The Roots of Persistent Global Gaps in Democracy: Making the Family Count

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Abstract

This study investigates the importance of "family systems" as an historical institution in explaining the persistence of cross-national gaps in democracy. The main argument is, countries that were characterized by a nuclear household structure and had egalitarian inheritance practices in the past have a longer history of liberal democracy (at the national level). This relationship which has been tested using cross-section and panel regressions is supported by observations for 162 countries over 150 years and is robust against the inclusion of socio-economic and regional characteristics. The results of the instrumental variable approach shows that the persistent effect of family systems on national democracy run through its' long term impact on socio-economic characteristics, past experience with local democracy and attitudes of the individuals. Overall, this study highlights the importance of taking into account the historical characteristics of countries when explaining disparities in development outcomes.

Key Words: family systems, historical institutions, institutional democracy

JEL Codes: J120, N300, C230

1. INTRODUCTION

Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, many countries in Eastern Europe, and a number of countries in Latin America, Asia and Sub Saharan Africa underwent a transition to a democratic regime. Nevertheless, the democratic wave did not engulf China, Cuba, Iraq, Iran, Ivory Coast, Kuwait, North Korea, Libya, Zimbabwe and many other states (Doorenspleet, 2004). In 2011, there were still a large number of countries that were ruled by authoritarian regimes (see Map 1 in the appendix for a global illustration of the political regimes). Next to the direct importance of democracy, related to the freedoms of the citizens which enables people to express their needs (Sen, 1999), research highlights democracy's role in the countries' ability to generate innovation, wealth, and growth (e.g., Acemoglu & Robinson, 2012; North & Weingast, 1989). Thus, it crucial both for the policy makers and scholars to understand the conditions that maintain, consolidate, and promote democracy as a political regime of the countries. The main purpose of this paper is to contribute to the democracy literature by assessing the role of a less known historical institution, that of the "family systems" as devised by Emmanuel Todd (1985), to explain the persistent nature of democracy.

The "third wave" of democratization which took off after the end of the Portuguese dictatorship in 1974, and spread to Latin America (Doorenspleet, 2000), has alerted researchers about the importance of the role of international influences. The diffusional pattern suggested that the likelihood of a transition in a country depends on the events in other states (Wejnert, 2005; Huntington, 1991).[1] By the 1990s, the possibility of "exporting" democracy to different

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[1] According to proponents of this view, countries democratize in clusters within the regions of the world and this transition happens in waves (Huntington, 1991). For instance, the third wave includes the democratic transition of

corners of the world such as sub-Saharan Africa and the Middle East drove the foreign policy of the United States and the agenda of the policy makers (e.g., Berendsen, 2008). However, the end result was not very successful. In 2002, the Middle East (including Arab North Africa) was still largely ruled by autocracies (Gleditsch & Ward, 2006). Myanmar and Gambia are the prototypical cases of long-standing dictatorships (Haber & Monaldo, 2010). While in the time period between 1977 and 1994, 15 out of 16 Latin American countries moved to democratic rule, totalitarian Cuba remains an exception in the region (Jones, 2012). The ideal of liberal democracy was not internalized either by Belarus, Turkmenistan or Azerbaijan after the collapse of Soviet Union.

A group of scholars, based on the modernization thesis, have argued that as countries became more economically developed and achieved higher levels of educational attainment, they would eventually, by default adopt democracy as a political regime (e.g., Doorenspleet, 2004; Inglehart, 1997; Murtin & Wacziarg, 2011). Yet looking at two of the biggest economies contrasting evidence can be observed; China despite its' economic growth in the last three decades and the democratization trend in the mid-1980s in Eastern Asia still has not experienced a democratic transition to this day[2] whereas India since independence is ruled by democracy despite its level of economic development at the time of independence. Przeworski and Limongi (1997) demonstrate that if the economic development thesis was true, disregarding those countries that derive more than one-half of their revenues from oil, dictatorships should have endured in Singapore, East Germany, Taiwan, USSR, Spain, Bulgaria, Argentina, and Mexico

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Southern European countries in the 1970s, Latin American countries in the 1980s, and Soviet bloc countries in the 1990s (Wejnert, 2005). This process has been described as the snowballing effect by Lipset (1959).

[2] Some argue that even in China, civil liberties have improved significantly with two decades of sustained economic growth (Ginsburg, 2008). An evaluation of this claim and its implications is beyond the scope of this study. On an institutional level, it still remains to be classified as an undemocratic regime (Marshall & Jaggers, 2010).

for many more years than they did, which had higher levels of per capita income than Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Netherlands, and Norway by 1950.

Historical institutions (e.g., colonial institutions, religion) provide an alternative explanation for these counter examples. Engerman & Sokoloff (2005) showed that Europeans implemented inclusive institutions (e.g., suffrage) in the New World first in economically and ethnically homogenous populations, such as Argentina, Uruguay, and Costa Rica, and the impact of these colonial institutions on current national polity outcomes lasts until today (Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005; Sokoloff & Engerman, 2000). However, these explanations do not provide insight for countries that have never been colonized and are still ruled by authoritarian regimes. A second predictor is religion. The Middle East is argued to be dominated by authoritarian regimes due to the incompatibility of Islam with democracy, as it promotes authoritarian values (Fukuyama, 1992; Huntington, 1999), compared to Protestantism which led to an emphasis on egalitarianism, civil society formation, and made possible the liberal democracy in Western European states (Tusalem, 2009). Religion as an exogamous predictor is argued to impact the national democratic outcome through its effect on culture, which is often treated as a "black box" (Acemoglu & Johnson, 2005). The broadness of the term "culture", the lack of sufficient theory, the methodological difficulties to operationalize and understand the causal relation between culture and macro-level outcomes result in a scarcity of research on this topic (Licht et al., 2006; Guiso et al., 2006). [3]Although religion provides a way to account for the role of history and for differences in political culture, it has its shortcomings. It is hard to conclude whether religion was the driving force that gave some societies a head start in the democratization process by

