need to distinguish free from unfree labour. Marcel van der Linden defines free labour as the hiring out by a person - the worker - the right to use his or her labour power for a limited time to another agency.[12] The very notion of 'hiring out for a limited time' makes it possible to distinguish free from unfree labour. In principle, a free labourer may change boss while an unfree labourer is tied to the same boss for a very long period, and in many cases during his entire life. Of course - and we will come back to this - there is a significant grey zone between these two situations, but this does not diminish the significance of this distinction. It is important to emphasize that here the nature of the contractual relation is essential, rather than the nature, let alone the quality of the remuneration although the two are related of course. This also implies an important role of the state, which regulates and enforces contracts. All distinctions mentioned so far - regardless whether considered legal or illegal - have been summarised in Figure 1

Figure 1. A socio-economic classification of human activities

<table>
<tr><td colspan="4">Relaxing</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="4">Education</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="4">Work</td><td rowspan="2">'reproductive'</td><td colspan="2">non-SNA, e.g. domestic work, taking care of children, siblings</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2">extended SNA, e.g. food, fuel, and fodder collection for home consumption</td></tr>
<tr><td colspan="2" rowspan="3">'productive' or SNA</td><td>'entrepreneurial'</td><td>employment of labourers</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2"></td><td>self employed work</td></tr>
<tr><td rowspan="2">labour</td><td>free labour</td></tr>
<tr><td></td><td>unfree labour</td></tr>
</table>

Properly speaking all transitions on the individual level from other positions to free labour in Figure 1 can be called 'proletarianization' and all transitions from free labour to other

[11] Tilly 1984, 1.
[12] Van der Linden 1997, 502. He opposes Marx=s illogical definition of a >temporary sale of labour power= and his treatment of labour as a commodity.

positions 'deproletarianizatio'. Thus the following four types of transitions have to be envisaged in order to grasp the phenomenon of proletarization and deproletarization fully. Transition one and two determine the ratio between free labour (persons or output) and total population; transition three and four the ratio between free labour and the total 'active' population of 'working age':
- The trajectory between non-work (relaxation or schooling) and free labour;
- The trajectory between reproductive work and free labour;
- The trajectory between entrepreneurial work and free labour;
- The trajectory between unfree and free labour.

If we step from the individual to the generational level behind the first type of transition another one is hidden as will be discussed in the historiography section: the degree to which the already proletarianized part of society shows a higher rate of natural growth than the non-proletarianized ones.

In nearly all historical debates, however, only the transition from independent small producer (like peasant or artisan) to free wage labourer is commonly known as the process of proletarianization. As will be shown this is a regrettable restriction of this fundamental process. Transitions between different forms of free and unfree labour are equally important and we should neither forget those between unremunerated domestic activities and free labour nor those between education and free labour.

The assumption is that free wage labourers operate on a labour market. But what do we mean by such a market, i.e. did economic forces substantially determine what labourers were paid for their time, skill and effort, instead of 'custom' or 'tradition'?[13] Leaving aside the history of unfree labour on Western European soil we have to conclude that in order to understand the behaviour of 'free' labourers 'customs' cannot be neglected at all.[14] For the time before the Industrial revolution Grantham and De Vries and others mention the following indicators of customary labour markets which could affect the terms on which wage labour was supplied and the subsequent evolution of labour relations[15]:
- legal limitations on job search and penal sanctions on breach of contract;
- limitations on job information;
- limited communication techniques (e.g. only by word of mouth);
- privileged channels of job information;
- high travel costs in relation to the expected net earnings;
- pre-existing regional, occupational, religious, linguistic and other social structures (including first and foremost gender, but also age and race);
- 'modern' B in the De Vries/Van der Woude terminology B security systems like reservation wages, queuing for employment in the high wage sector and temporary availability of public support (charity).

Amongst others De Vries supposes that the Dutch labour market in the seventeenth century showed signs of modernity, notwithstanding 'sticky' time wage levels in the well-paid sector,

[13] De Vries and Van der Woude 1997, 608; without mentioning him in their discussion on this page the authors disagree with Van Zanden 1993; De Vries 1994, 47 mentions following adaptations of wage levels: altering time wage rates, 'wage drift' (altering the effective compensation through the manipulation of terms of employment other than the wage rate itself), but omits the important altering (gang or individual) piece rates.
[14] For unfree labour in Europe see Steinfeld 1991, Eltis 2000.
[15] Grantham 1994, De Vries 1994, Lucassen 1987, Lucassen 1995, Lucassen 2000 (additionally: Lederer and Marschak 1927), Eltis 2000.

but that economic problems in the eighteenth century caused the prevalence of custom 'by the broad allegiance of the population to a system that gave security B at a price to some.'[16]

All these characteristics were still valid in nineteenth century Europe.[17] Job mediation was overwhelmingly done on a personal basis, which means that apprenticeship, school attendance aimed at a particular job or branch, or change of job between firms or within a firm primarily took place by word of mouth between relatives or personal acquaintances. Next came professional networks like guilds, which during the nineteenth century were succeeded by journeymen's organizations, (like the French 'compagnonnage'), other professional organizations (like the German 'Innungen'), and early local trade unions. Commercial job mediation was restricted to (part of the) soldiers, sailors and domestic servants. Papers who offered possibilities for job seekers or employers to place adverts also could be subsumed under commercial job mediation. It has been documented already in the late seventeenth century (Houghton), but could only attain some real impact after the drop in the cost of papers after 1850, first in the big cities. Another form of impersonal job mediation emerged only at the end of the century when in many European countries national trade unions, employers' organizations and finally the national state became players in the field.

During the twentieth century European states successfully tried to marginalise commercial mediation and to absorb union and employers' initiatives, strongly supported by the ILO, which was founded after World War I. Although this tendency of a state monopoly on job mediation was greatly enhanced by the Welfare State until the liberalization movement at the end of the twentieth century, also in nowadays Western Europe personal mediation still is extremely important. Although ILO pushed hard to attain state monopolies on impersonal job mediation outside Europe, this failed, mainly because of the apparent advantages attached to personal contacts by most workers and employers.

3. Proletarianization: a European Historiography

The way most of us use the (as such much older) word 'proletariat' goes back to Lorenz von Stein and - a few years later - to the *Communist Manifesto* of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Its significance in this famous text is analytically vague (proletarians equal modern labourers[18]) and derives its significance primarily from its rhetoric ('Proletarier aller Länder, vereinigt euch!'). In their later work this concept stayed rather vague and receded in favour of expressions like 'working class'. No wonder that Marx himself never seems to have derived 'proletarianization' from his key concept. 'Enteignung' (expropriation of the producers by the capitalists) was his key concept.[19]

In the same year that Marx died it was his disciple August Bebel who used the new concept 'proletarianization' in his monograph *Die Frau und der Sozialismus* (1883). It also pops up occasionally in the late works of Friedrich Engels, and in the writings of Rosa Luxemburg and other socialists at the beginning of the twentieth century. In short, the concept proletarianization finds its origin in the period when Marxism came into being as an ideology.

[16] De Vries 1994, 63.
[17] What follows is a summary of Lucassen 2000, chapters 3 and 4.
[18] [Chapter 1: 'die modernen Arbeiter, die *Proletarier'* and 'Die moderne Industrie hat die kleine Werkstube des patriarchalischen Meisters in die grosse Fabrik des industriellen Kapitalisten verwandelt', my edition pp. 50 and 51]
[19] Conze 1984, 61-63; Van der Linden1997B, 444; Briefs 1926, 173-176; Briefs 1937, 75-83. Both authors provide an interesting conceptual history of the concept proletarian beginning in classical antiquity.

