To move or not to move. A global overview of migration to the city since the 18th century.[1]

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ABSTRACT

This article tries to understand why and under what conditions people in the past two centuries settled in cities and how to explain the huge differences in levels of rural to urban migrations between various parts of the world (focusing especially on the Atlantic, China, India and Sub-Saharan Africa). Although increasing urbanization seems to be a more or less universal pattern, it is unclear why only a quarter of the Indian population lived in cities at the end of the twentieth century or why urbanization levels in North Africa are much higher than in Sub-Saharan Africa. A second and closely related question addressed in this paper is how to explain the differences in settlement patterns of immigrants, ranging from staying permanently in the city to highly volatile and circular moves that create a rural-urban continuum. The basic argument in this article is that to understand both differences in the level and the nature of urbanization throughout the world we have to look at what cities have to offer to their (new) inhabitants in terms of rights and services. The better and encompassing the bid is, the more people will permanently settle in urban centers and the less they will depend on ethnic or kin networks, and vice versa. In this model ethnicity, whether it is portrayed as tribal or reliance on the family or household, is primarily seen as a function of the extent of institutional completeness of cities. The more services cities provide, the less need there is to rely on 'strong ties' of kin and co-ethnics, and to spread risks between the city and the countryside, which leads to circular movements between rural and urban areas..

Introduction

In his recent book *Triumph of the city* the Harvard economist Edward Glaeser presents the city as the best possible place to live, both in the past, the present and the foreseeable future. Echoing the work of Jane Jacobs on mixed zoning and Richard Florida on the creative class he argues that the combination of density and diversity makes cities engines of creativity and innovation, as well as upward social mobility.[2] Glaeser points out that the chances for a city to fulfill these functions depend on a number of conditions, such as well functioning institutions and a diversified economy. This also explains why so many people flock to the city worldwide, notwithstanding extreme poverty in endless slums. Even in third world megacities, like Lagos and Kolkata, poor immigrants from the countryside who end up in vast shantytowns or favelas are on average better off than those who remain behind in the countryside. Such cities, with negative exceptions like Kinshasa, may seem hellholes to many, but poor rural migrants go there for a reason. We

[1] I thank Leslie Moch, José Moya, Lynn Lees, Andrew Lees, Prashant Kidambi, Peter Clark, Adam McKeown, Jan Lucassen and participants of the Leiden Seminar on Global Interactions for their critical remarks on an earlier version.

[2] Edward Ludwig Glaeser, *Triumph of the City: How Our Greatest Invention Makes Us Richer, Smarter, Greener, Healthier and Happier* (London: MacMillan, 2011).

should worry more about places that do not attract the poor than places that do, so Glaeser argues. [3] A similar argument can be found in Doug Saunders' well researched and highly interesting book *Arrival City*, where he more specifically focuses on the urban twilight zones (the 'arrival city') where poor rural migrants initially settle and build their social capital.[4]

In this article I do not so much want to discuss to what extent urban slums indeed make 'spring boards to middle class prosperity'[5], but concentrate on the question under what conditions people in the past two centuries settled in cities and how to explain the huge differences between various parts of the world. If what Glaeser and Saunders describe is indeed a more or less universal pattern, the question forces itself upon us why only a quarter of the Indian population lived in cities at the end of the twentieth century and why urbanization levels in North Africa are much higher than in Sub-Saharan Africa. A second and closely related question that interests me here is how to explain the differences in settlement patterns of immigrants, ranging from staying permanently in the city to highly volatile and circular moves that create a rural-urban continuum.

Since the end of the 19th century with the birth of the social sciences (Durkheim, Tönnies, Simmel, Weber) such questions were cast in the master narrative of modernization, mixed with Weberian notions of citizenship and public sphere. Until the 19th century, so the story went, most people were tied to the land, lived in small villages and tilled the land. Country-folk were prisoners of traditional values, strong kin networks and remnants of traditional feudal relations. In other parts of the world, especially in Asia and Africa, the idea of citizenship based on a shared urban space was lacking as people lived in societies dominated by tribalism, family lineages and ancestor cults which even pervaded life in the few cities that had developed as nodal points of administration and commerce.

Only when Europeans broke the Malthusian ceiling at the end of the 18th century and industrialization unleashed previously untapped powers, the population in Western Europe and North America finally started to grow in a spectacular way. With the mechanization of agriculture in the course of the 19th century the great mass of the peasant population was freed of its rural shackles and moved to cities, where their manpower was much needed. They were confronted with a new urban culture of anonymous, individual achievement and soon weak ties replaced suffocating clan solidarity. This rural-urban mass migration was most visible in the great transatlantic migrations from Europe to the Americas and white settler colonies in Oceania, which consisted of some 50 million Europeans in the period 1820-1920. But also within Europe tens of millions were uprooted and settled in towns never to return to the countryside. Initially most new city dwellers held on to ethnic networks and clustered in certain neighborhoods, like the Auvergnats or Bretons in Paris, Spanish peasants in Buenos Aires, Polish speaking Germans in the Ruhr area, and Italians in New York. During the first phase migrant associations and hometown associations (*Landsmannschaften*) and the

[3] Ibid., 71.
[4] Doug Saunders, *Arrival city. How the largest migration in history is reshaping our world* (London 2011).
[5] Ibid., 74.

ethnic infrastructure in their new urban neighborhoods shielded them from full exposure to modern city life, of which their children reaped the fruit.[6]

This stereotypical modernization tale may not be not entirely false, but it is nevertheless misleading, because it assumes a much too binary opposition between the village and the city. More importantly, it easily can lead scholars to privilege the European experience in which cities developed into places with a common citizenship that gradually superseded ethnic affiliations and where a civil society and public sphere developed already in the 17th and 18th centuries, however partial and contested. As Bin Wong has rightfully argued with respect to the history of China, the greatest disadvantage of this Western blueprint is that it serves as a model that is used to measure the rest of the world. This myopic Eurocentrism has blinded scholars for different societal structures in other parts of the world and has produced a wealth of what one could call 'default studies', explaining the absence of civil society and public sphere in Asia and Africa.[7]

In this paper I will try to avoid the Weberian trap, but without throwing away the baby with the bathwater. For a global comparison of rural-urban migrations and the ensuing settlement process we need some kind of yardstick and the Weberian-Habermassian model, stripped of its normative Eurocentrism, is still very useful as a heuristic devise. If only we avoid teleological interpretations of historical trends and have an open eye for other manifestations of shared urban identities and practices.

Towards a typology

The basic argument in this article is that to understand both differences in the level and the nature of urbanization throughout the world we have to look at what cities have to offer to their (new) inhabitants in terms of rights and services. The better and encompassing the bid is, the more people will permanently settle in urban centers and the less they will depend on ethnic or kin networks, and vice versa. In this model ethnicity, whether it is portrayed as tribal or reliance on the family or household, is primarily seen as a function of the institutional completeness of cities. The more services cities provide, the less need there is to rely on 'strong ties' of kin and co-ethnics,[8] and to spread risks between the city and the countryside, which leads to circular movements between rural and urban areas. From this perspective therefore ethnicity or tribalism is not an explanatory, or independent, variable, but something that needs to be explained: *explanandum* instead of *explanans*. These considerations have lead me to construct the following typology which encapsulates the bulk of the rural-urban migration configurations in the world in the last two centuries.

Figure 1: A global-historical typology of rural-urban migrations and settlement

Type	Urbanization level	Settlement process	Migratory pattern

[6] For a global overview of migrant associations see José C. Moya, "Immigrants and Associations: A Global and Historical Perspective," *Journal of ethnic and migration studies* 31, no. 5 (2005).

[7] Roy Bin Wong, *China Transformed: Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000).

[8] For a application of (Granovetter's) 'weak' and 'strong' ties concept to migration history see: Leslie Page Moch, "Networks among Bretons? The Evidence for Paris, 1875-1925.," *Continuity and Change* 18, no. 3 (2003).

1: The full citizen model	**High**	**Weak Ties (civil)**	**Permanent Settlement**
2:The ethno-national model			
3: The external differential citizenship model			
4: The internal differential citizenship model			
5: *The 'empty citizenship' model*	**Low**	**Strong ties (ethnic)**	**Circulatory/ temporary**

1: The full citizenship model

This model can be considered as the flagship of the Weberian fleet and goes back to medieval European cities that developed in Southern Europe and then gradually spread in the direction of Northwestern Europe. These cities were relatively independent of the sovereign and offered its citizens forms of citizenship that freed them of feudal obligations and which transcended kin or ethnic ties. Inhabitants of the city shared a *communitas* that provided institutional support from poor relief to the regulation of the labor market and a shared public sphere.[9] From the 19th century onwards this inclusive model was transferred to the national (and more recently to the supranational level), with full scale welfare states and liberal democracies as the zenith of inclusiveness, especially in (Western) Europe, North America, Japan and Oceania.