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[3] The role of culture on various macro-level outcomes such as economic development, governmental institutions, fertility levels has started to be placed in the agenda of scientific academic scholars since the 1990s and resulted in valuable research outcomes (e.g., Inglehart, 1997; Tabellini, 2010; Duranton et al. 2009; Guiso et al. 2006; Licht et al., 2006). However, much remains to be investigated to a further extent to be able to understand the causal mechanisms between culture and various macro-level outcomes and to understand what institutions play the primary role.

promoting the norms and values that are conducive to democracy. For instance, Ciftci (2010) shows that that there is high variation between Muslim majority societies in the support for democratic systems.

This study focuses on a lesser known historical institution "family systems", defined as "a set of beliefs and norms, common practices, and associated sanctions through which kinship and the rights and obligations of particular kin relationships are defined" (Mason, 2001, p.160). Although family has received attention in the previous literature as an important institution, little attention has been given to the impact of family structures on other institutions and their ability to change them (Grief, 2005). The classification of Todd (1985) provides the most variation in family systems on a global level.[4] Furthermore, his focus on the variation in family values which he traces back to the Middle Ages and claims is persistent over time (supported by Alesina & Giuliano, 2011; Galasso & Profeta, 2010) provides an alternative to religion to account for variation in culture.[5]

The results of the study show that family systems are a strong predictor to explain the persistence of national democracy. Countries that were characterized by family systems that promote egalitarian and liberal values have a longer history of democracy. This finding is robust to alternative classifications of family systems constructed based on Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas and the inclusion of other potential predictors of democracy. Family systems also appear to

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[4] As an alternative to Todd's model on a global level, Therborn (2004) offers a geo-cultural definition of the family structures. However, Todd's model is preferred as it enables one to take into account larger variation in the family structures within region and provides more insight about the relation between and within generations. The exception to the statement about regional variation is that Todd (1985)'s model for Africa is problematic in the sense that there is not much variation in family systems among the countries in Africa except countries in the northern part of the continent (please see Map 2).

[5] Another reason why it is worthwhile to investigate the link between the family and democracy is that previous research found that the ways relations are organized in the family has implications for macroeconomic and demographic outcomes in a society (Alesina & Giuliano, 2010). Among many outcomes, family structures are found to significantly influence fertility, household formation and consumption (Giuliano, 2007, 2010) and macroeconomic outcomes such as educational attainment, social capital, labour participation, wealth, and inequality (Duranton et al., 2009).

be a better predictor in explaining the cross-national differences in democracy than religion and colonial institutions. Furthermore, the study provides evidence on mechanisms, showing that family systems have a persistent effect on national democracy through their role on local democracy practices, current attitudes of individuals, and socio-economic development. The findings are in line with the arguments and findings of Giuliano & Nunn (2013), Almond & Verba (1989), Persson & Tabellini (2006), Haber & Monaldo (2010) who show that historical institutions have a long term effect on current development outcomes.

2. GLOBAL AND HISTORICAL TRENDS IN DEMOCRACY

2.1. Definition and Measurement of Democracy

There is no consensus on the definition and measurement of democracy in the previous literature.[6] Nevertheless, a few basic criteria should be present which are; the existence of certain fundamental democratic rights involving universal suffrage, free and fair elections, and the upholding of a number of political liberties (Hadenius & Teorell, 2005; Jaggers & Gurr, 1995). In the current study, Bollen's definition of democracy is adopted where democracy is defined as "the extent to which a political system allows political liberties and democratic rule. Political liberties are present to the degree that freedom of expression and the freedom to organize groups that can support or oppose the government exist. Democratic rule refers to the accountability of the elites to the general population where this is nearly always manifested in the presence of free and fair elections held at reasonable intervals" (2009, p. 368).

The Polity IV index is used as a measure of democracy which covers all the independent states that have a total population of 500,000 or more in the most recent year (Marshall et al.,

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[6] Please See Munck (2003) for a review of the definitions and measurements used in the previous literature; Bollen (2009) for a discussion on the issue.

2011). The index is based on three criteria; the competitiveness of political participation, the competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief executive. The scale ranges from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). For ease of interpretation, the Polity IV index has been standardized to range between 0 and 1 in which a higher score means a higher level of democracy.[7] The Polity IV index is highly correlated with other democracy indices of Bollen (1980), Arat (1991), Vanhanen (1990), and Gasiorowski (1993) where the correlations range between .85 and .93 and shows the Polity IV index is an accurate measure of democracy (Jagger & Gurr, 1995). To check the robustness of the findings, Freedom House Index (2011) is used which is a measure of democracy available from 1972 onwards. Furthermore, to capture the persistent nature of democracy, a "duration of democracy" measure is calculated based on the Polity IV index which counts the number of years of uninterrupted democratic regime in a country. Both the Freedom House Index and "duration of democracy" are rescaled to range between 0 and 1.

2.2. Global Trends in Democracy

Below, Figure 1 illustrates the trends in unweighted regional and world average of country scores between 1850s and 2000 in the Polity IV index.