Remarkably however, before 1906 it never was defined clearly but always used in passing, as something self-evident.[20]

According to Werner Conze the first one to develop 'proletarianization' in an analytical and scientific way was Werner Sombart (1863-1941), the same economist-cum-sociologist who coined the concept 'capitalism' in his famous *Der moderne Kapitalismus* (1902).[21] In 1906 Sombart published his small study *Das Proletariat. Bilder und Studien* as the first volume in the series *Die Gesellschaft. Sammlung sozialpsychologischer Monographien* edited by the philosopher of religion Martin Buber.[22] He defined the proletariat as the modern social class of unpropertied wage labourers, forced to enter into free wage contracts with capitalist employers. Men, women and children, well and badly paid, rural, industrial and commercial proletarians, they all are part of this class, which according to Sombart is essentially different from other social classes. Not completely consistent with this definition he puts those employed by the state on a par with those employed by capitalists.[23] It looks as if he is forced to do so in an attempt to figure out how many Germans precisely were proletarians. He rejects the assertion of the *Communist Manifesto* that at the time the proletarian movement already

[20] I am grateful to my IISH-colleague Jaap Kloosterman for his information on the early use of the concept. He refers for these early texts i.a. to www.mlwerke.de.
[21] Cf. Lucassen 2001, 170.
[22] Sombart 1906; Conze 1984, 64; cf. Schumpeter 1954, 815-820 and Briefs 1926, 219. My use of the insights of what we might call the mature phase of the German historical school of economics runs parallel with Grantham's programme 'to analyse statistical information generated by the great flash of statistical light generated between 1870 and 1930' (Grantham 1994, 4).
[23] Sombart 1906, 3: 'Proletariat nennen wir diejenige soziale Klasse in unseren modernen Gesellschaften, die aus den besitzlosen Lohnarbeitern besteht, das heisst also aus denjenigen Bevölkerungselementen, die (weil sie keine Mittel haben, um sich wirtschaftlich selbständig zu machen), genötigt sind, auf dem Wege des freien Lohnvertrags ihre Arbeitskraft gegen Entgelt einem kapitalistischen Unternehmer zeitweilig zur Nützung zu überlassen.'

was the wide majority of the population of Western Europe. As an alternative he tries to interpret the German 1895 occupational and industrial census in two steps in order to show the distinction between full-blooded (i.e. employed in middle and large enterprises) and half-blooded proletarians and the rest of the population (see Table 1 and Table 2).[24] In order to estimate the number of full-blooded proletarians Sombart assigns much weight to the size of the enterprise.

Table 1 The German full-blooded proletariat in 1895 according to Sombart

	Occupational population	As a % of the total population (including dependents)
Impeccable full-blooded proletarians ('einwandsfreie Vollblutproletarier'): 265,317 employees ('Angestellte') and 3,656,254 labourers in firms employing over 20 persons in industry, trade and commerce, minus 400,000 central and local civil servants, and minus 21,571 persons of a bourgeois-like nature ('Angestellte bourgeoisoiden Characters')	3,500,000	13 - 14 %
Agricultural labourers in capitalist enterprises (one-third of all agricultural labourers)	1,500,000	
Subtotal full-blooded proletarians without question ('zweifellose Vollblutproletarier')	**5,000,000**	**20 %**
1,224,006 wage labourers ('Arbeiter') and 126,220 employees ('Angestellte') in firms employing 6-20 persons in industry, trade and commerce	1,350,226	
Similar agricultural labourers	650,000	
Subtotal for smaller firms	**2,000,000**	
Grand total	**7,000,000**	**33 1/3 %**
Conclusion: the real proletarians ('echte Proletarier') constitute one third to one fifth of the total population		

[24] Sombart 1906, 5-8. I add the original German terminology in order to avoid misunderstandings because of the translation. The tables in this particular form are mine. Without changing any figures I have tried to group Sombart=s data as clearly as possible.

If, however, we include the countless half-blooded proletarians, i.e. 'Habenichtse' in German, 'il popolino' in Italian or the 'peuple' in French (cf. Louis Blanc: 'qui ne possédant pas de capital dépendent d=autrui complètement') as well as the real proletarian small self-employed in the crafts and in agriculture we reach far higher numbers. Including all those enumerated in Table 1 all proletarians and proletaroids ('proletarischen und proletaroiden Existenzen') add up to the lower class ('niederes Volk') also called the labouring population ('arbeitende Bevölkerung') which constitute to two-thirds of the population.

Table 2 The German labouring population in 1895 according to Sombart

	occupational population	their dependents	total population
Wage labourers in Industry, Trade, Commerce, and Agriculture, including civil servants	13,438,377	12,327,571	25,765,948
Wage labourers of a changing nature, domestic service etc. ('Lohnarbeiter wechselnder Art, Häusliche Dienste etc.')	432,491	453,041	885,532
Lower civil servants including non-commissioned officers and soldiers. ('Unterbeamten, Unteroffiziere und Gemeinen des Heeres')	769,822	270,249	1,040,071
Domestics ('Dienstboten')	1,339,316	-	1,339,316
Subtotal 'proletarians'	**15,980,006***	**13,050,861**	**28,030,867**
Industrial individual subcontractors ('Alleinmeister im Gewerbe=)	1,035,580	1,671,468	2,707,048
Self-employed in home industries (one-person enterprises)	232,033	258,232	490,265
Self-employed in trade and commerce (id.)	453,805	791,372	1,245,177
Farmers working less than 2 hectares	525,297	1,107,659	1,632,956
Subtotal 'proletaroids'	**2,246,715**	**3,828,731**	**6,075,446**
Total 'labouring population'	**18,226,721**	**16,879,592**	**35,106,313**
as a % of the total population			67.5 %

* of whom 800,000 married women (16,8 % of industrial labourers and 20 % of labourers in commerce)[25]

[25] Sombart 1906, 43-44.

Sombart thinks that the results he reached for Germany are valid for all other capitalist countries. He warns that the result of two-thirds is a maximum as - unavoidably - bourgeois-like persons like higher civil servants ('bourgeoisiden Existenzen') and possibly petit-bourgeois ('Kleinbürgerlichen') elements are part of these figures. Apart from showing that sixty years earlier on Marx and Engels overestimated the size of the proletariat grossly Sombart does not analyse historical developments, Sombart also discusses the origins of the modern proletariat which has been summarised somewhat later in a brilliant way by another German, Goetz Briefs.[26]

Briefs also adds some important specifications to the debate. Essential for him is that the proletarian is free, property-less and barred from upward mobility.[27] He warns e.g. against a number of careless equations, in particular:
- against the mixing up of the concepts proletarian and poor and thus of proletarianization and impoverishment of formerly more prosperous groups;
- against the equation of wage labourer and proletarian. The latter certainly is a wage labourer but one who is forced to offer his labour continuously because this is his only way to survive. The proletarian has no prospects for himself or his offspring to improve this situation. That is why Briefs is of opinion that tenured civil servants and employees with a pension scheme are not proletarians; and vice versa why the professions also can count proletarians in their ranks.[28] We will come to this problem in our discussion of the relation between the proletariat and the labour market.

Briefs's summary of the existing theories regarding the emergence of the proletariat starts with Karl Marx and afterwards Gustav Schmoller who tried to situate it first in the dissolution of feudalism in Europe, i.e. of slavery, serfdom, the guilds and even the English monasteries in the time of the Reformation and second in the privatization of the commons.[29] He then shows how important Sombart's critique has been. Sombart warns in particular against the application of this - in his eyes one-sided - interpretation of the English developments to other countries in Europe. Sombart and Briefs rather are inclined to follow Ricardo and Malthus who before Marx stressed the possibility of an autonomous growth of the proletariat, i.a. by the possibility for parents to send their children to the factories at an early age. The first German factory labourers did the same. They were predominantly recruited from the agricultural proletariat, grown superfluous by mechanization, and eager to find more permanent employment because of the transition in the countryside from tenured jobs to seasonal employment. The same goes for France and Belgium. In sum, according to Briefs the industrial proletariat in western Europe emerges from natural growth or 'proletarian reproduction' (a combination from early marriage and child labour) as well as from the shift from employment in agriculture and cottage industry to industrial employment, both in the

[26] Briefs 1926. This excellent study concentrates on the industrial proletariat since c. 1800 and leaves out agricultural labourers. There is also a French translation (Briefs c. 1935; on the origins of the proletariat see 127-143), while an English version (Briefs 1937) contains part of the original German text of 1926, but also differs in many respects (on the origins of the proletariat see 97-110).[ADD INTERNETINFO on Briefs]
[27] Briefs 1926, 150-153.
[28] Briefs 1926, 155, fn. 1 quotes the American William Leiserson who wrote 1922: 'Insecurity of the wage-earner=s job is the fundamental characteristic of our industrial situation which the wage-earner never forgets and which colors his relation to the work and his theories of economics.' In the end Briefs puts a strong emphasis on class consciousness, although not necessarily along Marxist lines (Idem, 162); Briefs 1937, 187-189; Cf. Michels 1926, esp. 258-271.
[29] Briefs 1926, 182-188. He does not refer here to Sombart 1906 where this history is lacking indeed but to his *Modern Capitalism* (1902), which however is not very helpful for our purpose.

countryside and in towns. Forced expropriation is far less important and migration from the countryside to the towns and the cities comes later.[30]

After the consolidation of especially German sociology in the first decades of the twentieth century discussions about the historical process of proletarianization seem to peter out. Based on the success of demographic and agricultural history and later of the history of 'proto-industrialization' only in the 1970s historians and social scientists return to the old big questions about 'proletarianization'.[31] Famous are the Brenner debate (started in the 1970s) about the transformation process in the late Middle Ages and the Early Modern period and the work of the American sociologist Charles Tilly on proletarianization e few years later.