Especially in Western Europe, the Americas, white settler colonies and Japan[10] most migrants to cities, both internal and external, can be classified as 'citizens on arrival', which means that full assimilation is the preferred mode and that ethnicity –

[9] See also Wim Blockmans, "Inclusiveness and Exclusion: Trust Networks at the Origins of European Cities " *Theory and Society* 39, no. 3-4- (2010).

[10] André Sorensen, *The Making of Urban Japan. Cities and Planning from Edo to the Twenty-First Century* (London: Routledge, 2002). Although the ties to the home village in Japan were strong, this did not prevent a rapid permanent urbanization. Internal migrants were not excluded from urban institutions, whereas migrants from abroad, like Koreans, were seen as fundamentally different. Notwithstanding ethnocentrism and restrictive aliens policies foreign immigrants were not deprived of political and social rights, however: Erin Aeren Chung, "Workers or Residents? Diverging Patterns of Immigrant Incorporation in Korea and Japan," *Pacific affairs* 83, no. 4 (2010), 13-14.

including transnational practices - fades after two or three generations. More recent rhetorics about multiculturalism notwithstanding, legal migrants from all over the world are still primarily defined and treated as citizens and in the long run integrate in their host societies.[11] In the new world this homogenization was furthermore stimulated by discourses about whiteness and the deliberate policies to change the racial balance of the country. Well known examples are the American Quota acts from 1917 onwards which favored (Northwest) Europeans and similar policies in (former) British dominions like Canada and Australia. But also Latin American countries were heavily influenced by racial world views. In the latter part of the 19th century Brazil stimulated the immigration of Europeans to counterbalance the former black slave population. Thus, the population of Sao Paolo rose from 32,000 in 1872 to 580,000 in 1920, for a large part through immigration from Italy, Portugal and Spain, whose passage was often paid by the Brazilian government.[12] Another darker side of the full citizen model is that migrants who were deemed racially and or culturally too different to assimilate and to be granted equal rights, were either not allowed to enter or, when already present (either as 'native peoples' or as minorities like the Roma) partly excluded from citizenship.[13] From the 1960s in most democratic states the stress on ethnicity and race gradually shifted to human capital as the main criterion to allow people from other states in as permanent citizens.[14]

2:The ethno-national model

In the Russian, Hapsburg and Ottoman empires (with the exception of Istanbul) urbanization levels were much lower than in the rest of Europe and the settlement process, also in the successor states, was shaped by ethno/religious criteria. Although a shared urban citizenship cum public sphere developed to some extent, it was segmented as it interfered with nationalist and religious group thinking, which caused forms of segregation within cities and fostered ethnic and religious ties. During and after World War 1 these multiethnic empires finally dissolved and gave way to the nation state model.[15] The relative tolerance towards differences suddenly changed into a stress on ethnic homogeneity, which turned ethnic and religious groups into problematic segments of the population. In extreme cases this lead to genocide (Armenians in Turkey), large scale population exchanges (Turkey-Greece 1922), ethnic cleansings (Yugoslavian civil war of the 1990s) and virulent forms of discrimination against Jews and Roma, but also

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[11] Leo Lucassen, David Feldman and Jochen Oltmer, eds., *Paths of Integration. Migrants in Western Europe (1880-2004)* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2006).

[12] Sales Augusto dos Santos, "Historical Roots of the "Whitening" of Brazil," *Latin American Perspectives* 29, no. 1 (2002), there 69-70.

[13] For the Indian populations of Latin America who migrated to cities see Paul L. Doughty, "Life Goes On: Revisiting Lima's Migrant Associations," in *Migrants, Regional Identities and Latin American Cities*, ed. Teófilo Altamirano and Lane Ryo Hirabayashi (The Society for Latin American Anthropology, 1997). and Alan Gilbert, *The Latin American City* (London: `The Latin American Bureau, 1994). And Orlandina de Oliveira and Bryan Roberts, "Urban Development and Social Inequality in Latin America," in *The Urban Transformation of the Developing World*, ed. Josef Gugler (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996) 253-314.

[14] Adam McKeown, *Melancholy Order: Asian Migration and the Globalization of Borders* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008).

[15] Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

national minorities. This highly ethno-nationalist opportunity structure, which was only fortified with the fall of the Iron Curtain and the dissolving of the Soviet empire, had lasting consequences for the settlement process of migrants to cities like Moscow, Budapest and Istanbul, and created important barriers for assimilation and full citizenship. The position of Kurds in Turkish cities or Chechens in Russian towns (or more in general the Russian internal passport system) [16] can be seen as the result of this extreme socio-political transformation.

3: The external differential citizenship model

In contrast to liberal democratic states, where citizenship rights are in principal meant for all inhabitants, many autocratic, dictatorial or partial democratic states draw the principal line between insiders and outsiders, using nationality as key criterium. Natives are treated as full citizens and provided with all kind of rights and (urban) benefits, with the exception of political rights, which are denied to aliens. The result is a permanent and forced condition of circularity and temporariness, that makes foreign migrants, whether they work in cities or not, dependent on kin and co-ethnics. A good example are the Gulf states which have been recruiting Asian migrants in large numbers since the 1970s, but treat them as non-citizens and bar them from citizenship. [17] This has especially consequences for their settlement process, because most of them are not given citizenship rights and may be expelled at will, mostly when the economy goes down. Similar mechanisms are found in states that developed into democracies but where citizenship is defined in ethnic or religious terms, like Malaysia.[18]

4: The internal differential citizenship model

This model refers to states that differentiate citizenship rights among one's citizens according to their residence, with the aim to restrict and control internal migration from the countryside to the city. As a consequence rural migrants who settled in cities become either illegal or they are not automatically entitled to civic rights, entitlements and equal entrance to urban institutions (welfare, education etc.). This model was widely spread in early modern Europe, but after 1800 remained in force in Russia.[19] Its most extreme version is the Chinese *hukou* system that was installed by the Communist regime in the 1950s and successfully slowed down rural to urban migrations until the late 1970s. But also when the reins were slackened from 1978 onwards rural migrants remained excluded

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[16] Charles Steinwedel, "Making Social Groups, One Person at a Time: The Identification of Individuals by Estate, Religious Confession, and Ethnicity in Late Imperial Russia," in *Documenting Individual Identity. The Development of State Practices in the Modern World*, ed. Jane Caplan and John Torpey (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 67-82; Marc Garcelon, "Colonizing the Subject: The Genealogy and Legacy of the Soviet Internal Passport," in *Documenting Individual Identity*, 83-100.

[17] Onno Winckler, "The Challenge of Foreign Workers in the Persian-Arabian Gulf: The Case of Oman," *Immigrants and Minorities* 19, no. 2 (2000) 23-52; Gianluca Parolin, P, *Citizenship in the Arab World. Kin, Religion and Nation-State* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2009).

[18] Blanca Garcés Mascarenas, "Old and New Labour Migrations to Malaysia: From Colonial Times to the Present," in *Illegal Migration and Gender in a Global and Historical Perspective*, ed. Marlou Schrover, et al. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008) 105-126.

[19] Jeffrey Burds, *Peasant Dreams & Market Politics. Labor Migration and the Russian Village, 1861-1905* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1998); David Moon, "Peasant Migration, the Abolition of Serfdom, and the Internal Passport System in the Russian Empire, C. 1800-1914," in *Coerced and Free Migration. Global Perspectives*, ed. David Eltis (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2002), 324-357.

from urban citizenship, creating two classes of city-dwellers: those with urban citizenship and access to all kind of services, and the migrants who were only allowed to work, but whose citizenship was limited to the countryside. Because of the lack of social provisions in the city this model contains strong incentives to return (at least temporarily) to the home region.

Another variant is the segregation of the Palestinians in Israel and the creation of artificial 'homelands' in South Africa under Apartheid, which was institutionalized in 1948. The latter enabled Black Africans to migrate to South African and Namibian mines, but these (male) migrants found themselves isolated in compounds. Permanent settlement was forbidden and their citizenship rights were restricted to their 'homelands' or *Bantustans.* Ironically, elements of the Apartheid system have remained in force under the new ANC regime, but now aimed at African migrants from neighboring states, leading to violent clashes with the native population.[20]

5: *The 'empty citizenship' model*

Finally there are cities that have very little to offer to newcomers. These can be found in (Sub-Saharan) Africa, parts of Asia (like India) and in different degrees in South America. States and cities in these parts of the world are either too weak, too poor or for other reasons provide neither a common safety net nor a sense of urban citizenship for (mostly internal) migrants who move to cities. At least after decolonization, people are free to move to cities, but are largely left to themselves in highly segregated slums, isolated from wealthy and gated parts of the city. To some extent a 'lighter' version can be found in the United States (and to a lesser degree France and Italy) where 'hyperghettos' have developed, [21] populated by racial minorities and poor immigrants, which bear a resemblance to the slums and favelas of Calcutta, Lagos and Rio de Janeiro.