Figure 1. Trends in Democratic Institutions over the World

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[7] A continuous measure of democracy is preferable over a categorical specification since in a categorical measure of democracy, part of the variation within and between countries is lost (see Bollen, 2009; Collier & Addock, 1999 for a review).

As can be seen from Figure 1, there has been a general upward trend in the level of democracy around the world since the 1850s, except for in Western Offshoots countries (i.e., US, Canada, Australia and New Zeeland) which experienced a democratic transition in the beginning of the 1800s and have had stable democracy since. Until the 1920s, there was a major wave of democratic transitions, mainly in Western European countries. However, some of the new democracies failed to survive (e.g., Germany, Italy) which was largely the result of two World Wars, illustrated by the sharp decline in Figure 1. The 1950s is characterized by the spread of democracy to Southern Asia while in the mid-1970s, democracy spread to Asian and Latin American countries, followed by Eastern European and the Soviet Union, and Sub-Saharan Africa in the late 1980s and early-1990s. However, despite this spread of democracy, the overall

pattern is the persistence of inequalities in democratic institutions between the regions of the world. The Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa are poor performers in national democracy.

3. FAMILY SYSTEMS AND DEMOCRACY

3.1. Literature on Historical Institutions, Family Systems and Democracy

A large body of research (e.g, Greif, 1994; Acemoglu et al. 2002) has put forth statistical evidence showing that historical events have long-term impacts on current outcomes (Nunn 2009). In terms of political institutions, one of the best known arguments is the "colonial thesis" by Acemoglu & Johnson (2005). They argue that in areas where Europeans could settle, growth-promoting institutions that provided a rule of law and protection of private property rights were established. However, Glaeser et al. (2004) make the point that European settlers also brought ''their know-how and human capital'', together with their beliefs and values regarding freedom, liberty, equality, and the appropriate role of government (Nunn, 2012). Norms and values define what is preferable and natural in social relations. They decrease the costs for developing, justifying and sustaining formal institutions that are compatible with prevailing cultural values (Licht et al. 2006; Nee, 2005). Each polity - traditional, democratic, or authoritarian - has one form of culture that is congruent with its own structure. Cultural traits stabilize democracy by "providing an enduring base of mass support" (Inglehart, 1997, p.164).

The established link between historical institutions, culture and development originates from Weber (1930)'s argument on Protestant ethics which supposedly provided the moral foundation for a modern market based industrial economy (Nunn, 2012). Similar links between Protestantism and democracy has been established in empirical studies (Bollen & Jackman, 1985; Anderson, 2004; Huntington, 1991). The Protestant religion is argued to have led to the early emergence of political democracy in Western European and its offshoots as it placed an

emphasis on the self-literacy of individuals, possibly influencing citizen converts to question authority, demand accountability, and seek more civil and political rights. Furthermore, Protestant societies also advocated a distinct separation between the church and the state and were more supportive of self-expressive values (Woodberry & Shah, 2004; Tusalem, 2009). On the other side of the story, a long debate exists as to the compatibility of Islam with democracy (Spierings et al. 2009). Muslim majority countries are depicted as lacking democracies because they are prone to political violence, lack secularism and supportive values for democracy (Huntington 1999). Fish (2002) demonstrates that Muslim societies lack democracy because of the lack of gender equality in the region rather than these factors outlined by Huntington (1999).

However, to what extent the disadvantageous position of women is caused by Islam itself or by cultural practices has also been subject to scholarly debate. Al-Hibri (1997) showed that patriarchal culture in the Middle East existed before Islam came to the region and the gender discriminating practices are the result of the patriarchal culture rather than Islam itself. In a similar school of thought, Ahmed (1993) argues that the subordination of women in the Middle East became institutionalized with the rise of urban societies and that of archaic states in particular. The type of marriage that Islam legitimized was in absolute correspondence with the sociocultural systems already in place throughout the Middle East. Looking at Western Europe, van Zanden and de Moor (2009) show links between the emergence of the European Marriage Pattern (EMP), characterized by later age of marriage and a nuclear household structure, and the success of the North Sea region in the post 1600 period. Greif (2010) highlights that the differences in family structures between Western Europe and China had long term effects on economic outcomes. While China is characterized by clan family structures which resulted in kinship-based corporations, the nuclear family structure in Western Europe gave rise to

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institutionalized corporations such as guilds. These examples point out that next to religion, there is reason to suspect that the way families are historically organized had long term consequences for national democracies.

Family, as pointed out by many researchers, is the main carrier of the socialization function and parents pass on to their children particular attitudes, values, and identities (see Dolan (1995) for a review). That is why it has long been suspected that a reciprocal relationship exists between family and the state. As Aristotle puts it in *The Politics*, the household experiences of ruling and being ruled were essential preparations for citizenship. In other words, functions observed originally in the context of household and family have been transferred, often indirectly, to superordinate social forms, in particular the state (Mitterauer & Sieder, 1982, p. 4). The reasoning is that "If the rules of the most basic unit in a society- the family- are not in agreement with the idea of democracy, then political democracy may not be supported by the society in question" (Lane & Errson, 2003, p. 125). Todd puts forward the idea that 'family relations-those between parents and children, between husband and wife-provide a model for political systems and serve to define the relationship between the individual and authority' (p6). To be more precise, "the family types that promote authoritarian values support 'solutions imposed from above' while 'transformations from below' are supported by the liberal families and radical reorganization of the social order is associated with the egalitarian family types" (Mamadouh, 1999, p. 482). Based on this reasoning, the main argument of this study is that *the way families were organized in the past explains (part of) the variation in the persistence of national democracy*. While Todd's family systems are simple enough to classify the countries in the world which would enable a global quantitative analysis, they are rich enough to understand the features of the family that plays a role in transmission of culture and their impact on political

outcomes (Galasso & Profeta, 2010). The seven types of family enable us to examine the interplay between egalitarian and liberal values which, as outlined above, are expected to lead to different political outcomes.[8]

Todd defines seven family systems by the extent to which they are liberal which is determined by the co-residence practices (i.e., living with the parents) and by the extent to which they are egalitarian based on the inheritance practices (asymmetrical vs. symmetrical) and marriage arrangements (exogamous vs. endogamous). An overview of family systems and their potential link to national democracy outcomes is provided in Table 1 while Map 2 in the appendix illustrates the distribution of the family systems over the world.