Without the demographic and the agricultural history the empirical basis for scholars like Robert Brenner and Charles Tilly would have been lacking. Therefore we now first need to spend time to the demographic and agricultural history as far as it has been dealing with 'social stratification', especially of the countryside. Although the authors in this field have not been stressing as emphatically as Brenner and Tilly the phenomenon of proletarianization, their empirical work can provide important building blocks. The first to be mentioned is Bernard Slicher van Bath (1910-2004) and his 'Wageningen School' (Ad van der Woude, Joop Faber and Henk Roessingh) and next scholars who initially have been inspired by his work like Jan de Vries, Paul Klep, and Jan Bieleman.[32]

In his book on the Duchy of Brabant (in his case the nowadays provinces Brabant and Antwerp in Belgium) Paul Klep has proceeded in a methodologically most rigorous way, questioning his data to the extreme about the way incomes were earned. Because of this and of his excellent sources his results deserve more than average attention of the student of proletarianization. I will summarise his results in a table (Table 3).

[30] Briefs 1926, 187-188. Important is his summary of developments in Russia, which I will leave aside here.
[31] If the titles of monographs in the library catalogue of the IISH, combined with the extensive bibliography in Tilly 1984, 62-85 offer a valid indication: the French 'prolétarisation' is used for the first time in an isolated way in the title of an article in 1954 (to disappear again and to reappear in a book title in 1985), the Italian 'proletarizzazione' and the Swedish 'proletarisering' can be found for the first time in book titles in 1975, the Spanish 'proletarizacion' in 1977, whereas Charles Tilly starts to use it in titles of his publications in 1981.
[32] Slicher van Bath 1963, 310-324; Klep 1981; a summary of most stratifications, made for the Netherlands in this framework are to be found in De Vries and van der Woude 1997, chapters 11 and 12.

Table 3 The proletarian population of Brabant, 1702/9-1910 according to Paul Klep (x 1,000)[33]

	1702/9	1755	1846	1866	1910
Independent farmers	124	68	121	132	138
Rural self-employment		85	145	372	635
Urban self-employment	123	107	156		
Rest self-employment	-	-	64	46	94
Subtotal Nonproletarians	**247 (51%)**	**260 (52%)**	**486 (44%)**	**556 (43%)**	**867 (35%)**
Urban day-labourers	19	10	163	469	1.267
Urban skilled labourers	84	60			
Rural day-labourers	66	86	246	112	83
Rural cottagers	66	84	203	155	225
Subtotal Proletarians	**235 (49%)**	**240 (48%)**	**612 (56%)**	**736 (57%)**	**1.575 (65%)**
Total population	**482 (100%)**	**500 (100%)**	**1.098 (100%)**	**1.292 (100%)**	**2.448 (100%)**
Proletarians as % of population:					
Urban	46	40	47		
Rural	51	52	63		
Total	43	48	59		

If I may postpone the Brenner debate to the end of this paragraph I will now concentrate on Tilly=s research methods and results. The mature version of his theory is to be found in his essay on the >Demographic Origins of the European Proletariat= in which he pitted Marx (and Smith) against Malthus. Marx as the protagonist of the expropriation of peasants and artisans, e.g. where he situated proletarianisation in chapter 26 (sic) of *Capital*: on >those moments when great masses of men are suddenly and forcibly torn from their means of subsistence, and hurdled as free and Aunattached@ proletarians on the labor-market. The expropriation of the agricultural producer, of the peasant, from the soil, is the basis of the whole process.=[34] Malthus as the protagonist of natural growth of the proletariat in showing

[33] Klep 1981, 56, 295/6, 300, 489-499. Partially I had to combine his figures. Especially in the case of 1846 I had to choose between slightly diverging data in different parts of the book (the most important being that the urban proletarianization in that year could as well have been 49%). The data are arranged in such a way as to make them comparable to Table 4.
[34] Tilly 1984, 3-4, 56, fn.5-7 where he quotes chapter 25 and the in the German original non-existing chapters 26-32,

that the poor Englishman of his time had strong incentives to marry early and multiply. Apparently completely unaware of the results reached long before by Sombart and Briefs and by Klep a few years before Tilly's reconstruction confirms fully their conclusions on the origins of the European proletariat.

By adjusting and combining Bairoch's population estimates for Europe (except for Russia), estimates on the agricultural proportion in this population based on different sources and the distribution of the workforce of Saxony in 1550, 1750, and 1843 according to Blaschke (see Table 4).[35]

Table 4 The proletarian population of Europe except Russia, 1500-1900 according to Charles Tilly (x 1,000)[36]

	1500	1550	1750	1800	1843	1900
Nonproletarians	39	54	55	50	61	85
Urban proletarians	1	2	8	10	33	75
Rural proletarians	16	15	69	90	116	125
Proletarians total	17	17	76	100	149	200
Total population	56	71	131	150	210	285
Proletarians as % of population:						
Urban	15.5		44.8		51.7	
Rural	25.6		60.6		79.1	
Total	24.3		58.4		70.8	

The next step is to assess the importance of the three possible components of the growth of the proletariat in Western and Central Europe. First Tilly adjusts for net migration and next he estimates different rates of natural increase for urban and rural proletarians and nonproletarians in order to reach conclusions about the increase of the proletariat by way of social mobility.

In his conclusion he gives far greater weight to the movement between generations and to differential natural increase (so to Malthus= argumentation) than to lifetime mobility of workers and their households from nonproletarian to proletarian positions as the principal component of the growth of the proletariat (Marx=s argumentation). However he rejects Malthus' idea that natural growth is basically exogenous to political economy: 'the alterations in nutrition [...] depended to an important degree on the activities of merchants and

whereas it should be beyond any doubt chapter 24 (cf. Briefs 1926, 182, fn. 6).

[35] Tilly 1984, 33: 'The procedure is simple: Adopt Paul Bairoch=s estimates of rural and urban population, interpolate values for 1550, 1750, and 1843, and then apply the percentages of proletarians that Blaschke finds in Saxony's rural and urban sectors to the whole European population. Although this approach multiplies suppositions by approximations, it suggests orders of magnitude for the growth of the European proletariat.'

[36] Tilly 1984, 33 and 36.

agricultural capitalists. And - most important - the pattern of proletarian natural increase in response to the availability of wage labor [...] depended entirely on the capitalists' provision of employment. Specialist farmers who offered work to day laborers and petty entrepreneurs who built cottage industry thereby incited the disproportionate natural increase of the proletariat. Not that they plotted to do so or ceased to condemn the heedless breeding of the workers: The power of a system like capitalism is that it does not require malevolent, or even self-conscious, agents to do its work.'[37]

Although the origins of the proletariat are analyzed in the same way by the Germans Sombart and Briefs in the first and by the American Tilly in the last quarter of the twentieth century, one problem is left. If we compare Tables 1 and 2 with Table 4 we see that the levels of proletarianization differ substantially. Tilly=s figures for the 1840s are higher than Sombart=s for the 1890s. The implication would be that Germany underwent deproletarianization during that half century, which is impossible. This is the more remarkable as all these reconstructions are based on German occupational censuses. How is this possible?

The solution seems to be rather simple. Not only English developments are inadequate to represent those in the continental part of Western Europe, but the same goes for the Saxon ones (see Table 5).

[37] Tilly 1984, 54.