In order to prevent marginalization many migrants nurture ties with their place of origin and set up all kinds of home town associations. Such a rural-urban continuum should not only be interpreted as an insurance against social risks, but may also have emotional and spiritual meanings for the migrants and their kin. The preference in China and parts of sub Saharan Africa to be buried in the home village, as well as ongoing remittances testify to that. The lack of common civil urban institutions explain the heightened salience of ethnic and kin networks that channel and regulate migration between countryside and towns. As we will see in the next sections on Africa and India, this does not automatically lead to extreme pluralism and as a consequence a very weak public sphere. Parallel to hometown associations there was room for the creation of ties and allegiances, through work, religion and leisure, which created at least a partial shared urban culture. How this balance between 'ethnic' and 'civil', or the 'subject' and the 'citizen'[22] works out depends on the concrete local and historical context.

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[20] Jonathan Crush, "Fortress South Africa and the Deconstruction of Apartheid's Migration Regime," *Geoforum* 30(1999) 1-11.

[21] Loïc Wacquant, *Urban Outcasts: A Comparative Sociology of Advanced Marginality* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2008).

[22] Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).

The advantage of this typology (figure 1) is not only heuristic, but also theoretical in the sense that it specifies the factors that influence migratory behavior. Moreover, the typology has an in-built temporal and spatial flexibility that prevents geographical or ideological determinism. If we take the state as level of analysis, for example, twentieth century France would fulfill most of the conditions that underlie the full citizenship model, whereas Kinshasa would fall in the 'empty citizenship' model. France in the mid 19th century, however, or the Parisian banlieus in the present, show also aspects of 'empty citizenship', whereas the former Kinshasa, the Belgian colonial capital of Leopoldville, on the other hand, provided many more services to its citizens, albeit partly on a racial basis, than its postcolonial successor.

In this article I will further test this typology to discuss, explain and systematize the bewildering variety in both migratory and settlement processes throughout the world in the last two centuries. I will do that by focusing primarily on those parts of the world that so far have been left out of discussions about urbanization, ethnicity and migration, such as China, India and Sub-Saharan Africa. Before doing so, however, I will first present a brief summary of the major trends in urbanization and migration and use the Atlantic world as point of departure for the global comparison. To what extent was Europe indeed different from the rest of the world and is it so that the 'full citizenship' model, as Weber assumed, was much more deeply rooted here?

Migration and urbanization levels in the Atlantic World and beyond

At the end of the 18th century Europe was not the most urbanized part of the world. If we take 10,000 inhabitants as the urban threshold, its urbanization level was lower than in Japan and the Middle East and not dramatically higher than South America and India. Only China, North America and Africa lagged behind.[23] Only at the end of the 19th century Western Europe and the United States surpassed the rest of the world (table 1).

Table 1: Urbanization levels in Japan, the Middle East, Europe and China 1800-1890 (cities > 10,000)

	1800	**1890**
Japan	15	20
Middle East	12	15
Western Europe	10	30
Europe	9	15
Latin America	7	10
India	6	9
United States	3	32
China	3	5
Africa	2	4
World	6	13

[23] Paolo Malanima, *Pre-Modern European Economy (10th-19th Centuries)* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2009), 242.

Source: Europe: Malanima, *Pre-Modern European Economy*, 242; Idem, "Urbanization.", in: Stephen Broadberry and Kecin O'Rourke (eds.), *The Cambridge Economic History of Modern Europe. Vol 1 1700-1870* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 260; Champion, Anthony Gerard and Graeme Hugo. *New Forms of Urbanization: Beyond the Urban-Rural Dichotomy* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2004), 44; Utvik, Bjoern Olav. "The Modernizing Force of Islam.", In: John L. Esposito and Francois Burgat (eds.), *Modernizing Islam: Religion in the Public Sphere in the Middle East and Europe* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2003), 44.

These very broad trends, however, hide important differences within Europe (as well as other regions), with respect to economic growth, urbanization and proletarianization. From the 16th century onwards North-Western Europe, for example, developed into a highly urbanized and commercialized region, very different from most other parts of Europe. This 'little divergence'[24] has its roots in the late Middle Ages and it explains the rise of the Dutch Republic in the 17th and that of England in the 18th as world powers. As in other continents, in most parts of Europe, especially the North and the East, the bulk of the population lived in villages and had little urban experiences (table 2).

[24] Jan Luiten van Zanden, *The Long Road to the Industrial Revolution. The European Economy in a Global Perspective 1000-1800* (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2009).

Table 2: Urbanization levels in Europe 1700-1870 in percentages (cities >5000)

	1700	**1750**	**1800**	**1870**
The Netherlands	45	39	24 (37)	32
Belgium	29	26	24 (20)	32
England	15	22	30 (23)	50
Italy	15	16	18 (18)	20
Spain	14	14	19 (18)	25
Europe	11	12	12 (12)	20

Source: Malanima, "Urbanization", 260. Somewhat different outcomes in Paul Bairoch, *Cities and Economic Development. From the Dawn of History to the Present*. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1988) 221 (% between brackets).

In the 19th century the combined industrial and agrarian revolutions caused an unprecedented growth of the population and pushed urbanization levels up, first in the Atlantic world (Europe and North America), followed by Southern America and Japan. This spectacular rise in urbanization levels, however, should not primarily be interpreted as the consequence of increased mobility. Migration to cities grew, but overall migration levels were already quite high, both in Europe and in other parts of the world long before the Industrial Revolution set of.[25]

A second correction to modernization theory concerns the nature of migration. In contrast to what is often assumed, most migrants in cities were highly mobile and moved between towns, but also between cities and the countryside. Also in the heyday of urbanization in Europe, the second half of the 19th century, many migrants remained in touch with their village of origin. Employment perspectives in the city, for example in the building sector, were still too uncertain and unstable and for many young migrants employment in cities was part of their life cycle, after which many hoped to return to the countryside.[26] Only when the urban labor market started to offer year round jobs and agriculture underwent further mechanization, the links with the countryside weakened. This intermediate phase of high rural-urban mobility not only concerned internal migrations. In France, for example, there were ample complaints in the latter decades of the 19th century that male Italian labor migrants behaved like nomads and therefore constituted a threat to the position of the French worker. Only when Italians settled down and joined with their family, the 'immigrant threat diminished and relations with native workers normalized.[27]

This temporary character of the migration to cities also characterized much of the Transatlantic migrations. Especially male labor migrants from Southern Europe behaved as 'birds of passage', or 'Golondrinas' (Spanish for swallows). Thanks to the transport

[25] Jan Lucassen and Leo Lucassen, "The Mobility Transition Revisited, 1500-1900: What the Case of Europe Can Offer to Global History," *The Journal of Global History* 4, no. 4 (2009), 347-377; idem, "From Mobility Transition to Comparative Global Migration History," *The Journal of Global History* 6, no. 2 (2011) 299-307.

[26] Steven Hochstadt, *Mobility and Modernity: Migration in Germany, 1820-1989* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999).

[27] Leo Lucassen, *The Immigrant Threat: The Integration of Old and New Migrants in Western Europe since 1850* (Urbana and Chicago: The University of Illinois Press, 2005), chapter 3.

revolution (steam trains and ships), the costs and sailing time of transatlantic passages decreased considerably after 1860, and millions of workers navigated the new Atlantic space on a temporary basis:[28] either as seasonal migrants on the Argentinean Pampas, or as temporary workers in the mines and factories in North America. Before World War 1, the share of return migrations among Italians, Spaniards, but also workers from South-eastern Europe were very high. For many of them these temporary long distance migrations fitted well in their household strategies, which were based on income pooling through temporary migrations that had a long tradition. The only difference after 1860 was the scale and the extension of their migration field.

In the twentieth century new forms of temporary migration developed. First in the interwar period, with France, Belgium, Switzerland and the Netherlands as major poles of attraction, second during 'Les trente glorieuses' with the guest worker programmes in Western Europe, and finally during the first decade of the 21st century a highly volatile labor migration system developed with workers from Eastern Europe (especially Poland and Rumania) moving to the west and the south. In time many guest workers settled for good, and the overwhelming part of them in cities. There they were joined by both newcomers from the colonies (in the United Kingdom, Belgium, the Netherlands, France and Portugal) and by asylum seekers, refugees and high skilled migrants from all over the world. Immigration to the United States decreased dramatically during and after World War I and only resumed in the 1970s, now predominantly from Latin America, Asia and Africa. In the mean time the Great Migration of African Americans to Northern cities and temporary workers from Mexico (through the 'Bracero' program, 1942-1967) had a dramatic impact on the ethnic composition of American cities.[29] The result of the various migrations in the 20th century in the Atlantic world was that the share of foreign born jumped to some 10% of the population in most countries,[30] but in cities this could easily reach 30%.

Settling down and the role of citizenship

The phenomenon of migrants moving in chains, embedded in their own ethnic networks, and developing an infrastructure of ethnic associations, is well known both in the early modern and modern period and can be witnessed in all parts of the world. The extensiveness and duration, however, vary widely and depend on both the intentions and preferences of the migrants themselves and on the urban (and national) opportunity structures. Especially the nature of urban institutions and their inclusiveness towards migrants is crucial to explain different patterns within Europe and in a global perspective.