Table 1- Overview of the Family Systems and Democracy

Family Type	Attitudes on liberty	Attitudes on egalitarianism	Examples	National Democracy
Absolute Nuclear	Free, no cohabitation, highly liberal	Indifference, partly egalitarian	United Kingdom, the United States, Canada, New Zealand, Australia, the Netherlands and Denmark	High and stable democracy
Egalitarian	Free, no cohabitation,	Symmetry,	France,	High and

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[8] The persistence of the family systems and to what extent these family types correspond to the family relations over the world is open to criticisms. Many studies (e.g., Farell, VandeVusse, & Ocobock, 2012) on family point out that family behaviour experienced major transformations due to economic (e.g., industrialization) (Grief, 2006), social (e.g., social capital) (Coleman, 1990), and legal changes (e.g., change in inheritance laws). As pointed out in the introduction, the family values are persistent due to the intergenerational transmission of these values from parents to children (Alesina & Giuliano, 2011; Galasso & Profeta, 2010). Another mechanism of the persistence of these values can be attributed to the influence of the family institutions on different economic and political institutions, which in return would perpetuate the dominant family traits over time (Galasso & Profeta, 2010). Empirical support for Todd´s conceptual model is also evident from different studies. The study of Galasso & Profeta (2010) shows that Todd's family classification is strongly correlated with the family classification of Alesina & Giuliano (2007) which is based on the recent World Values Survey (1981-2004) dataset. The study by Rijpma & Carmichael (2013) tested Todd's classification with Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas which includes information on 1267 societies for the period 1850–1950 and found Todd's family classifications matched well with Murdock's data which supports for the validity of Todd´s work. For more information about Todd's classification and test of his classification, see Rijpma & Carmichael (2013).

nuclear	highly liberal	egalitarian for male children	Switzerland, Poland, Romania, Italy, Greece, Spain, Portugal, partly Latin America	stable democracy
Stem	Parents influence on one child, partly authoritarian	Asymmetry, but egalitarian practice for women	Germany, Austria, Belgium, Norway, Sweden, Israel, Japan, and Korea	High and stable democracy
Endogamous Community	Custom, cohabitation, highly authoritarian	Symmetry for male descendant	Arab world, Turkey, Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan	Low and unstable democracy
Exogamous Community	Parent, cohabitation, authoritarian	Symmetry for male descendant	Burma, Thailand, Laos, Philippines, Cambodia, Malaysia, Indonesia, Madagascar, Sri Lanka	Low and unstable democracy
Anomic	Indifference	Indifference	Russia, Yugoslavia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Hungary, Albania, China, India and Cuba	Low and very unstable democracy
African	Indifference	Indifference	Large part of the African continent	Low and very unstable democracy

3.2. Empirical Evidence

The effect of family systems on democratic systems is studied in a systematic manner by using the following panel specification:

$$D_{i,t} = \alpha + \varphi D_{it-1} + \beta_s F_i + BX_{i,t} + \gamma_s\big(F_i X_{i,t}\big) + \delta_t + \varepsilon_{i,t} \qquad (1)^{[9]}$$

In equation (1) D is the democracy score of country (i) at time (t). *F* is the type of family system in country (i); X is a set of control variables, namely lag of GDP per capita, lag of income from oil[10], percentage of Muslim and Protestant religious population[11], regional dummies and colonial origin dummies; (F X) is the interaction term between family systems and income from oil and religion; δ_t is a set of time dummies to capture the existence of "democratic waves". The lagged value of democracy is included in the right hand side which "provides a simple way to account for historical factors that cause current differences in the dependent variable that are difficult to account for in other ways" (Wooldridge, 2006, p 310). The item of primary interest is the vector of coefficients β_s which capture the direct effect of family systems on democracy and of secondary interest are the vector coefficients γ_s which capture the moderation effect of family systems on the relation between religion, oil and democracy. The model has been tested using a panel data random effects estimation since our main interest variable, family systems is time-invariant. Table A in the appendix provides information on data sources and the content of the variables, whereas Table B provides summary statistics of the variables.

In Table 2, the results for the panel data analysis are presented. The results of Model 1, where only family systems are included, show that endogamous community and African families are less democratic whereas absolute nuclear and stem families are more democratic than egalitarian nuclear ones. Thus the lack of democracy in the Middle East, largely characterized by

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[9] It is not possible to include country fixed effects because of the time invariant nature of family systems.

[10] The first lags of the continuous independent variables are included to achieve the proper length of time it takes to affect the dependent variable at time t (Finkel, 1995).