Table 5. Occupations in Germany per 100 heads of households, December 1846[38]

	Prussia	Bavaria	Saxony	German Zollverein
1. Occupied in factories ('bei der Fabrikation'*)	4.08	3.95	11.93	4.44
2. Self-employed in crafts, trade and transport: masters, journeymen and apprentices ('Gewerbetreibende aller Art'**)	6.98	7.88	9.89	7.25
3. Day labourers ('Handarbeiter'+)	9.12	4.55	7.12	7.24
4. Servants ('Gesinde'++)	7.89	11.67	7.30	7.84
5. Farmers, soldiers, civil servants, rentiers ('Landwirte, Militärs, Beambte, Rentner')	21.93	22.55	13.77	20.98
Inhabitants (MIO)	16.113	4.505	1.837	27.188
Of which in categories 1-4 (in absolute figures)	5.042	1.237	0.666	7.281
The same in percentage of all heads of household	31.3 %	27.4 %	36.2 %	26.8 %
'Proletarians' in percentage of total population	62.6 %	54.8 %	72.4 %	53.6 %

Key:
* Both factories with centralised production and decentralised cottage industry (Neuhaus 1926, 363, fn. 1)
** This is derived from the enumeration and explication in Idem, 366-370
+ Examples: 'Tagelöhner, Holzhauer, Chaussee- und Eisenbahnarbeiter, Näherinnen, Wäscherinnen, Kellner'. This category has not been enumerated consistently in all states (Idem, 370)
++ Personal servants, domestic servants, including those in agriculture (Idem, 370-371)

On the one hand the degree of proletarianization according to these figures (72.4%) is more or less the same as the one given by Tilly on the basis of Blaschke (70.8%). On the other hand Table 5 shows that Saxony clearly was the most industrialized and - although slightly less outspoken - the most proletarianized state in Germany. Although every researcher can understand the temptation to use Blaschke's figures because of their rarity, in particular as

[38] Neuhaus 1926, 370 (after the Prussian statistician Dieterici 1851). Dieterici puts married women and children together at 50% for all states. That is why I use the term heads of households instead of 'Einwohner' as given in the German text. For the same reason I have multiplied the figures in the last line (calculated by myself on the basis of the figures given in the last row in Idem, 367) by two.

they cover so many ages, unfortunately they cannot be taken to represent the situation in the rest of Germany, no more than the rest of Western Europe.[39]

What nevertheless is possible by combining Tables 1, 2 and 5 is to show the growth of proletarianization in Germany. Taking the most inclusive definition proletarians were roughly 55 per cent of the population around the mid-century and roughly 70 around 1900. If the Prussian data for 1816 and 1846 have any value for German developments as a whole we may conclude besides that proletarianization in the first half of the nineteenth century has been extremely slow, although the number of factory workers grew quickly at the expense of the servants.[40]

Last, Blaschke's figures as presented by Tilly are much more ambiguous as a yardstick for proletarianization than we might wish.[41] Among the 'Bauern' (farmers, rather than peasants) apparently also unfree serfs are counted, while serf-like obligations also had been pressed on seizable parts of the rest of the rural population. Before 1843 the important category of gardeners and cottagers very gradually had grown into real proletarians. In the 16th-18th centuries many of them were self-employed in cottage industry. Unfortunately Blaschke is totally unclear about their degree of independence of the urban entrepreneurs. Also among the 'Inwohner in den Städten' (Tilly's 'independent workers') many were self-employed and increasingly also professionals. Only the 'Inwohner in den Dörfern' (Tilly's 'village labor') were without any doubt proletarians. If it were possible to adjust Saxony's data in this way they would come much nearer to the Brabantine data presented by Klep.

Tilly's results have been cited time and again but his methods have not found many emulators, although the type of studies he uses have increased greatly, in particular do we know now much more about demographic history than a quarter of a century ago. In contrast, the debate about the transition between Middle Ages and the Early Modern Period, revived by Rober Brenner in the 1970s, has received new impulses over the years.

Very briefly - because this topic will be covered extensively by others in this conference - Brenner has revived the debate about proletarianization in the countryside. After some decades however the outcome is very unclear, at least on a European level because one of the main results of this lively debate is that detailed regional studies are unavoidable: the European economic and social landscape in the early modern period is extremely diversified. In the words of Maarten Prak: 'if that new Grand Theory [of the rise of capitalism] is eventually to appear, it will have to take into account two important results [...] First, we need a clearer understanding of the dynamics of early modern Europe. This in turn requires a better understanding of the regional division of labour in Europe. Second, any Grand Theory should

[39] Strictly speaking I cannot prove the latter assertion without an analysis of occupational censuses of other European countries which is impossible in the framework of this paper (see however Neuhaus 1926, 434-459); It is remarkable that Tilly himself realises the peculiarity of saxony within the German context (Tilly 1984, 32), but he defends his choice with the argument that nothing better is available (Tilly 1984, 34). Blaschke 1967, 182 and 195 stresses also the differences between Saxony and Prussia.

[40] Neuhaus 1926, 371 (after the Prussian statistician Dieterici 1848); cf. Schlumbohm 2001.

[41] Blaschke 1967 is not very specific, probably because it is a popular edition (with only very scanty footnotes) of his Habilitationsschrift which I have not seen yet. [Also to be read - see Slicher van Bath 1963, 314-315 – his 'Soziale Gliederung und Entwicklung der sächsischen Landbevölkerung im 16. bis 18. Jahrh.', in: *Zeitschrift für Agrargeschichte und Agrarsoziologie* 4 (1956) 144-155]. On the farmers and serfdom see pp 179, 194-195; on the Gärtner and Häusler pp 183, 186-187,194; on proto-industrialization pp 161, 164-165; on Inwohner in Städten pp 178-179; on Inwohner in Dörfern p. 188, cf. Also Slicher van Bath 1963, 312.

reckon with the fact that over at least three centuries capitalism was struggling to emerge from a largely non-capitalist world.'[42]

This awareness is certainly growing and some crude modelling of Europe in regions with specific proletarianization patterns have been presented although still much has to be done.[43] Only by the nineteenth century state formation had resulted in much greater uniformity.[44] But especially the second point raised by Prak has been taken up, albeit in particular for the economically most advanced regions like the maritime parts of the Low Countries and England.

Recently scholars like Jan Luiten van Zanden and Bas van Bavel have suggested recently that for these regions the rate of proletarianization has grown quickly already at the end of the Middle Ages. Van Bavel even was able to estimate the share of wage labour in the total labour input for two different rural regions in the Netherlands in the mid sixteenth century. For the countryside of the province of Holland he arrived at 48% and for the countryside of the Guelders river area even at 57%. He compares this with contemporaneous situations in other regions. In rural inland Flanders no more than 20-25 % of the rural labour input was in the form of wage labour. In Norfolk in around 1525 and the rest of the sixteenth century, 20-35 % of the rural population consisted of wage labourers. In other parts of England, such as Leicester and Lincolnshire, wage labour amounted to 20-33 % of the rural population. For Saxony in 1550, as we have seen, Tilly's interpretation of Blaschke's figures led him to believe that 25.6 % of the rural population and 15.5 of the urban population, so over-all 24.3 per cent of the Electorate's inhabitants held proletarian occupations.[45]

Van Bavel's explanation for these discrepancies in different parts of Europe and for the high figures for free wage labour in the northern parts of the Low Countries is institutional and geographical-economic. Such high figures could only be reached where on the one hand legislation like the English Statute of Labourers (1349) and the Statute of Artificers (1563) were lacking, and where the nobility was unable to impose or maintain servitude. On the other hand the nearness of the sea and of urban centres and the cheapness of water transport also played a role. He speculates that two proletarianization spurts have taken place, the earliest one in the 15th/16th and the second one in the 16th/17th century.

4. Preliminary results: Western Europe

Europe-wide estimates of the labour input in the past are impossible. Therefore we will have to use less precise indicators, notably occupational statistics, but also these have their drawbacks (see Appendix). Nevertheless, let us start with the crudest of all yardsticks: the shift from the agricultural to other sectors of the economy. Subsequently we will try to use somewhat more precise indicators along the lines already discussed in the historiography section.

Trustworthy European figures are rare before the twentieth century and for many countries in the east and the south even later on much basic information is missing.

[42] Prak 2001, 19. See also other contributions in the same volume Van Bavel 2004, 145 on regional variability: >In the Netherlands these developments appear to have operated mainly at a regional level, with the regions in question being a few thousand km2 in size=.
[43] E.g. Lucassen 2001 and Thoen 2004, esp. 48 and 58-60.
[44] Cf. The conclusions regarding the land market by Van Bavel and Hoppenbrouwers 2004, 38.
[45] Van Bavel 2003.

Nevertheless, in order to show the general trend we can use the ratio between agricultural and industrial employment (even if we know that labourers were certainly not absent from agriculture, and that the other occupational categories contained e.g. numerous shopkeepers, artisans and other self-employed) as a uniform though inaccurate approximation of the levels of proletarianization.

Those engaged in agriculture were already in a minority in certain parts of Europe around 1800, especially in England and the Netherlands. During the nineteenth century, most Western European countries reached this stage as well. In 1910 the agricultural sector occupied 43 per cent of the population in France, 34 in Germany, and a mere 12 in the United Kingdom. Half a century later, the figures were 21, 14 and 4 per cent, respectively. Eastern and Southeastern Europe went the same way somewhat later. Russia underwent the forced collectivization in the 1930s, and the agricultural population of countries like Spain, Hungary and Poland lost their majority between 1940 and 1960, with the same happening afterwards in Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia.[46] Again: not so much the absolute levels but the historical tendency in the different parts of Europe is what matters here.