Starting with internal migrants in 19th century Western Europe, we can ascertain that ethnicity did matter and that many of them were considered not only as country bumpkins, but also culturally as aliens. This pertained especially to those whose dialects or religion differed from the national standard, like the Bretons and Auvergnats in Paris, who initially built strong ethnic networks, or the Irish in British and the Poles in German

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[28] Mark Wyman, *Round-Trip America: The Immigrants Return to Europe, 1880-1930* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), 22-24.

[29] James N. Gregory, *The Southern Diaspora: How the Great Migrations of Black and White Southerners Transformed America* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2005).

[30] Giovanni Gozzini, "The Global System of International Migrations, 1900 and 2000: A Comparative Approach," *Journal of Global History* 1, no. 1 (2006), 321-341

cities. Both were officially citizens, but were perceived and treated as fundamentally different.[31] Many of the Irish and the Poles also stressed their national cohesiveness and established a dense network of ethnic institutions. In the long run (mostly after the second generation) the ascribed and self-chosen ethnic identity faded and the descendants of these migrants blended in the urban environment. This was even largely true for one of the most despised minorities in Europe, the Jews, many of whom during the 19th century also moved to cities as internal migrants and gradually assimilated, although in the private sphere many held on to a 'light' version of Jewish identity.[32]

The example of the Jews immediately reminds us of important differences between Western and Eastern Europe when it comes to the salience of religion and ethnicity. Whereas in the west citizenship was largely inclusive and did not pose huge barriers to formerly discriminated groups, ethnic categorizations proved more resilient as one moves east. During the nineteenth century especially the three large multiethnic empires (Austrian-Hungarian, Ottoman and Russian) adopted a virulent nationalism that defined ethnic, linguistic and religious minorities as fundamentally different, even if they shared the same nationality. As a result members of such minority groups who settled in cities remained visible, also in the long run, and therefore fall in our second model (the ethno-national model). Even within Europe a shared public sphere and forms of civil society therefore clearly had its limits.

Including foreign immigrants in the short 20th century

Whereas internal migrations in Western Europe slowed down after World I, rural to urban moves increasingly acquired an international and after World War II even a global character. In some cases internal migrants were still perceived as alien, as in the case of Southern Italians in Milan and Turin, the problematisation increasingly shifted to aliens with a different nationality. In a way Europe's countryside moved to the Southern outskirts of the continent and beyond, more specifically to Anatolia and Northern Africa, and in the case of colonial migrants to the Caribbean and South Asia.[33]

Apart from France, where immigration was promoted for demographic reasons from the 1920s onwards, most postwar Western European countries were opposed to permanent immigration, but because of the economic boom period between the end of the 1940s and the middle of the 1970s temporary foreign labor was deemed unavoidable. In the United Kingdom labor scarcity was solved by migrants from the colonies, but on the continent predominantly by the recruitment of male guest workers from Southern Europe (Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece, Yugoslavia) and soon also Turkey and Northern Africa (Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria). When the oil crisis hit Europe in the 1970s, something unexpected happened. While unemployment levels went up steeply, Turks and Moroccans decided to stay and call for their families to join them. This lead to a mass immigration to Western European cities during a long period of economic recession in the late 1970s and 1980s. The reason for this badly timed mass immigration, which partly

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[31] Lucassen, *The Immigrant Threat*.

[32] Marion A. Kaplan, *The Making of the Jewish Middle Class. Women, Family, and Identity in Imperial Germany* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991); Marsha Rozenblit, *The Jews of Vienna, 1867-1914. Assimilation and Identity* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1983).

[33] For a good overview of migration to Western Europe in the 20th century: Leslie Page Moch, *Moving Europeans. Migration in Western Europe since 1650* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003).

coincided with the arrival of colonial migrants (e.g. the Surinamese in the Netherlands), was twofold: first of all these migrants had built up social and legal rights through their contributions to the welfare state, and secondly - and this distinguishes them from most Southern European guest workers – the decision to close the borders in the mid 1970s for labor migrants had the opposite effect. It was only then that non-European guest workers realized that by leaving they would give up all their rights and would never be admitted back in, while in their countries of origin the alternative was unemployment without social benefits.

That their settlement process would lead to social problems, such as high unemployment, youth criminality, underperforming at school and segregation in derelict neighborhoods, need not come as surprise. The bad timing of the immigration combined with low human capital was bound to create integration problems, which were further highlighted by the stigmatization of Islam, triggered by the Rushdie affair in 1989.[34] Given this background it is remarkable that so many children of these migrants are doing rather well at school and at the labor market.[35] At the same time the long term perspective of a considerable number of them is gloomy, as they are locked in innercity- and *banlieu* kind of ghettos, where crime and oppositional cultures are rampant.

The socio-economic and cultural problems that result from the immigration have given way to a widespread pessimism about the possibilities of integration, a fear for the islamization and even of Muslims thus creating a 'Eurabia'. Structural similarities with the difficult and lengthy integration process of Catholic Irish and Russian Jews in England and the United States a century earlier are often denied, when considered at all. In depth analyses of migrants then and now, however, show that such comparisons are highly relevant.[36] Although it is clear that different family systems, cultural practices and religious values lead to partial ethnic group formation in European cities, especially among migrants with a Muslim and Hindu background,[37] there are ample indications that their children *are* integrating, both structurally (in the domains of work, education and housing) and – albeit slower – in terms of identification (marriages, friends, associations). Transnational ties and practices are still nourished, but over time loose significance ands intensity. As in the United States the mainstream in European cities is gradually changing and becoming more inclusive to the children of migrants who add their own flavors and partly change the mainstream.

Given the unfavorable circumstances (bad timing of the immigration and the pervasive problematisation of immigration), this mutual integration process is remarkable and shows the strength of the inclusive and egalitarian West European citizenship model, that treats legal migrants and their descendants in principle as equals and offers them entrance to a range of urban (and national) institutions, including welfare benefits, political rights, education, the possibilities to mingle in the public sphere and ample opportunities to add their own institutions to the already vibrant civil society. That this also results in conflicts and even anti-immigrant populist political parties, at the national

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[34] Lucassen, *The Immigrant Threat*., 129.

[35] Maurice Crul and Jens Schneider, "Comparative Integration Context Theory: Participation and Belonging in New Diverse European Cities " *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 33, no. 7 (2010) 1249-1269.

[36] Nancy Foner, *From Ellis Island to JFK. New York's Two Great Waves of Immigration* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000); Lucassen, *The Immigrant Threat*.

[37] Leo Lucassen and Charlotte Laarman, "Immigration, Intermarriage and the Changing Face of Europe in the Post War Period," *The History of the Family* 14, no. 1 (2009).

and the local level, does not stop the ongoing integration process. The relative openness and inclusiveness of West European states and cities was furthermore helped by deliberate inclusive definitions of (post) colonial migrants, that extends also to the German *Aussiedler* (descendants of erstwhile German colonists in Eastern Europe). French, British, German, Portuguese and Dutch governments from the late 1940s onwards chose to define them as part of the national body or as citizens of the common empire, thus stressing their right to settle in the 'mother country' and being treated as equals.[38] Ethnicity was to some extent recognized but largely downplayed in favor of a common national identity.

At the other side of the Atlantic

Developments in the United States, at the other end of the Atlantic world, bear important similarities, but also highlight crucial differences. Notwithstanding pessimism about long term integration ('assimilation') of the new immigrants, empirical research shows ongoing converging trends. Children of current (Asian and Hispanic) immigrants still prefer English as the standard language and share core values of patriotism, capitalism and individualism, notwithstanding the pull of ethnic networks. However, in the United States formal and informal urban ethnic institutions are stronger and play a bigger role in migrants' lives. The main reason are that the welfare state is much less developed and that social and economic equality is not seen as per se desirable. The most obvious difference with Europe is the obsession with race, especially blackness (predominantly relates to ex African slaves), in stead of religion. Due to the legacy of slavery, of which the legal remnants were only dismantled in the 1960s, the social and cultural distance between 'white' and 'black' Americans is still considerable, which explains the hugely disadvantaged position of a large part of the African-American population. This is most visible in the many vast urban black ghettos, from which the state has largely withdrawn and in which poverty, unemployment, broken families and criminality are rampant. The absence or very poor quality of urban institutions produced 'hyperghettos' that resemble the favelas in Latin America and the slums of African and Indian cities.

Having nuanced and qualified the 'full citizenship' and the 'ethno-national' models, it is now time to look more closely at parts of the world that apparently seem to follow quite distinct roads and where the migration to cities seems to be structured along other lines.

Urban citizenship in China

In stark contrast to their Japanese neighbors, in the 19th and 20th centuries Chinese have displayed a reluctance to settle in cities and the urbanization level therefore remained rather low, with the exception of regions like the lower Yangtze.[39] Around 1800 the difference with Europe was still small, but already then there were important differences. Where in Western Europe most urbanites inhabited a large number of relatively small cities which integrated the surrounding countryside in the market economy, in China

[38] Andrea L. Smith, ed. *Europe's Invisible Migrants* (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2003).