[11] The religion is also included as a dummy in the regression based on the majority status of the religious denomination. The conclusions that are drawn from this specification are similar to those that are presented in the text.

endogamous community family and Sub-Saharan Africa, dominated by the African family system can be attributed to the ways families were organized in the past. Similar results are evident for the role of family systems in the stability of democracy which is tested in a cross sectional specification with simple OLS (Column 5). The stability of democracy is lower in countries, characterized by endogamous, exogamous and African family systems and higher in countries which had absolute nuclear and stem family structures. The fact that the stem family system is significantly more democratic and has a longer history of democracy than the egalitarian nuclear family points to the role of gender equality in democratic transitions which is in line with previous findings (Inglehart et al. 2004). Maternal authority (Todd, 1987) and gender equality (The World Bank, 2011) are argued to promote socio-economic development which might be the cause of the differences between the two family types. This link is investigated further in section 4.

Model 2 takes into account socio-economic and other historical characteristics that might be driving the relation between family systems and democracy. The significant difference between stem and egalitarian nuclear families disappears implying part of the gap can be attributed to socio-economic or regional differences. One important finding is that endogamous community family is significantly less democratic even when the Muslim variable is taken into account. This refutes the widely-spread discussion about the compatibility of Islam and democracy (Ciftci, 2010) and points out that the underachievement of Muslim majority countries in democracy is related to the family organization rather than the Islam. However, Protestantism seems to have an independent impact on democracy. When the effects of the contextual characteristics are examined, countries which have higher levels of economic development, are also more democratic whereas countries that have higher income from oil tend to be less

democratic which is in line with the findings of previous literature (e.g., Barro, 1999; Doorenspleet, 2004; Ross 2001). Furthermore, Table C in the appendix shows the standardized coefficients of Model 2. Among all the predictors included in the analysis, the level of democracy in the previous time point (10 year interval) has the strongest explanatory power which highlights the persistent nature of democracy; whereas family systems, especially endogamous community family seem to be the second strongest predictor in the Model.

In model 3, data from Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas is employed to check the robustness of the findings related to the family systems. Community family type as a measure of the co-residence and asymmetry as a measure of inheritance practices are included in the analysis which make up the family classifications of Todd (1985). While countries are characterized by community family structure score .06 less on the polity index, there is not a significant direct effect of inheritance practices. This might be due to the fact that the inheritance practices do mainly cover inheritance practices between brothers which exclude a gender aspect. A second explanation is that the detrimental effect of inegalitarian inheritance practices disappears once the differences in socio-economic and regional characteristics are accounted for. Once the patrilineal descendant is included in the model instead of asymmetrical inheritance practices, countries were characterized by patrilineal family practices, are less likely to be democratic.[12]

Model 4 investigates whether the way family relations were organized have an impact on the relation between religion, oil, and democracy outcomes. Religion and family structures might be mutually reinforcing a culture that is either conducive or non-favorable for democracy. The results of Model 4 support this expectation where the negative impact of Islam on democracy is stronger where community family structure dominant the region. This implies that the cross-

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[12] Our aim to test the model of Todd (1985). Therefore for comparability of the results we keep asymmetrical inheritance practices in the analysis.

national differences between Muslim majority countries in democratic outcomes such as Gambia, Malaysia, Sierra Leone, Mali compared to Egypt, United Arab Emirates, Oman, Qatar are driven by the community family practices. A similar link exists between Protestantism and inheritance practices implying that the positive link between Protestantism and democracy is less strong where inegalitarian inheritance practices exist. This might be the reason why Germany is categorized as an unstable democracy in Europe according to Lipset (Almond & Verba, 1989).

In Model 5, the negative link between oil and democracy is investigated to a further extent. Reliance on oil is argued to promote authoritarian regimes (Ross, 2001). If oil has a detrimental effect on democracy, this negative effect is expected to be stronger in countries which were historically characterized by family structure that promotes authoritarian values. The results of Model 5 support this expectation. Considering that the main effect of Muslim religion is taken into account, this finding helps to explain why there are large differences in democracy outcomes between oil exporters such as Venezuela and Indonesia compared to Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, Oman, Kuwait, Qatar, and Libya which have a long history of authoritarian regimes.

Table 2- Relationship between Family Systems and Democracy

	Polity IV:1849-2009 (10-year interval)					Duration Democ. (Cross-Sectional)	Freedom Index: 1972-2002 (10-year interval)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(7)	(6)
Endogamous Community	-.26***	-.15***				-.11***	-.15***
	(.06)	(.04)				(.03)	(.05)
Stem	.27***	.03				.19**	-.01

	(.08)	(.02)				(.08)	(.02)
Absolute Nuclear	.48***	.05*				.43***	-.00
	(.06)	(.02)				(.10)	(.03)
Exogamous Community	-.00	-.04*				-.05*	-.01
	(.06)	(.02)				(.03)	(.04)
Anomic	.04	-.01				.04	-.12***
	(.06)	(.02)				(.05)	(.03)
African	-.15**	-.07*				-.09**	-.09^
	(.05)	(.03)				(.03)	(.05)
Community			-.06**	-.04^	-.05**		
			(.02)	(.03)	(.02)		
Asymmetrical Inheritance			.02	.04	.02		
			(.02)	(.04)	(.02)		
Muslim70		-.00	-.04	.00	-.03	.02	-.00
		(.04)	(.03)	(.05)	(.03)	(.03)	(.04)
Protestant70		.04^	.07**	.15*	.08**	.17**	.03
		(.02)	(.03)	(.07)	(.03)	(.11)	(.03)
British Colonial Origin		-.04*	-.06**	-.06***	-.06***	.01	.01
		(.01)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.02)	(.03)
Log GDP t-1		.03*	.03**	.03**	.04***	.02*	.06***
		(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.01)	(.02)
Log Oil t-1		-.00**	-.00*	-.00*	-.00	-.00	-.01***
		(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.00)	(.01)
Polity t-1		.72***	.72***	.71***	.71***		.57***
		(.03)	(.03)	(.03)	(.03)		(.04)
Interactions							
Muslim*Community				-.08^			
				(.05)			
Muslim*Inheritance				.08			
				(.42)			
Protestant*Community				-.02			
				(.06)			
Protestant*Inheritance				-.10^			
				(.08)			
LogOil*Community					-.00^		
					(.00)		
LogOil*Inheritance					.00		