At the end of the twentieth century we reach really firm ground where all authors agree that roughly all over Europe 90 per cent of the active occupational population was engaged in free wage labour, a historical maximum.[47] All having been said we nevertheless can summarise results obtained so far (see Table 6) in order to find out certain trends.

Table 6 Proletarianization levels in different parts of Europe and in the continent as a whole, 16th-19th century

	urban	rural	total
before 1500			
1500-1600	Saxony 1550: < 15% London 1550: 50-75%	Leicestershire / Lincolnshire 1525-1600: 20-33% Norfolk 1525-1600: 20-35% Saxony 1550: < 26% Inland Flanders 1550: 20-25% Holland 1550: 48% Guelders 1550: 57%	Saxony 1550: < 24%
1600-1700	Amsterdam 1688: 75-80%	Drenthe 1672: 28% Drenthe 1692: 26%	Dutch Republic 1650: > 50%
1700-1800	Brabant 1702/9: 46% Brabant 1755: 40% Saxony 1750: < 45%	Brabant 1702/9: 51% Drenthe 1742: 35% Saxony 1750: < 61%	Brabant 1702/9: 43% Brabant 1755: 48% Saxony 1750: < 58%

[46] Macura 1976, 28.
[47] Tilly 1984, 36; Pierenkemper 1987 [...]

		Brabant 1755: 52% Drenthe 1774: 40%	
1800-1900	Brabant 1846: 47% Saxony 1843: 52%	Drenthe 1804: 41% Sundsvall 1809: 60% Brabant 1846: 63% Saxony 1843: 79% Sundsvall 1849: 80% Sundsvall 1889: 90%	Brabant 1846: 59% Saxony 1843: 71% Saxony 1846: 72% Germany 1846: 54% Germany 1895: 67%
1900-2000			Western Europe 1980: 90%

Key: Amsterdam: Lourens & Lucassen 1998, 145; Brabant: Klep 1981, 295-296, 300; Drenthe: Bieleman 1987, 132; Dutch Republic, 132: De Vries 1994, 39; Germany and Saxony 1846: see preceding text; Guelderland River-area and Holland: Van Bavel 2003; Leicestershire and Lincolnshire: Van Bavel 2003; London: Rappaport 1989, 243 (my interpretation); Norfolk: Van Bavel 2003; Saxony: Blaschke 1967; Sundsvall (Sweden): Maas & van Leeuwen 2004, 236; Western Europe: see preceding text.

Such figures have to be and can be multiplied.[48] If then it is possible to develop a feasible classification of socio-economic regions and towns for Europe it should be possible in principle to estimate the proletarianization rate at specific moments for regions, countries and for Europe as a whole. That is not my ambition. I think, however, that starting with the Malthusian model, followed by the Marxian-Marxist model, the revisionist model a la Briefs and the revival of the agricultural-cum-demographic history in the last quarter of the twentieth century a new model of European proletarianization is presenting itself.[49]

In c. 1000 CE the overwhelming majority of the population combined self-subsistence activities with services, forced on them by feudal lords. In the following two or three ages a first transition took place in the direction of self-employment for the market, witness the colonisation by free farmers in e.g. the Low Countries, Central and Eastern Europe[50], and also the foundation, initially hesitantly, of towns all over the continent. Somewhat later and even more slowly a third type of work announced itself: free wage labour in the countryside of the Low Countries and England (e.g. in dike building), for the first professional armies, and in those towns where successful crafts were expanding (especially the cloth industry).

At the end of the Middle Ages proletarianization levels in most parts of Western Europe will not have exceeded one quarter of the population, with the exception of certain parts of the countryside of the Netherlands and large urban centres in Southern Europe and Paris. Counterreactions were the limitations on the movement of free labour in England, caused by labour shortages after the Plague. In Central and Eastern Europe the reaction was much more vehement as 'second serfdom' expanded. It meant the return of unfree labour, primarily at the cost of self-employment.

[48] A starting point for rural areas provides Slicher van Bath 1963, 310-324.
[49] Cf. also Grantham 1994, 10ff: Eltis 2000, 5ff.
[50] Hoerder [...]

The Early Modern Period shows diverging trajectories in the mobilization of free labour.[51] Most relevant are:
- maintenance of high proletarianization levels (around half the population) in a few isolated regions around the North Sea;
- growth of the proletariat (more than half the population) in large urban centres of, say, 50,000 and more inhabitants, caused by industrial concentration, maritime expansion, and state formation. In this respect the Dutch Republic emulated its Italian examples even to the extent of shaping the first international labour markets for seasonal labourers, soldiers and especially for sailors;
- growth of the proletariat (up to fifty per cent of the population) in those parts of rural Europe where agricultural specialization or proto-industrialization took place under favourable institutional circumstances, in particular the absence of limitations on migration;
- stagnation or only moderate increase of wage labour in most parts of Western Europe (rural and small towns), due to limitations on migration, restrictive poor laws and exclusive guild regulations.

In the nineteenth century convergence took place into a more uniform pattern of proletarianization levels up to national levels between 50 and 75 per cent, caused by modernisation of agriculture and industrialization. National labour markets hesitantly developed. The previously small international labour markets for seasonal and migratory labour expanded quickly (while the labour market for professional soldiers shifted to other continents). In the meantime in Eastern Europe wage labour crept into serfdom and expanded quickly after its abolition. By way of massive migratory labour self-exploitation and free wage labour could be combined.

In the twentieth century proletarianization levels rose to 75-90 per cent, starting in the Northwest of the continent and spreading eastwards and southwards. Although dictatorial regimes could cause serious drawbacks over one or more decades (like in Germany and the Soviet Union) national free labour markets blossomed and integrated and in the second half of the century international labour markets followed. Sailors took the lead in creating global labour markets, which in other sectors of the economy emerged later after costs of transport and information dropped in the last quarter of the century.

What does this European picture mean for understanding proletarianization in India? If European developments can offer any guidance we have to concentrate on:
- rural proletarianization instead of urbanization in small- and medium-sized towns;
- commercialization and monetization of the countryside;
- the demise of all sorts of monopolization of labour (slavery, serfdom, indentured labour, guilds).

5. Preliminary results: India

Population growth in already settled areas might, as we have seen in the European case, be a crude but first indicator for proletarianization on condition that it is not caused by institutionalized unfree labour (by natural growth or imports) and that international

[51] Cf. Lucassen 2001.

migrations do not disturb the picture. Let us first compare, therefore, population growth in India and Europe (see table 7)

Table 7 The population of Western Europe and India

	Indian subcontinent*	India	Western Europe*
1500			48,000,000
1600	140,000-150,000		69,000,000
1750	190,000,000		
1800	200,000,000		115,000,000 (1820)
1851	224,000,000		143,000,000
1861	241,000,000		
1871	255,200,000	209,100,000	163,000
1881	257,400,000	210,900,000	167,000,000
1891	282,100,000	231,400,000	188,000,000
1901	285,300,000	238,400,000	205,000,000
1911	303,000,000	252,100,000	225,000,000
1921	305,700,000	251,300,000	222,000,000
1931	338,200,000	279,000,000	237,000,000
1941	389,000,000	318,700,000	248,000,000
1951		361,100,000	258,000,000
1961		439,200,000	276,000,000
1971		548,160,000	298,000,000
1981		683,329,000	306,000,000
1991		846,388,000	314,000,000
2001		1,027,015,000	325,000,000

Key: *Indian Subcontinent* : India, Pakistan, Bangladesh; Western Europe: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom.
Sources: *Indian Subcontinent* 1600 and 1800: Habib 1982, 166, 176; 1750: Visaria and Visaria 1983, 466 (selected is the Bhattacharya figure as his series is most consistent of the other figures chosen); 1851-1941: Visaria and Visaria 1983, 488 (census, adjusted by Davis1871-1901, and Gujral=s estimates for 1851-1861); *India* 1871-1961: Cassen 1978, 7; 1971-2001: http://www.geohive.com;
W*estern Europe*: http://www.eco.rug.nl/~Maddison/Historical_Statistics.

Population growth in India as such has been much slower than in Western Europe until the beginning of the twentieth century. These figures (of which the pre-1881 Indian data present a lot of problems for demographers), therefore seem to suggest:
- most likely no strong proletarianization between 1600 and 1750;
- possibly proletarianization between 1800 and c.1910 and again in the 1920s and 1930s with an interruption in the 1870s and the 1890s, in particular as population losses due to international migration in the period 1840-1920 in Europe and India show some resemblance;[52]
- strong proletarianization in the second half of the twentieth century.