[39] G. William Skinner, "Regional Urbanization in Nineteenth-Century China," in *The City in Late Imperial China*, ed. G. William Skinner (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1977), 235. In 1843 the urbanization level for the Lower Yangtze region was (8%), which was twice as high as North China.

large cities (over 100,000) dominated.[40] In the course of the 19th and 20th centuries China remained predominantly rural and only from the end of the 1970s urbanization levels went up steeply, rising from 17% in 1978 to 45% in 2008.[41]

This Chinese pattern was strongly shaped by both state policies as well as cultural preferences that valued enduring contacts with one's place of origin. The most dominant theme in discussions about Chinese cities which has major repercussions of the way we interpret migration and settlement processes, is Weber's claim that Chinese cities did not constitute a real urban community, because the tradition of lineages and the ancestral cult ('the magic closure of clans')[42] prevented the emergence of an urban civic confederation. Forms of civil society and public sphere therefore did barely develop. This would also explain why most migrants remained locked in their own ethnic (hometown) associations, known as *huiguan* (or *tongxianghui*) and developed a strong 'sojourner' mentality that kept the bonds with the home village or region as well as their own language intact. This was deemed crucial because of the pivotal role of the ancestral cult which among other things prescribed that one had to be buried 'at home' and thus continuing the spiritual link with one's ancestors. Apart from burials, migrants and their descendants also sent back remittances and returned for visits during festivals like Chinese New Year.[43]

The Chinese reality, however, was much more diverse and highly dependent on the specific historical context. In reality there were many China's and differences between cities and various parts of China were considerable. A good example is Yangzhou in the Northeast, close to Nanking.[44] In this bustling commercial and immigrant town, dominated by merchants from Huizhou, migrants with many different linguistic background soon developed a common identity and a common urban language, while at the same time certain merchant groups displayed a strong ethnic cohesiveness and sojourner mentality.

In other towns the impact of native place associations was much more prominent and illustrates the centrality of the attachment to 'home'.[45] Also here, however, such a focus easily leads to essentialist, static and simplistic accounts of the settlement process of rural migrants in Chinese cities. Whether native place associations were created, depended on wealth. Especially rich merchant groups, like those from Guangdong in Shanghai, built temples for their local gods and burial sites that functioned as a substitute for the home region. Poor migrants from Hubei (Jiangsu), however, lacked the means to establish their own community institutions.[46] Their ethnicity was much more created through stigmatization as '*Jiangbei'*, a label that had clear class overtones and that was applied to a much wider regional group of poor migrants. Ethnicity was therefore not

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[40] Ibid. 240.

[41] Jinghzu Zhao, *Towards Sustainable Cities in China: Analysis and Assessment of Some Chinese Cities in 2008* (New York: Springer, 2011), v; Kam Wing Chan, "Fundamentals of China's Urbanization and Policy," *The China Review* 10, no. 1 (2010), 79.

[42] William Rowe, "Social Stability and Social Change," in *The Cambridge History of China*, ed. Willard J. Peterson (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 2002). 529-531.

[43] As recorded in the fascinating Chinese documentary "The Last Train Home."

[44] Antonia Finnane, *Speaking of Yangzhou: A Chinese City, 1550-1850* (Cambridge: Harvard University Asia Center, 2004).

[45] Bryna Goodman, *Native Place, City, and Nation. Regional Networks and Identities in Shanghai, 1853-1937* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 2-6.

[46] Ibid. 117.

only a positive and conscious choice, but could also be the result of systematic ascription and as such is comparable with the labeling of African Americans or hillbillies in the United States.[47]

In Shanghai the proliferation of *huiguans* stood in the way of a common urban identity and language, but it did not entirely prevent shared urban experiences and class identities. Native place associations proved very flexible and able to adapt to waves of modernization. In the latter part of the 19th century they became more democratic and less ethnic.[48] Some scholars therefore argue that these associations were the centre of a Chinese form of public sphere, that was less individualistic, but nevertheless delineated a collective social space which only partly overlapped with the state.[49] And when the state imploded at the beginning of the 20th century, it were these commercial urban institutions that took over and, as in Tianjin, expanded their activities in public services, policing and poor relief.[50] Finally, it is important to note that *huiguans* became the center of popular social mobilization in the 20th century and played an important role in the spread of nationalism in the 20th century. It was precisely the sojourning conditions and the sojourning networks within the Chinese empire that permitted the imagining of a national community.[51]

A final warning against considering native place associations as a sign of cultural continuity is that the success of sojourning merchants to organize and mobilize other migrants with a similar local, regional and linguistic background varied greatly and that part of the rural to urban flow, especially those from nearby, quickly assimilated into the native urban population.[52] For many it was too costly to maintain ties with the home village, whereas others changed their official place of registration – as well as their lineages - to the city where they actually lived. Especially those who wanted to join the city elites had a strong incentive to do so, as it gave access to lucrative jobs, education and the famous state exams.[53]

The Communist era and the hukou system

With the Communist take-over in 1949, China initially adopted the Soviet model of development that stressed urbanization and industrialization.[54] This set off a huge migration stream to Chinese cities. As this threatened the privileged welfare provisions

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[47] Emily Honig, *Creating Chinese Ethnicity: Subei People in Shanghai, 1850-1980* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 2-5.

[48] Goodman, *Native Place, City, and Nation*, 43.

[49] Ibid. 311; Peter J. Carroll, *Between Heaven and Modernity: Reconstructing Suzhou, 1895-1937* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2006), 7-8.

[50] Man Bun Kwan, *The Salt Merchants of Tianjin: State Making and Civil Society in Late Imperial China* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2001), chapter 5.

[51] Goodman, *Native Place, City, and Nation*, 313; Mary Backus Rankin, *Elite Activism and Political Transformation in China: Zhejiang Province, 1865-1911* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1986), 87-95; Richard Belsky, *Localities at the Center: Native Place, Space, Power in Late Imperial Beijing* (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), 4.

[52] William Rowe, *Hankow: Commerce and Society in a Chinese City, 1796-1889* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1984), 215.

[53] Ibid. 235-238.

[54] Only between 1926 and 1939 some 23 million Russians moved to cities: David L. Hoffmann, "Moving to Moscow: Patterns of Peasant in-Migration During the First Five-Years-Plan," *Slavic Review* 50, no. 4 (1991) 847-857.

for urban citizens, the state soon took measures, including deportation, to discourage people from leaving the countryside.[55] The cornerstone of these measures was the so-called *hukou* household registration legislation in 1958, that made it very difficult and often impossible for rural folk to settle in cities.[56] The state could thus control internal migration, slow down urban growth and thus prevent the uncontrolled creation of slums.[57] The hukou system very much reminds us of the Russian *propiska* residence permit system which also limited the legal settlement of peasants in cities and which was directly linked to the use of internal passports. [58] In China the choice to produce industrial goods in the countryside appeared a failure and the regime embarked upon a 'coastal development strategy', starting with special economic zones in 1979, open coastal cities in 1984 and complete freedom in 1994. As a result temporary migration to cities, predominantly in the East and the Southeast increased exponentially: from 6.6 million in 1982 to 149 million in 2005.[59]

Although the liberalization since 1978 has pushed up urbanization levels dramatically, the discriminatory effects of the *hukou* legislation are still felt, although this varies strongly. Many migrants do not have entrance to urban institutions, like housing, jobs, education and poor relief, unless they can afford to buy urban citizenship. Some cities like Shanghai have started to experiment with granting welfare benefits to skilled migrants, but many other towns are afraid that relaxation of the rules will be to costly for the local taxpayers. [60] Although there have been many public protests against this discrimination, most migrants seem to accept the situation, which can be explained by their own cultural preferences to foster ties with their home village and return there on a regular basis. Apart from considerations concerning ancestors and lineage, this transient behavior can also be seen as insurance against the insecure existence in the city.[61] The idea of temporariness of this huge 'floating population' (over 200 millions in 2010), is also shown by the fact that their children often remain in the village and are taken care of by their grandparents. Finally the Chinese family system and the tradition for women to move to the household of the groom's family, often arranged locally, strengthen the inclination to remain in regular touch with the region of origin. Only recently new

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[55] Don Han, "Policing and Racialization of Rural Migrant Workers in Chinese Cities," *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 33, no. 4 (2010), 597.

[56] Hanchao Lu, "Small Town China: A Historical Perspective on Rural-Urban Relations," in *One Country, Two Societies: Rural-Urban Inequality in Contemporary China*, ed. Martin King Whyte (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010), 48.

[57] Fei-Ling Wang, "Renovating the Great Floodgate: The Reform of China's Hukou System," in *One Country, Two Societies. Rural-Urban Inequality in Contemporary China*, ed. Martin King Whyte (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010).

[58] Wu Jieh-Min, "Rural Migrant Workers and China's Differential Citizenship. A Comparative Differential Analysis," in *One Country, Two Societies: Rural Urban Inequality in Contemporary China*, ed. Martin King Whyte (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2010), 59; Fei-Ling Wang, *Organizing through Division and Exclusion: China's Hukou System* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), 32-40.