			(.00)				
Constant	.69***	.08	.00	-.00	-.00	-.05	-.11
	(.05)	(.10)	(.08)	(.08)	(.08)	(.12)	(.15)
Number of Observations (Countries)	1385	962	751	751	751	145	246
	(162)	(145)	(123)	(123)	(123)		(122)
R2	.37	.78	.80	.80	.81	.66	.83

Notes: ***<.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^p<.10 (for 1 tailed-t test). Reference category for the family systems is egalitarian nuclear family. Regional (except Model 1) and year fixed effects are included in all the models. The unstandardized coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in the parenthesis.

As a robustness check (Model 6), the Freedom House Index which is available from 1972 onwards is used as an alternative measures of democracy. While the conclusions that could be drawn from these models are similar to the ones outlined above, one difference is that anomic families have less freedom compared to the egalitarian nuclear families whereas absolute and egalitarian nuclear families do not differ in terms of civil and political liberties when the macro conditions are accounted for.

4. POSSIBLE CHANNELS FROM FAMILY SYSTEMS TO POLITICAL DEMOCRACY

4.1. Literature

In the previous section, a direct link between family systems and national states' political regimes has been illustrated, implying that historical institutions matter which is in line with the findings of previous literature (e.g., Acemoglu & Johnson 2005; Nunn 2009). This section aims to show how they matter. Family systems might explain the persistence in democracy through several channels. Here, the focus is on three channels; socio-economic development (including gender equality), local democracy and their impact on current norms and values.

Todd (1987) shows that family structures are associated with different socio-economic outcomes. He particularly focuses on the link between maternal authority in the family and its relation to investment in human capital. Duranton et al. (2009) tested this association between

Todd's family systems and a number of socio-economic outcomes empirically where they found that in Europe, countries that were characterized with absolute nuclear families have higher education levels, female labour force participation, and economic development today. Socio-economic development is expected to lead to higher levels of national democracy as it increases the desires for citizens in democracy as individuals give priority to freedom of choice (e.g., Lipset, 1959; Barro, 1999; Burkhart & Lewis-Beck, 1994). Thus, family systems are expected to have an indirect effect on democracy through its effect on socio-economic development.

As an alternative mechanism, the way family systems were historically organized might have led to development of regional democracy practices. In a recent study, Giuliano and Nunn (2013) showed that past experience with local level democracy is associated with more supportive beliefs of national democracy today. The link between how family has been structured influenced the emergence of local institutions has been shown by Greif (2006) which was shortly mentioned in the previous section of this paper. He argues that different family structures produce differing emphases on community and society, where nuclear families have to lead to stronger society type institutions such as guilds, universities (e.g., Western Europe), and communitarian family structures to stronger community type institutions emphasizing kinship relations (e.g., China).

Lastly, as argued both in the previous section and here, attitudes people have which relate to democracy, play a role in ensuring good quality democratic institutions and make them endure once they are in place. This finding has been supported by previous literature (e.g., Inglehart, 1997; Lane & Errson, 2003). Thus the norms and values transmitted in the families through generations has a persistent impact on attitudes individuals hold which helps to explain why the cross-national differences in democratic institutions are persistent today.

4.2. Empirical Assessment by 2SLS

To test the channels outlined above, 2SLS estimation is employed for which the results are shown in Table 3. The channels are assessed in separate models to avoid over-specification (especially for the last 3 models where the number of observations are limited) and multicollinearity problems (i.e., between gdp per capita, education and gender equality).

The results of Model 1 which includes log of GDP per capita, show that absolute nuclear and stem families are characterized with higher economic development whereas community family, anomic and African families have lower economic development which has an indirect effect on democracy. Looking at Model 2, similar disparities exist in terms of human capital. Absolute nuclear families have high levels of education whereas countries characterized with African family and anomic families have low levels of education. Model 3 shows that countries that are characterized with absolute nuclear and stem families have higher levels of gender equality, anomic and African family systems score poorly on the gender equality. Overall, family systems have an indirect effect on the persistent national democracy running through socio-economic development.

In Model 4, the link between family systems and local democracy practices is investigated. The local democracy measure comes from Murdock's Ethnographic data and is aggregated at the national level which measures to the extent the heads of the local office were appointed based on patrilineal heir. In line with Guiliano and Nunn (2013), a history of democracy at the local level is associated with contemporary democracy at the national level whereas family systems explain the differences in countries experience with local democracy. This finding is particularly relevant for regions where African family system is dominant. Countries that have been characterized with selection to the office of local headman based on

patrilineal heir are less democratic at the national level. A word of caution is necessary here. The results might be driven by the fact that Murdock Ethnographic Atlas has much better coverage for Africa compared to other regions of the world (Rijpma & Carmichael 2013).