In order to test these suppositions and to know about what levels of proletarianization we are talking we have to start with the occupational censuses from 1871 onwards (see appendix 2). As such they do not tell us very much as long as we do not know what sort of enterprises and labour relations are hidden behind the largest category, that of the 'cultivators'. Thanks to the critical evaluation by J. Krishnamurty we receive a first glimpse of proletarianization levels in the Indian countryside between 1871 and 1961 (Table 8)

Table 8 The Agricultural work force in relation to the number of agricultural labourers, India 1871/2-1961

		Agricultural work force (MIO)		Agricultural labourers (MIO)		Percentages	
		Actual workers (1)	Population supported (2)	Actual workers (3)	Population supported (4)	(3):(1)	(4):(2)
1871/2	M	45.7		8.2		18.2	
1881	M	49.5		13.4		27.1	
1891	T		195.6		44.8		22.9
1901	M	64.8		16.4		25.3	

[52] Hoerder 2002, [....]

	F	30.8		13.6		44.2	
	T	95.6	207.7	30.0	53.1	31.4	25.6
1911	M	70.4		16.3		23.2	
	F	34.9		15.1		43.3	
	T	105.3		31.4		29.8	
1921	M	71.7		15.4		21.5	
	F	35.0		12.2		36.5	
	T	106.7		27.6		26.4	
1931	M	73.9		21.9		29.6	
	F	30.8		18.1		58.9	
	T	104.7		40.0		38.2	
1951	M					25.1	
	F					42.6	
	T					30.7	
1961	M					24.6	
	F					32.2	
	T					26.4	

Source: Krishnamurty 1992, 109-111 (1871/2 underestimated figures for only adults in British India and Burma; 1881-1891: British India plus large native states; 1901-1931: South Asia; 1951-1961: India)

For males the share of agricultural labourers fluctuated between 20 and 30 per cent, say around 25%, for females around 355 and for all persons around 30 per cent. Between 1871 and 1961 the share of agricultural labour does suggest no sustained upward trend. This share, however, might be seriously underestimated as S.J. Patel=s discussion of the 1931 census returns may show see table 9).

Table 9 The composition of the agrarian society in India, 1931[53]

	Millions	Per cent
Rent receivers and farmers cultivating more than five acres	32	28.9
Dwarf-holding labourers of which petty proprietors	10	9.0

[53] Patel 1992, 73.

Dwarf-holding labourers of which tenants-at-will and sharecroppers	27	24.3
Dwarf-holding labourers subtotal	**37**	**33.3**
Landless labourers of which bonded labourers	3	2.7
Landless labourers of which under-employed labourers	35	31.5
Landless labourers of which full-time >free= labourers	4	3.6
Landless labourers subtotal	**42**	**37.8**
Those with no rights to land subtotal	**79**	**71.1**
Total agricultural working population	**111**	**100.0**

Due to different definitions of proletarianization we see similar discrepancies for the agricultural working population of India in 1931 as before for the total working population of Germany in 1895 (cf. Tables 1 and 2). As I do not know of the same detailed analysis for other years the question arises whether the level of 71.1 per cent was a recent phenomenon in 1931. The high population growth in the interwar years suggests that this level had been rising recently, but that is no reason to suppose that before WWI rural social structures were stable.

All-India data regarding this problem are lacking as far as I know, but a classic by Dharma Kumar (1965, reprinted with an extensive introduction in 1992) may give us an idea of prevailing trends.[54] In Madras landless agricultural labour casts could have formed one quarter of the total agricultural population at the beginning of the nineteenth century.[55] According to Neeladri Bhattacharya who bases himself on a critical evaluation of Dharma Kumar's work on the Madras Presidency, there are good reasons to believe that in the first three quarters of the nineteenth century this share has risen substantially. He writes: 'Clearly the supply of labour sustained by the caste structure since the pre-British days was being supplemented by a supply created by economic forces [i.e. extension of cultivation and the increase in productivity]. Here the distinction between casual labour and the attached permanent farm servant may be crucial. Perhaps the latter were from servile untouchable castes, and the impoverished ryots [farmers] worked mostly as seasonal or daily labourers. If this was so, then it would also affect the estimation of the number of agricultural labourers in general and those from peasant castes in particular.'[56] Dharma Kumar, unaware of this critique because it appeared simultaneously with her 'Introduction to reprint', shows how labour, recruited from 'tribal' parts of the population might have strengthened the group of wage labourers and in this way seems to confirm Bhattacharya's suppositions. Nevertheless, she remains - against what she calls the 'nationalist-Marxist' school - convinced that '[m]embers of certain castes were by and large agricultural labourers at the outset of British rule [...] and the estimate shows that that the group was sizeable so that it cannot be held that

[54] Kumar 1992, esp. xxxi-xl..
[55] Kumar 1992, ch. IV and 191; Bhattacharya 1992, 170-171 (footnote 83) quotes her result 17-25 %, while Kumar 1992, xxxi provides arguments pointing rather to a higher than a lower percentage.
[56] Bhattacharya 1992, 171 (footnote 83).

landless labour was virtually created by British rule.'[57] For the North such data are not available but the trend, found for the Punjab between 1881 and 1921 is also stable, only to rise in the 1920s.[58]

If we could conclude that proletarianization levels were already high in the agricultural sector at the beginning of the nineteenth century, grew slowly before 1920 and quicker thereafter, is it possible - following Patel's conclusion for 1931 to guess that 'those with no rights to land' formed already half of the 'total working population' around 1800? And if this is really the case what could we say about the proletarianization levels of the total population and their development before the undisputed spurt in the second part of the twentieth century?

As agriculture is so dominant in India, comprising a solid 70 plus per cent of the working force in the late nineteenth and first half of the twentieth centuries (see Appendix 1) we have to find out whether proletarianization levels in other economic sectors differed from those in agriculture. For industry (ten per cent of total employment 1891-1991) it means that we have to look at traditional and craft enterprise. In 1911 only five per cent of industrial employment was located in registered factories, in 1961 fifteen, and in 1991 nearly thirty per cent. Until the last quarter of the nineteenth century the majority of the rest of the industrial workforce originally was to be found in the household industry, whereas afterwards unofficial factories took the lead.[59] Because of this slow growth of the size of the enterprise it is possible to define many craftspeople, in particular in the countryside, as self-employed, working for customers (as a rule in the same village) instead of as wage dependents working for bosses instead of for wages. As such artisans were 'unfree to specialize, to choose customers, or to set prices'[60] this would be wrong however. Both in the 'traditional' situation and in the small or large factory later on the big majority of the industrial labour force has to be defined as proletarian, evolving form less to more free forms of contract.

Last but not least the tertiary sector or the services. Occupational census data since 1881 (see Appendix) show already that services in India occupy more people than industry. Dharma Kumar has shown that in South India services have been even more important in the first half of the nineteenth century. She supposes that a shift has taken place from the services in the direction of agriculture, on the one hand because of the change in government because the British needed less soldiers, village militia and armed messengers, and put less value on a number of religion-bound services (including beggars). On the other hand the rise of export-oriented agriculture increased the demand for labour in the primary sector. Part of those engaged in the service sector made a living by realising profits, like merchants, and therefore can be seen as self-employed or even as employers, but the majority received remunerations for their services. As in village crafts and industries the mode of payment varied: 'one very common system was to allot rent-free lands; another was to set aside part of the harvest, and additional payments would also be made for special occasions, such as festivals, and for special services.'[61]

6. Comparisons and discussions.

[57] Kumar 1992, xxxvii; on Marxism among Indian historians also xiii..
[58] Bhattacharya 1992, 183, 190.
[59] Roy 1999, 6.
[60] Roy 1999, 34.
[61] Kumar 1987, 375; cf. Kumar 1992, xxx where she quotes David Ludden on the remunerations of agricultural labour.