[59] Jianfa Shen, "Increasing Internal Migration in China from 1985 to 2005: Institutional Versus Economic Drivers," in *Migration and mobility in a global historical perspective* (Taipei2010).

[60] Wang, "Renovating the Great Floodgate: The Reform of China's Hukou System.", 342-351.

[61] Cindy Fan, *China on the Move. Migration, the State, and the Household* (London: Routledge, 2008).

patterns of neo-local marriages in boom towns like Dongguan in the South-east are emerging.[62]

The exclusion of rural migrants from urban provisions does not apply to those who are stimulated by the state to settle in regions, including cities, that are considered in need of Sinicization by 'Han' Chinese. Well know destinations are Yunnan in the South and Tibet and Xinjiang in the West. Here migrants behave more as colonizers and are granted rights upon arrival.[63] Also in this configuration, ethnic identities (Han versus other minorities) are stressed and remain important nodes of orientation in the new urban environment.

India and the pull of the village

In 2007 two of the ten largest cities in the world were situated in India: Bombay (Mumbai) with some 19 million inhabitants ranked number four, behind Mexico City, New York and Tokyo, whereas Calcutta (Kolkata) occupied the eighth position with 15 million residents. Yet, India as a whole is not a highly urbanized country, as we can see in table 1. Compared with other parts of the world, but also with East Asia (mainly China, Korea and Japan) South Asia, which largely overlaps with India, has the lowest urbanization levels and since the 1960s has been overtaken by Africa.

Table 3: Levels of urbanization (20,000>), by region and year (1920-2000)[64]

	1920	**1940**	**1960**	**1980**	**2000**
Africa	5	7	13	27	37
South Asia	6	8	14	24*	30*
China			*16*	*20*	*36*
Japan			*63*	*76*	*79*
East Asia* **	7	12	19	27	42
India			*18*	*23*	*28*
Latin America[65]	14	20	33	65	75
Soviet Union	10	24	36	64	73**
Europe (ex USSR)	35	40	44	69	74

[62] Hong Zhang, "Labor Migration, Gender, and the Rise of Neo-Local Marriages in the Economic Boomtown of Dongguan, South China," *Journal of Contemporary China* 18, no. 61 (2009) 639-656.

[63] Shen, "Increasing Internal Migration in China from 1985 to 2005"; see for Yunnan Mette Halskov Hansen, "The Call of Mao or Money? Han Chinese Settlers on China's South-Western Borders." *The China Quarterly*, no. 158 (1999), 394-413. For a historical background see Pamela Kyle Crossley, Helen Siu, and Donald S. Sutton, eds. *Empire at the Margins: Culture, Ethnicity, and Frontier in Early Modern China*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006).

[64] Paul Bairoch, *Cities and Economic Development. From the Dawn of History to the Present* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1988), 302, 495 gives levels of urbanization for the period 1910-1980, but uses a 5,000 threshold.

[65] Percentages within Latin America vary hugely: high in the temperate zone (32% in 1920) and much lower in the tropical zone (11% in 1920), the Caribbean and the Middle American mainland: United Nations, *"Growth of the World's Urban and Rural Population, 1920-2000,"* (New York: United Nations, 1969), 124.

Oceania	37	41	53	72	74
North America	41	46	58	74	77

Source: 1920-1960: United Nations, *Growth of the world's urban and rural population, 1920-2000* (New York, 1969), 31; 1980-2000, plus the figures for China, Japan and India 1960-2000: *World urbanization prospects. The 2001 revision* (New York 2002) 26-37 (table A-2).
* South-Central Asia; ** Russian Federation *** including Japan, China and Korea

This leads us to the question how to characterize the nature of India's urbanization process. To understand the role of migration in the growth of cities, many scholars have warned against a linear and mechanistic Western view which assumes that with industrialization and modernization people in the countryside will automatically move to cities. As the statistics show, this clearly did not happen in India.

The relatively low Indian urbanization levels, however, do not mean that Indians are immobile. To the contrary, especially intrastate mobility has been quite high, already in the 17th and 18th centuries.[66] Many migrants, however, do not settle for good in cities. Instead a pattern of large scale circular and seasonal migration developed from the late 19th century onwards. Migrants flocked to cities, but most of them stayed only temporarily and remained attached to the villages of birth. This system is well studied for the two largest cities Calcutta and Bombay.

In Calcutta most migrants were drawn to the jute mills and until the 1960s most of them, predominantly male, did this on a temporary basis. The reasons are twofold: 1) the nature of the city and 2) cultural specific aspects of village life and family systems. On the one hand urban industries did not provide year round employment, except for a small number of workers, and its business cycle was characterized by unpredictable ups and downs.[67] As we have seen this bears a lot of similarities with the urbanization process in Western Europe in the late 19th century, where many migrants – both internal and international – combined temporary jobs in the city with seasonal work in the countryside.[68] Moreover, housing in Indian cities was relatively expensive and there were barely any urban institutions which offered shelter against risks such as unemployment, sickness or death. As in China many migrants therefore kept their ties with the village of origin. Moreover, this enabled them to prevent full-scale proletarianization. Many of them settled in the slums, but returned to their villages on a regular basis, especially single men whose families remained in the countryside. But also workers with stable and year round positions preferred to spread social risks and did not give up their rural ties.[69] As De Haan remarked in his study on the Calcutta jute mills: "There continue to be amazingly close links between the industrial area and the 'native' villages hundreds of

[66] Ian J. Kerr, "On the Move. Circulating Labour in Pre-Colonial, Colonial and Post-Colonial India," in *India's Labouring Poor. Historical Studies C. 1600-C. 2000*, ed. Rana P. Behal and Marcel van der Linden (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press India, 2007), 85-110.
[67] Samita Sen, *Women and Labour in Late Colonial India: The Bengal Jute Industry* (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 1999), 48.
[68] Hochstadt, *Mobility and Modernity*; Moch, *Moving Europeans*.
[69] Arjan de Haan, *Unsettled Settlers. Migrant Workers and Industrial Capitalism in Calcutta* (Hilversum: Verloren, 1994), 239.

kilometers away."[70] The developments of the Indian society in the course of the 20th century counter-intuitively greatly facilitated temporary migrations through the spread of cheap fast transport (busses and trains). In a way one could even speak of seasonal migration from the cities to the rural regions, as many male migrants spent most of their time in the city.[71] This pattern was stimulated by (jute) mill owners in Calcutta who until the second part of the 20th century preferred a flexible workforce and who did not follow the European industrial pattern of creating a stable work force.[72]

Although the reluctance to settle permanently is largely explained by the nature of urban institutions and labor markets, cultural specific characteristics also play a role. First of all we have to realize that India is a pluralistic state in terms of languages and religions, where most people live in linguistically more or less homogenous states. And although unlike China India is a democracy with freedom of migration, people from other states, and sometimes even from other parts of the same state, are often perceived as aliens. This has resulted in an ethnocentric ideology in which (native) 'sons of the soil' are given preferential treatment with respect to employment, education and housing.[73] The industrial belt around Calcutta and Bombay, which accommodates large numbers of interstate migrants, are areas where this territorial exclusiveness has given rise to ethnic conflicts pertaining to urban resources.[74] The unstable work opportunities combined with the virtual absence of a local welfare state stimulated rural traditions of income pooling by household members, and explains the centrality of the family economy and the status of landownership.[75] As a result many temporary migrants return to their villages in the month of May, when the marriage season starts and family festivals set the ideal stage for settling family business.[76]

The temporariness of rural to urban migrants may also have promoted the recruitment of workers on an ethnic basis. Many temporary migrants in cities, both in industry and the building trade are organized in teams lead by a paymaster ('sardar' or 'khatardar') who prefer co-ethnic workers.[77] A system that was also common in early modern and 19th century Western Europe.[78] Moreover, many migrants organize in village clubs (a kind of hometown associations) with mutual insurance schemes to protect the members against the risks of unemployment, sickness and death and also offer credit facilities.[79]

The tendency for migrants to form separate social groups within the urban setting was further stimulated by the development of 'communalism'. This "belief that because

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[70] Ibid.

[71] Rajnarayan Chandavarkar, *History, Culture and the Indian City* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 67.

[72] Sen, *Women and Labour in Late Colonial India,* 48-50.

[73] Myron Weiner, *Sons of the Soil. Migration and Ethnic Conflict in India* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), 31.

[74] Ibid. 22 and 36.

[75] Chandavarkar, *History, Culture and the Indian City*, 63.

[76] Haan, *Unsettled Settlers*, 239. Although according to Sen absenteeism by rural workers from urban industries should not only be interpreted as their 'inability to adjust to the rhythm of industrial work' (Sen, *Women and Labour in Late Colonial India*, 43).

[77] Chandavarkar, *History, Culture and the Indian City*, 77; De Haan plays down the importance of sardars (*Unsettled Settlers*, 242).

[78] Jan Lucassen, *Migrant Labour in Europe. The Drift to the North Sea* (London: Croom Helm, 1987).