As a final channel, Model 5 investigates whether the way family relations have been organized in the past has an impact on democracy through its effect on current norms and values of individuals. Data on the importance of public expression is drawn from World Values Survey[13]. The findings show that individuals who are part of countries that were characterized by absolute nuclear families and stem families value higher expressing themselves through public channels whereas the opposite is true in countries which were characterized by community, anomic and African family types. This results in cross-national disparities in democracy today.

Table 3- 2SLS Estimations- Channels from Family Systems to National Democracy

	(1) Polity IV: 1849-2009 (10-year interval)	(2) Polity IV: 1849-2009 (10-year interval)	(3) Polity IV: Cross-sectional Average (1989-2009)	(4) Polity IV: Cross-sectional Average (1849-2009)	(5) Polity IV: Cross-sectional Average (1989-2009)
Second Stage					
Log Gdp	.07*** (.02)				
Education		.02** (.01)			
Gender Inequality			-.90*** (.15)		
Local Democracy				-.61*** (.11)	
Support- Public Expression					.64*** (.15)
R2 in second stage	.78	.78	.56	.22	.55
Observations	962	705	134	147	83
(Countries)	(145)	(76)			
First Stage					
Endogamous	-.29**	.34	.05	.10	-.13^

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[13] Although trust in others, as argued by Putnam (Putnam 1994) and support for democracy (Almond& Verba 1989) have an impact on democratic outcomes, they donnot seem to explain much related to the family systems part of the story. Therefore it is not reported in the text.

Community	(.13)	(.70)	(.05)	(.09)	(.08)
Stem	.33***	2.40***	-.14**	-.05	.25***
	(.06)	(.20)	(.05)	(.09)	(.06)
Absolute Nuclear	.34***	2.46***	-.10*	-.04	.33***
	(.08)	(.24)	(.06)	(.11)	(.07)
Exogamous	-.38***	-.01	-.00	.04	-.10*
Community	(.06)	(.20)	(.03)	(.07)	(.05)
Anomic	-.34***	-.72***	.11***	-.07	-.14**
	(.06)	(.18)	(.04)	(.08)	(.06)
African	-1.22***	-2.34***	.33***	.49***	-.23***
	(.07)	(.27)	(.04)	(.07)	(.06)
F-statistics	16.37	16.69	50.65	10.14	20.69
R2 in first stage	.72	.84	.73	.53	.78

Notes: ***<.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, ^p<.10 (for 1 tailed-t test). Reference category for the family systems is egalitarian nuclear family. Regional fixed effects, log oil, British colonial origin percentage of Muslim and Protestant population are included in all the models. Year fixed effects and lag of polity are included in the first two models. F statistics are provided for the joint significance of family systems including the same controls in the second stage. The unstandardized coefficients are reported with robust standard errors in the parenthesis.

5. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION

This study provided a systematic investigation on the role of historical institutions in explaining disparities in national democracy by focusing on family structures. Our findings contribute to the literature on historical institutions having long term impacts on development outcomes.

To be more precise, the way families have been organized have an impact in explaining why some countries, especially located in the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa are struggling to adopt democratic institutions whereas especially Western European countries and its offshoots have long experience with democracy. Countries that are characterized by family structures that promote egalitarian and liberal values have a longer history of democracy. Furthermore, family systems as an alternative historical institution to religion play a major role in promoting norms and values conducive to democracy.

Overall, this study showed that family structure as an explanatory factor improves our understanding of the persistent global inequalities in democratic outcomes. This has implications

for political and economic literature, especially for understanding why common determinants of democracy such as oil or religion led to different national democratic outcomes. Family systems are shown to have a persistent effect on social and economic outcomes as well (e.g., Galasso & Profeta, 2010). Thus, the main conclusion drawn from this study would be similar to that of Duranton et al. (2009, p. 21): "Whatever interpretative framework is used, it is reasonable to conclude that family structure deserves to be a fundamental component of the society and community debate."

However, this study also brings out questions regarding how long the persistent effect of family systems on democracy will continue and what are the necessary changes to escape the traps of family structures for countries in Africa, in Middle East and Asia. Migration and globalization could be two factors that might lead to a change in the persistent family structures (Duranton et al. 2009). This remains as an ambition for the future studies to investigate.

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APPENDIX:

Map 1. Distribution of the Political Systems over the World, 2011

Source: Marshall et al. (2011)

Map 2. Todd (1985)'s Classification of the Family Systems over the World

Todd's EoI classification

- absnucl
- african
- anomic
- author
- egalnucl
- egalnucl/anomic
- endocom
- exocom

Source: Rijpma& Carmichael (2013)