At first sight the result of our exercise to reconstruct the degree of wage dependency or the rate of proletarianization has yielded remarkable results. For Western Europe the first big jumps seem to have pushed back in time from the Early Modern Period to the late Middle Ages and the second big jump forward to the late nineteenth and the twentieth centuries. In between developments have been much more gradual. For India it seems still too early to say much about the period before 1800, which at the same time means that nothing can be excluded. The high South-Indian levels of wage dependency at the beginning of the nineteenth century cry for an answer when such levels have been achieved first. Political and economic structures in the period 1500-1800, commonly called the Mughal period, certainly do not preclude high levels of wage dependency.[62]

For the period that quantitative comparisons between Western Europe and India become possible absolute levels of proletarianization seem to differ much less than could have been expected on the basis of the existing literature based on the results of occupational censuses. This approach over-emphasizes the significance of a large agricultural sector at the cost of that of levels of proletarianization. To quote e.g. Bairoch and Limbor who made the first worldwide comparisons (for the period 1880-1960): 'As might be expected, the structure of the labour force in the developing countries is an expression of their low level of economic development. Over 70 per cent of the working population was still engaged in agriculture in 1960, this being close to the percentage in the developing countries at the beginning of the nineteenth century, implying a gap of about a century and a half.'[63] Contrary to what I thought initially, transitions between different types of proletarian existence (in different sectors, under different sorts of contracts) have proven to be much more important than transitions between self-employment (in which earnings depend on profits made in markets) and wage labour (in which earners depend on the outcome of contracts made in the labour market).

This part of the conclusion pertains to the first of the many questions posed in the invitation for this conference. Apart from 'the rise' also organization and institutional framework of factor markets deserve our attention. As stated in the introduction, for the factor 'labour' this boils down to the question under what circumstances 'the rise of wage labour' has taken place, depending on the ownership of, the right to, and the transfer of labour, as well as on facilities for job training and education, formal and informal rules for hiring and firing, and instruments for the monitoring of labourers.

In this paper far too much efforts have been spent to reconstruct levels of wage dependency B at the cost of answers to all these questions, which indeed are urgent if levels of wage dependency as such may be less different between continents. How to describe and analyse the structure of the labour market mobility now becomes the key problem. In its crudest form it seems to be a legal question: is labour free or is it not? In a more subtle form not only the freedom to move, but also sufficient information where to go to in order to find work or to improve labour conditions are at stake. Scholars have put much effort to answer the first question, but the second may be even more interesting, not only for Western Europe, but also for India and for the comparison between the two.

By way of conclusion, comparisons between Europe and India might seem to be simple, but they are not. The simple answer would be that Western Europe early on was much more

[62] Subrahmanyam [...]; Prakash [...].
[63] Bairoch and Limbor 1968, 325.

literate, much more mobile and that the labour force was much more organized than in India. Unfortunately we lack too much information on the working of labour markets in both subcontinents, but especially in India to confirm this impression. Maybe the last point deserves special attention, for in the century starting in c. 1880 one of the successful innovations of national and international trade unions was the quick exchange of information about the labour market. As we know however, alternatives have been available in Europe (e.g. in guilds, in the tramping system), and we may ask: why not also in India? We don=t know. Another simple answer would also be that limitations on mobility, set by the caste system, have restricted occupation choice extremely. However, it is again Dharma Kumar who warns us to jump to conclusions. In the preface to the reprint of her magnum opus she does not deny such limitations and she also points our attention to the fact that in the labour market group rights were more important than individual rights (see Eltis, quoted in my introduction), but that does not prevent occupational mobility between those more or less outside the cast system ('tribals' and adherents of other religions than Hinduism) and those within.[64] Europe lacked a cast system as we know, but its labour force was, nor is completely mobile as we all know. It would be worthwhile to solve the many questions left on occupational mobility afresh, now also inspired by the modern scholarly work on this phenomenon in Indian history.

[64] Kumar 1992, xxxi-xxxvi.

Appendix 1 Structure of the workforce according to the censuses in (undivided) India 1881-1951[65]

		1881	1901	1911	1921	1931	1951
Cultivators	M	51.7	53.2	53.5	56.1	49.8	54.4
	F	?	43.6	41.0	48.1	30.4	45.7
	P	?	50.3	49.6	53.5	44.3	52.2
Agricultural labourers	M	19*	14.3	15.4	14.4	19.5	16.4
	F	?	30.2	32.5	28.0	43.8	34.5
	P	?	19.1	20.8	18.6	26.3	21.1
Livestock, forestry, fishing, hunting etc.	M	1.7	4.2	4.9	4.1	4.9	2.4
	F	?	2.9	3.2	3.2	3.8	2.3
	P	?	3.8	4.4	4.0	4.6	2.4
Mining and quarrying	M	0.1	0.1	2.2	0.2	0.2	0.4
	F	?	0.1	0.2	0.3	0.2	0.3
	P	?	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.4
Manufacturing	M	10.6	9.5	9.1	9.0	8.4	9.1
	F	?	11.4	10.9	8.4	8.8	7.7
	P	?	10.1	9.6	8.8	8.5	8.7
Construction	M	0.5	1.1	1.3	1.1	1.2	1.4
	F	?	0.8	0.8	0.8	0.9	0.9
	P	?	1.0	1.2	1.0	1.1	1.3
Trade and commerce	M	4.9	5.8	5.5	5.9	5.9	6.1
	F	?	3.5	5.3	5.2	4.8	2.8
	P	?	5.1	5.4	5.7	5.6	5.2

[65] Krishnamurty 1983, 534-535.

Transport, storage and communication	M	1.8	1.5	1.7	1.3	1.4	1.9
	F	?	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.3
	P	?	1.1	1.2	1.0	1.1	1.5
Other services	M	9.8	10.2	8.3	7.8	8.6	7.8
	F	?	7.2	5.9	5.7	7.1	5.6
	P	?	9.3	7.6	7.2	8.2	7.2

Key:
* Agricultural labourers 10.7 and general labour 8.3; for 1911 these figures are 13.4 and 2.7.

Bibliography (still to be completed)

- Bairoch and Limbor 1968 [Y.]
- Bavel, B. J. P van, >Land , lease and agriculture. The transition of the rural economy in the Dutch river area from the fourteenth to the sixteenth century=, in: *Past and Present* 172 (2001) 3-43.
- Bavel, Bas van, >The transition in the Low Countries: Wage labour as an indicator of the rise of capitalism in the countryside, 14th to 17th centuries=, *Paper for the conference >Rodney Hilton=s Middle Ages=* (September 2003).
- Bavel, Bas J.P. van, >Structures of landownership, mobility of land and farm sizes. Diverging developments in the northern parts of the Low Countries, c. 1300-c. 1600', in: Bas J.P. van Bavel and Peter Hoppenbrouwers (eds), *Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2004) 131-148.
- Bavel, Bas J.P. van, and Peter Hoppenbrouwers, >Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late middle Ages-19th century)=, in: Bas J.P. van Bavel and Peter Hoppenbrouwers (eds), *Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2004) 13-43.
- Belchem, J., *Industrialization and the Working Class. The English Experience. 1750-1900* (Aldershot, 1999).
- Bieleman, Jan, AAG Bijdragen 29 1987 [...]
- Blaschke, Karlheinz, *Bevölkerungsgeschichte von Sachsen bis zur industriellen Revolution* (Weimar: Böhlau, 1967).
- Boonstra, O.W.A., *De waardij van een vroege opleiding. Een onderzoek naar de implicaties van het alfabetisme op het leven van de inwoners van Eindhoven en omliggende gemeenten 1800-1920* (Wageningen: A.A.G. Bijdragen 34, 1993).
- Briefs, Goetz, >Das Gewerbliche Proletariat=, in: G. Albrecht a.o. (eds.), *Grundriss der Sozialökonomik*. IX. Abteilung *Das soziale System des Kapitalismus* I.Teil *Die gesellschaftliche Schichtung im Kapitalismus* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1926) 142-240.
- Briefs, Goetz, *Le prolétariat industriel* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer; s.a. [c 1935])
- Briefs, Goetz A., *The Proletariat. A Challenge to Western Civilization* (London: McGraw-Hill, 1937).
- Brown, John C., Marco H.D. van Leeuwen, and David Mitch: >The History of the Modern Career: An Introduction=, in: David Mitch, John Brown, and Marco H.D. van Leeuwen (eds.), *Origins of the Modern career* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004) 3-41.
- Conze, Werner, >Proletariat, Pöbel, Pauperismus=, in: Otto Brunner, Werner Conze and Reinhart Koselleck (eds.), *Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. Historisches Lexikon zur politisch-sozialen Sprache in Deutschland* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1984) 27-68.
- Cunningham, Hugh, and Pier Paolo Viazzo (eds), *Child labour in historical perspective 1800-1900. Case studies from Europe, Japan and Colombia* (Florence: UNICEF, 1996)
- Daelemans, Frank, >Leiden 1581. Een socio-demografisch onderzoek=, in: *A.A.G. - Bijdragen* 19 (1975) 137-215
- Davids and Lucasen 1987 [Y]
- Desrosières, Alain, *The Politics of Large Numbers. A History of Statistical Reasoning* (Cambridge, Mass. And London: Harvard University Press, 1998)
- Eltis, The Rise 2000 [Y]