[79] Chandavarkar, *History, Culture and the Indian City*, 79.

a group of people follow a particular religion they have, as a result, common social, political and economic interests"[80] has deep roots in Indian society, but communal tensions only started to prevail since the violent civil war between Muslims and Hindus and the huge population exchanges that followed the partition of India and Pakistan in 1947.[81] The Indian historian Bipan Chandra does stress, however, that communalism should not be considered as a remnant of the past or a revival of traditionalism, but as an ideology that emerged as a consequence of modern politics, like nationalism and communism and which is inextricably linked to the rise of mass democracy and popular sovereignty.

We should take care, however, not to juxtapose this stress on pluralism and ethnic ties in India (and Africa) against an ideal-type of a Weberian city with a flourishing civil society and public sphere in which rural migrants are processed to become urbanites. Although there are fundamental differences between various parts of the world when it comes to the content of urban citizenship, such an overly simplistic interpretation neglects various kinds of overarching forms of citizenship that developed in India (and elsewhere) from the 19th century onwards. 'Communalism', for example, is a modern political phenomenon that also changed ethnic group formation among rural migrants in big cities, because it stressed religion (and not so much origin) as the principle for group formation. New pan-religious identities could then forge other and new ties between various sorts of migrants and urbanites with a similar religious background. In a way communalism therefore contributed to some extent to a widening public sphere and civil society. Moreover, from the end of the 19th century onwards the public sphere was broadened by the creation of public parks, libraries, movie theaters, radio broadcasting and fairs, as well as by all kind of associations, including the Freemasons who in principle did welcome all 'races' and religions.[82]

Finally, we should not forget that also all kind of migrant (home town) associations not just transplanted the village to the city and thus reproduced tribal identifications. Often, as in the case of South Indian migrants in New Delhi, pan-regional identities emerged in the context of migration and furthermore migrants are often active in various, only partly overlapping networks, depending on religion, caste or sect.[83] Or in the words of Nita Kumar who studied the migrants in Banares:

> "My study of the indigenous popular culture of Banares shows that formal and informal associations and 'clubs' are old, continuous, and multifarious, and that

[80] Bipan Chandra, *Communalism in Modern India* (New Delhi: Vikas Publishing House 1984), 1.
[81] Ibid. 4; Ashish Bose, "Urbanisation in India 1951-2001," in *Urbanisation in Developing Countries: Basic Services and Community Participation*, ed. Bidyut Mohanty (New Delhi: Institute of Scial Sciences, 1993), 108.
[82] Jyoti Kanchan, "Impact of Colonial Rule on Urban Life," in *The City in Indian History. Urban Demography, Society, and Politics*, ed. Indu Banga (New Delhi: 1991). 211-213; See also Lees about the fuzziness of British citizenship in the colonies: Lynn Hollen Lees, "Being British in Malaya, 1890-1940," *Journal of British Studies* 48, no. 1 (2009) 76-101.
[83] Andrea Menefee Singh, *Neighbourhood and Social Networks in Urban India* (New Delhi 1976), 159-161.

> ties and parallelisms based on everyday activities cut across lines of caste and religion."[84]

Home town associations, albeit ethnic in nature, can stimulate a more civil awareness and the engagement with the public sphere, because they become part of an arena for public recognition of regional identities.[85] Many such ethnic organizations became actors in urban politics with respect to urban facilities and provisions, which from the 20th century onwards largely focused on slum clearances.[86]

These qualifications, however, does not alter the fact that Indian civil society and public sphere were deeply segmented. Or, as Prashant Kidambi stated, what is 'distinctive about urban public culture in India is its polyphonic character'.[87] Not only because of the religious barriers put up by communalism, but also because urban provisions were far from equally distributed. This is evident when we look at town planning in the last century. Most efforts were put in segregating the middle classes and elites from the poor. This started as a colonial project, but, as also in Africa, it was continued after independence. The largest chunk of resources was therefore spent on provisions and infrastructural works that primarily benefitted the rich. Good illustrations are the continuous slum clearance projects – often labeled as 'beautification measures' – that chase the urban poor, among whom many were migrants, from valuable land.[88]

Africa: tribalism and modernity

The level of urbanization in Africa resembles that of Asia. In both cases the share of the population which lived in cities at the beginning of the 20th century was very low compared to Europe and North America (5 to 6%), whereas a century later both continents have arrived at a level of around 38%.[89] Finally we see important differences within the two continents. Within Africa high levels in the South and the North contrast with lower levels in the East and the Middle (table 4 and figure 2).

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[84] Nita Kumar, "Urban Culture in Modern India. World of the Lower Classes," in *The City in Indian History. Urban Demography, Society, and Politics*, ed. Indu Banga (New Delhi: Manohar Publications, 1991), 198.

[85] Singh, *Neighbourhood and Social Networks*, 157-162.

[86] Gregory Mann, "Locating Colonial Histories: Between France and West Africa." *The American historical review* 110, no. 2 (2005), 253-257.

[87] Prashant Kidambi, *The Making of an Indian Metropolis: Colonial Governance and Public Culture in Bombay, 1890-1920* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2007), 240.

[88] Mann, "Locating Colonial Histories", 253-256.

[89] http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wup2001/wup2001dh.pdf.

Table 4: Urbanization levels in Africa in 1975 and 2001

	1975	**2001**
Eastern Africa[90]	12,3	25,1
Middle Africa[91]	24,6	36
Western Africa[92]	18,5	40
Northern Africa[93]	39,5	49,3
Southern Africa[94]	46,2	54,7
Africa as a whole	24,4	37,7

Source: for 1975: Zachariah, K.C. and Julien Condé. *Migration in West Africa. Demographic Aspects*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press/ World Bank, 1981), 79; for 2001: http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/wup2001/wup2001dh.pdf.;

Figure 2: Urbanisation in Africa in 2001



Source: http://www.grida.no/publications/other/geo3/?src=/geo/geo3/english/410.htm.

Although Africa has large cities, like Lagos and Cairo (each some 10 millions), they do not figure in the World top ten of largest cities.[95] Most African cities are 'primate cities'. This means that within the boundaries of the state there are no other cities with a comparable size nearby and that most rural migrants move to the capital. This pattern is usually explained by the dominant role of the central government in most African states,

[90] Among others Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Zambia.
[91] Among others Angola, Cameroon, Congo.
[92] Among other Nigeria, Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia and Guinea.
[93] From Egypt to Morocco.
[94] Among others South Africa, Namibia and Botswana.
[95] Bill Freund, *The African City. A History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 145.

who spend the bulk of their money on education, health care and bureaucracy in the capital and as a result often are by far the most important employer.[96]

The development of urbanization in various parts of Africa was heavily influenced by colonialism which became a dominant force after the scramble for Africa in the late 19th century. French, English, German, Belgian, Portuguese, Spanish and Italian colonizers initially portrayed Africans as tribal people whose roots were and should remain rural: 'caring for their cows, while their women harvested the crops'.[97] The effects of detribalization would be much more negative than the uprooting of European peasants in the 19th century. Allowing large scale migration to cities was thought to destabilize African societies and lead to chaos and disruption.[98] As far as Africans lived in cities they should be segregated, either by creating 'villes nouvelles' for Europeans, as for example in many Moroccan and Algerian towns, or by separate neighborhoods. Another model was to allow African workers to move to industrial or mining areas, but only on a temporary basis and without loosening the ties to the region of origin, as in South Africa's 'T(h)uisland' system whose Bantu population was officially excluded from the South African nation. Male miners of these artificial miniature states were only allowed as workers in the so-called compound system, typical for the mining regions in South Africa and former Rhodesia. This created settlements of male dominated migrants who (at least until the 1940s) were not allowed to bring their families and who were expected to return eventually.[99] Belgian colonial rule also created strict rules on who was allowed to settle in cities, whereas the British colonizers in West Africa put no barriers.[100] In the post World War II period, England and France became wary of tribal notions and instead greeted the modernization paradigm that put high value on urbanization and a stable workforce. Or in the words of Fredrick Cooper:

> "They began to articulate a vision of a stable workforce, socialized into industrial discipline and urban life, breaking ties with backward rural villages and settling permanently, with wives and children, in cities, minetowns, and commercial centres."[101]

This vision of the ideal society was only partly shared by Africans, whose preferences in terms of family life, associations and the ongoing bonds between the countryside and the city lead to a rather different outcome. As in India, most migrants did not break off their contacts with their home villages and thus maintained a resilient rural-urban continuum. To understand this pattern I will focus on the following four factors: 1) cultural

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[96] Ibid. 145-146.
[97] Ibid. 82.
[98] Kenneth Little, *Urbanization as a Social Process. An Essay on Movement and Change in Contemporary Africa* (London and Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974), 14.
[99] Apart from these 'Tuisland' workers, many immigrants from neighboring states were (and are) recruited for the mines and also agriculture, which also after Apartheid were subjected to stringent control measures and who are largely excluded from society. This is also true for the ten of thousands of illegal workers from Mozambique and Zimbabwe: Crush, "Fortress South Africa and the Deconstruction of Apartheid's Migration Regime."
[100] Little, *Urbanization as a Social Process*, 16.
[101] Frederick Cooper, "Reconstructing Empire in British and French Africa," *Past and Present* 210, no. 6 (2011), 206.

preferences; 2) the urban economic structure; 3) the partial nature of the urban citizenship and more specifically he lack of a urban welfare structure; and 4) the social and political construction of identity through notions of 'autochthony'.