Table A. Description and Sources of the Variables

Variable	Description	Source
Dependent Variable: National-level Democracy Measures		
Polity IV	This measure covers all the independent states that have a total population of 500,000 or more in the most recent year. It is based on three criteria; competitiveness of political participation, the competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on chief executive. The scale ranges from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10 (consolidated democracy). For the ease of interpretation, the Polity IV index has been standardized to range between 0 and 1 in which higher score means higher level of democracy as a political regime. It is available from 1820 onwards and cover 166 countries.	Marshall et al. (2011)
Freedom House Index	As an alternative measure of democracy, freedom house index is used. This index focuses on political and civil liberties in a country where the index ranges between 1 and 7 with 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free and based on the sum of political and civil liberties, divided by two to create the Freedom Index. This variable has been rescaled and standardized to range between 0 and 1 in which a higher score means higher levels of freedom. It is available from 1972 to present and covers 194 countries.	Freedom House Index (2011)
Stability of Democracy	This index is created based on the Polity IV index and is used to measure the persistence in democracy. It simply counts the number of years a democratic system has been present interruptedly in a country since it has been independent. This scale has been standardized to range between 0 and 1.	Based on Marshall et al. (2011)
Independent Variables		
Historical Institutions		
Family Systems	As a main measure of family system, Todd's classification is used which is a time-invariant categorical variable and measured based on the following criteria: co-residence patterns, inheritance and marriage practices. Based on his typology, seven categories are included, namely (1) egalitarian nuclear family, (2) exogamous community family, (3) endogamous community family, (4) absolute nuclear family, (5) stem family, (6) anomic family, and (7) African family. In the analysis egalitarian nuclear family is used as the reference category. His classification of family structure has been tested by looking at percentage of the population that practice communitarian co-residence and asymmetrical inheritance practices. Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas contains information for 1265 ethnic groups. Based on the majority of the population, community and asymmetrical inheritance practices were coded as dummy variables.	Todd (1985), Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas
Colonial Origin	Their data exclusively focuses on "Western overseas" colonialism where countries are considered as colonized after 1700 and if it lasted for 10 years or longer. Based on these criteria, the colonial heritage variable includes 4 categories namely, (1) never colonized by a Western overseas colonial power, (2) British colony, (3) French colony, and (4) other colonies (e.g., Spanish, Dutch, Belgium, and American). In the analysis, the focus is on British colonialism as the effect of other colonizer identities are insignificant in the analysis.	Hadenius & Teorell (2005)
Religion	Religion is included in the analysis as the percentage of the population that have Muslim and	Barro's (2008) , La

	Protestant religious denomination in 1970 which comes from Barro (2008). As an alternative, a categorical measure of religion has been used from La Porta et al. (1999) where countries are grouped into four categories; (1) Muslim, (2) Christian (3) Protestant, and (4) other religious affiliation.	Barro (2008)
Socio-Economic Indicators		
Economic Development	To measure economic development, the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita is used. The log of GDP is taken in the analysis. It covers 166 countries where yearly observation becomes available after 1820s.	Maddison (2008)
Reliance on Natural Resources	Gross Oil Rent per capita is measured based on the income of the government provided by oil resources. The log of gross oil rents is taken in the analysis. It is available for 168 countries from 1800 onwards.	Haber & Menaldo (2011)
Human Capital	Human capital is measured by average years of schooling among the adult population age over 25. The variable is available in ten years interval between 1850-2000 covering 76 countries in the world. The data combines total enrolments in primary, secondary and tertiary schooling with age pyramids in order to calculate the average number of years of schooling among the adult population	Murrison & Murtin (2009)
Additional Instrumented Variables		
Gender Inequality	This index gives an indication of the inequality between men and women, measured along health, empowerment and labour market participation dimensions. This index varies from 0 to 1 where 0 means no inequality between men and women and 1 means total inequality. The index is available for 195 countries between 1995 and 2011.	United Nations Development Programme (2011)
Local Democracy	Local democracy measure comes from Murdock ethnographic Atlas based on Variable 73, "Succession to the Office of Local Headman: Type of Hereditary Succession" and measures the percentage of the population in a country which practices the local headman selection based on son inheritance.	Murdock's Ethnographic Atlas
Support for Public Expression	This variable is measured based on World Values Survey dataset where respondents were asked whether they signed a petition coded (1) and might or never do coded (0). La Porta et al. (1999) aggregated the individual information to country level by taking the mean of the answers. For more information, refer to Teorell et al. (2011)	La Porta et al. (1999)

Table B. Descriptive Statistics

Variable Name	Range	Mean	Countries	Observations
Dependet Variables				
Polity IV index	0-1	.48 (.33)	162	1385
Duration Democracy	0-1	.12 (.19)	159	-
Freedom House Index	0-1	.65 (.28)	168	473
Independent Variables				
Exogamous Community	0/1	.15	162	1385
Egalitarian nuclear family	0/1	.06	162	1385
Endogamous community family	0/1	.15	162	1385
Absolute nuclear family	0/1	.08	162	1385
Authoritarian family	0/1	.10	162	1385
Anomic family	0/1	.20	162	1385
African family systems	0/1	.14	162	1385
Community	0/1	.30	146	1271
Asymmetrical Inheritance	0/1	.14	130	1029
GDP per capita (log)	5.33-10.67	7.79 (.98)	155	1154
Gross Oil Rents (log)	-6.90-10.42	-2.85 (5.28)	155	1311
Average years of education	0.2-13.61	4.85 (3.47)	76	816
Muslim	0-1	.19 (.34)	152	1316
Protestant	0-.97	.11 (.21)	152	1316
British colony	0/1	.16	162	1385
Eastern Asia	0-1	.10	162	1385
Southern Asia	0-1	.05	162	1385
Middle East	0-1	.12	162	1385
Latin America	0-1	.21	162	1385
Local Democracy	0-.99	.15 (.28)	149	-
Gender Inequality	.06-.81	.43 (.19)	135	-
Support-Public Expression	.03-.87	.30).29'	159	

Table C-The standardized coefficients of Model 2 in Table 2

Variables	Standardized Coefficients
Endogamous Community	-.16***
Stem	.02
Absolute Nuclear	.03*
Exogamous Community	-.05**
Anomic	-.00
African	-.08**
Muslim70	-.00
Protestant70	.03^
British Colonial Origin	-.05*
Log GDP t-1	.07*
Log Oil t-1	-.05**
Polity t-1	.70***
Eastern Asia	-.04**
Middle East	-.00
Latin America	.04^
Southern Asia	.03^

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