- Grantham, George in Grantham and McKinnon 1994 [Y]
- Habib 1982 [Y]
- Hoerder 2002 [Y]
- Kay, Alison C., >Small Business, Self-Employment and Women=s Work-Life Choices in Nineteenth Century London=, in: David Mitch, John Brown, and Marco H.D. van Leeuwen (eds.), *Origins of the Modern career* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004) 191-206
- Klep, Paul M.M., *Bevolking en arbeid in transformatie. Een onderzoek naar de ontwikkelingen in Brabant, 1700-1900* (Nijmegen: SUN, 1981)
- Krishnamurty, J., >The Occupational Structure=, in: Dharma Kumar (ed.), The *Cambridge Economic History of India Vol 2: c. 1757-1970* (Cambridge: CUP, 1983) 533-550
- Krishnamurty, J in Guha 1992 [Y]
- Kumar, Dharma, >The forgotten sector in: IESHR 1987 [Y]
- Kumar, Dharma, *Land and Caste in South India* 1992 [Y]
- Lederer, Emil, und Jakob Marschak, >Die Klassen auf dem Arbeitsmarkt und ihre Organisationen=, in: G. Albrecht a.o. (eds.)*Grundriss der Sozialökonimik.* IX. Abteilung *Das soziale System des Kapitalismus* II.Teil *Die autonome und staatliche soziale Binnenpolitik im Kapitalismus* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1927) 106-258.
- Leick, Gwendolyn, *Mesopotamia. The Invention of the City* (London: Penguin Books, 2002).
- Lieten, G.K., >Child Labour in South Asia: An Account of Numbers=, in: G.K. Lieten, Ravi Srivastava, and Sukhadeo Thorat (eds.), *Small Hands in South Asia: Child Labour in Perspective* (IDPAD/Manohar: New Delhi, 2004) 37-59
- Lieten, G.K., Ravi Srivastava, and Sukhadeo Thorat (eds.), *Small Hands in South Asia: Child Labour in Perspective* (IDPAD/Manohar: New Delhi, 2004)
- Linden, Marcel van der, >The Origins, Spread and Normalization of Free Wage Labour=, in: Tom Brass and Marcel van der Linden (eds.), *Free and Unfree Labour. The Debate Continues* (Bern etc.: Peter lang, 1997A) 501-523
- Linden, Marcel van der, `EnteignungA 1997 [...]
- Linden, Marcel van der, and Jan Lucassen, *Prolegomena for a Global Labour History* (Amsterdam: IISH, 1999) (also at: http://www.iisg.nl/research/prolegomena.html)
- Lourens, Piet, and Jan Lucassen, >Ambachtsgilden binnen een handelskapitalistische stad: aanzetten voor een analyse van Amsterdam rond 1700", in: *NEHA-Jaarboek voor economische, bedrijfs- en techniekgeschiedenis* 61 (1998), 121-162
- Lourens, Piet, and Jan Lucassen, *Arbeitswanderung und berufliche Spezialisierung. Die lippischen Ziegler im 18. und 19. Jahrhundert* (Osnabrück: Rasch, 1999)
- Lucassen, Jan, *Migrant Labour in Europe 1600-1900. The Drift to the North Sea* (London etc.: Croom Helm, 1987)
- Lucassen, Jan in Davids and Lucassen, *Miracle* 1995 [Y]
- Lucassen, Jan, *In search of Work in Europe, 1800-2000* (Amsterdam: IISH Research Papers 39, 2000) (also at AANPASSEN!!: http://www.iisg.nl/research/prolegomena.html)
- Lucassen, Jan, >Mobilization of labour in early modern Europe=, in: Maarten Prak (ed.), *Early modern Capitalism. Economic and social change in Europe, 1400-1800* (London and New York: Croom Helm, 2001) 161-174

- Maas, Ineke, and Marco H.D. van Leeuwen, >Occupational Careers of the Total male Labour Force during Industrialization: The Example of Nineteenth-Century Sweden=, in: David Mitch, John Brown, and Marco H.D. van Leeuwen (eds.), *Origins of the Modern career* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004) 227-258
- Macura, Milos, >Population in Europe 1920-1970", in: C.M. Cipolla (ed.), *The Twentieth Century*, vol. I (, 5) (s.l., 1976) 1-87
- Michels, Robert, >Psychologie der antikapitalistischen Massenbewegungen=, in: G. Albrecht a.o. (eds.)*Grundriss der Sozialökonimik*. IX. Abteilung *Das soziale System des Kapitalismus* I.Teil *Die gesellschaftliche Schichtung im Kapitalismus* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1926) 241-359
- Neuhaus, Georg, >Die berufliche und soziale Gliederung der Bevölkerung im Zeitalter des Kapitalismus=, in: G. Albrecht a.o. (eds.)*Grundriss der Sozialökonimik*. IX. Abteilung *Das soziale System des Kapitalismus* I.Teil *Die gesellschaftliche Schichtung im Kapitalismus* (Tübingen: Mohr, 1926) 360-459
- Pierenkemper, T., >Labour Market, Labour Force and Standard of Living: From Agriculture to Industry=, in: K.J. Bade (ed.), *Population, Labour and Migration in 19th- and 20th-Century Germany* (Leamington Spa and New York, 1987) 35-58
- Play, F. Le, *L=organisation du travail selon la coutume des ateliers et la loi du décalogue* (Tours: Mame, 1893)
- Prak, Maarten, >Early modern capitalism. An introduction=, in: Maarten Prak (ed.), *Early modern Capitalism. Economic and social change in Europe, 1400-1800* (London and New York: Croom Helm, 2001) 1-21

  Rappaport 1989 [Y]

  Roy, Tirtankar, 1999 […]
- Salais, R., >Why was Unemployment So Low in France During the 1930s?=, in: Barry Eichengreen and T.J. Hatton (eds.), *Interwar Unemployment in International Perspective* (Dordrecht etc. 1988), 247-288
- Schlumbohm, Jürgen, >Labour in proto-industrialization: big questions and micro-answers=, in: Maarten Prak (ed.), *Early modern Capitalism. Economic and social change in Europe, 1400-1800* (London and New York: Croom Helm, 2001) 125-134
- Schumpeter, Joseph A., *History of economic analysis. Edited from manuscript by Elizabeth Boody Schumpeter* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1954)
- Slicher van Bath, *An Agrarian History of Western Europe, 500-1850* (London: Edward Arnold, 1963)
- Sombart, Werner, *Das Proletariat. Bilder und Studien* (Frankfurt am Main: Rütten & Loening, 1906)
- Spufford, Margaret, >Literacy, trade and religion in the commercial centres of Europe=, in: Karel Davids and Jan Lucassen (eds), *A miracle mirrored. The Dutch Republic in European Perspective* (Cambridge: CUP, 1995) 229-283
- Thoen, Eric, >Social agrosystems= as an economic concept to explain regional differences. An essay taking the former county of Flanders as an example (Middle Ages-19th century)", in: Bas J.P. van Bavel and Peter Hoppenbrouwers (eds), *Landholding and land transfer in the North Sea area (late Middle Ages-19th century)* (Turnhout: Brepols, 2004) 47-43-66
- Thomas, Keith (ed.), *The Oxford Book of Work* (Oxford: OUP, 1999)

- Tilly, Charles, >Demographic Origins of the European Proletariat=, in: David Levine (ed.), *Proletarianization and Family History* (Orlando etc.: Academic Press 1984) 1-85
- Tilly, Chris, and Charles Tilly, *Work under Capitalism* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1998)
- Visaria and Visaria in CEHI 1983
- Vries, Boudien de, Jan Lucassen, Piet Lourens, and Harm Nijboer: >Het economische leven: spectaculair succes en diep verval=, in: R.C.J. van Maanen (ed.), *Leiden. De geschiedenis van een Hollandse stad. Part 2 1574-1795* (Leiden: Stichting Geschiedschrijving Leiden, 2003) 85-107
- Jan de Vries, AHow did Y@ in Grantham and MacKinnon 1994 [Y]
- Vries, Jan de, and Ad van der Woude, *The First Modern Economy. Success, Failure, and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500-1815* (Cambridge: CUP, 1997)
- Wilkinson, Endymion, *Chinese History. > Manual Revised and Enlarged* ((Harvard, 2000)
- Zanden, Jan Luiten van, Rise 1993 [Y]