Cultural preferences

Catherine Conquerie-Vidrovitch described the nature of the cityward migration until the 1960s as follows:

> "The Africans did not flood continuously and irreversibly into the cities. Rather, the cities seasonably turned into a sort of population storehouse but did not grow linearly; a trade crisis, an epidemic, or a war (like that of 1914-1918) could put a halt to expansion."[102]

This changed gradually after World War II. Migration to cities was still largely a male affair but migrants started to stay longer. Moreover, women and children who used to remain behind in the countryside and tend the farm, increasingly joined the cityward migration. Changing patterns of land tenure, the introduction of cash crops and individual landownership stimulated the migration of whole families, so that the overrepresentation of males decreased.[103] Since the 1970s the urbanization gathered speed and increasing numbers of people have become urbanites.

This development, however, did not automatically weaken the strong attachment of the migrants with their villages of origin, nor did it put an end to the widespread preference to use kin and village networks in the city of settlement, making cities highly pluralistic. [104] As in China and India home town associations are numerous and remittances are more the rule than the exception. One of the reasons to foster ties with the village of origin is the value people attach to landownership and to being buried in the home village with the other ancestors. Thus towns and villages remain 'interrelated social fields'.[105] To what extent people are able to hold on to land and navigate the rural urban continuum varies greatly within Africa and is subject to change over time. The link with the countryside should therefore not be considered as an essentialist feature of Africans, as it is highly dependent on economic, social and political developments. Let us first consider the urban economic structure.

The urban economic structure

In Africa we can distinguish at least two types of cities that draw migrants. On the one hand there are the primate cities, mostly capitals of post colonial nation states and on the other hand mining towns, like in the Zambian (previously North Rhodesian) copperbelt and in South Africa. In the primate cities it is not so much industry that pulls migrants,

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[102] Catherine Conquerie-Vidrovitch, "The Process of Urbanization in Africa (from the Origins to the Beginning of Independence)," *African Studies Review* 34, no. 1 (1991), 49.

[103] Derek Byerlee, "Rural-Urban Migration in Africa. Theory, Policy and Research Implications," *International Migration Review* 8, no. 4 (1974), 546; Akin L. Mabogunje, "Systems Approach to a Theory of Rural-Urban Migration." *Geographical analysis* (1970), 8; Janet Abu-Lughod, "Varieties of Urban Experience: Contrast, Coexistence and Coalescence in Cairo." In *Middle Eastern Cities*, edited by Ira M. Lapidus. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969) 159-187, there 168.

[104] Little, *Urbanization as a Social Process* , 74-75.

[105] Margaret Peil and Pius O. Sada, *African Urban Society* (Chichester: John Wiley & Sons, 1984), 139.

but the bureaucracy of the national government, Western NGO's, hotels and educational and medical institutions linked to the state. These institutions create an additional flexible demand for all kind of services and other commercial activities, but at the same time their absorption capacity is limited. Many jobs, especially in the informal sector are subjected to ups and downs in the economy. Moreover, in the 1950s and 1960s, union activity notwithstanding, wages were so low that additional sources of income were necessary and permanent settlement in the city of the entire family impossible. This severed the links with the countryside. [106] In the colonial period the problem of the 'bachelor wage' was most widespread in East Africa, but also in Sierra Leone and Nigeria wages were too low to support an entire family.[107] More recently, circulating between city and village has decreased, because this may put at risk the chances for the scarce urban jobs, whereas the commodification of land has furthermore given the settlement in cities a more permanent character.[108]

The partial nature of the urban citizenship

Compared to European welfare states, and even to the more basic welfare provisions in Anglo Saxon countries like the U.S. and the United Kingdom, urban authorities in African cities had and still have not much to offer to their inhabitants, natives as well as migrants.[109] This concerns in the first place welfare provisions that reduce the risks of unemployment, sickness, old age and death. Although some companies, like the mining corporations in the Zambian copperbelt and in Belgian Congo, experimented with welfare benefits and pensions, these initiatives remained very limited.[110] Social policies that cover these costs are virtually absent,[111] but also other provisions, like education and health, are often only accessible for those who have enough money to pay for these services.

It should therefore not come as a surprise that migrants from the countryside heavily relied on personal networks of kin and co-ethnics which can offer support in the new environment. Ethnicity and rural ties remained important, but not because of some inherently essentialist African tradition, as Frederick Cooper observed: "Not only a sense of common language and a common past, but the insecurity of urban life encouraged if not forced the maintenance of rural ties and affiliations."[112] Ties with the village or region of origin give access to much needed resources such as food and seasonal work. It

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[106] Thomas S. Wiesner, "The Structure of Sociability: Urban Migration and Urban-Rural Ties in Kenya " *Urban Anthropology* 5(1976), 207.

[107] Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society. The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 326-327.

[108] Peil and Sada, *African Urban Society*, 120.

[109] Ian Gough et al., eds., *Insecurity and Welfare Regimes in Asia, Africa and Latin America: Social Policy in Development Contexts* (Cambridge Cambridge University Press, 2004). See also Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society*, 335 .

[110] James Ferguson, *Expectations of Modernity: Myths and Meanings of Urban Life on the Zambian Copperbelt* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999). 172; Leo Zeilig, ed. *Class Struggle and Resistance in Africa* (Cheltenham: New Clarion Press, 2002), 4.

[111] Some exceptions are the initiatives taken by Egypt's president Nasser in the 1950s and 1960s: Alexander, Anne, and Dave Renton. "Globalization, Imperialism and Popular Resistance in Egypt, 1880-2000." In *Class Struggle and Resistance in Africa*, edited by Leo Zeilig (Cheltenham: New Clarion Press , 2002), 87-115, there 99.

[112] Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society*, 374.

is therefore expected that migrants with a foothold in the city guide and support kin from their home area. The result is the emergence of ethnic enclaves in cities that not only support and cushion migrants, but that also are the nodal point in the networks that channel people to and from the city.[113] Bonds with the countryside are further severed by remittances in form of both cash and commodities, which can be seen as a kind of insurance premium safeguarding among other things rights to land.[114]

In absence of general and widely accessible urban institutions ethnicity, for natives as well as newcomers, structures urban life and has given rise to all kinds of welfare societies,[115] voluntary organizations, and hometown associations, like the Luo in Kampala. This should not be interpreted as the result of tribalism, but as an "unceasing contemporary socio-cultural response to situational stimuli", which arises through contact and competition in the urban arena.[116] Many studies of African cities, especially in sub-Saharan Africa (both in the East, Middle and the West) stress the transformative nature of cities, notwithstanding the central role of ethnicity. Not only are hometown associations involved in 'resocialising the country bumpkins'[117], but the city confronts migrants also with other forms of identification, like nationalism, religion and class consciousness. To some extent this was stimulated by colonial authorities after World War II who became interested in creating a stable workforce, socialized in urban life and who gave up ties with their original villages.[118] Finally 'Stadtluft' brought more freedom for women who could escape patriarchy, but also for villagers in general who were fed up with the repression by village chiefs, as Banton stressed for Sierra Leone in the 1950s.[119]

Although these attempts at social engineering through 'detribalization' soon got bogged down in African preferences in terms of family life and urban associations, something of an urban culture did develop, or in the word of the well know French anthropologist Georges Balandier who wrote an influential book on Brazzaville in the 1950s, a 'véritable culture négro-urbaine'.[120] Urban associations crosscut ethnicity and as they focused on urban neighborhoods they created a new form of social glue. Urban leisure in the form of culture, dance, clothing developed and created to some extent a new 'city air'.[121] Furthermore labor unions and religious organizations (both Christian and Muslim) offered mom ethnic modes of association.

The construction of identity and the notion of autochthony[122]

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[113] Conquerie-Vidrovitch, "The Process of Urbanization in Africa," 46.
[114] Little, *Urbanization as a Social Process*, 103. For the importance of remittances see also: Peil and Sada, *African Urban Society*, 142.
[115] A.L. Epstein, *Politics in an Urban African Community* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1958), 47.
[116] Conquerie-Vidrovitch, "The Process of Urbanization in Africa", 52.
[117] Little, *Urbanization as a Social Process*, 91.
[118] Cooper, "Reconstructing Empire in British and French Africa," 24.
[119] Little, *Urbanization as a Social Process*, 17.
[120] Georges Balandier, *Sociologie Des Brazzavilles Noires* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1955), 179 and 200.
[121] Freund, *The African City. A History*, 83-90; 149-150.
[122] Peter Geschiere and Peter Jackson, "Autochthony and the Crisis of Citizenship: Democratization, Decentralization, and the Politics of Belonging " *African Studies Review* 49, no. 2 (2006); and Peter Geschiere, *The Perils of Belonging. Autochthony, Citizenship, and Exclusion in Africa and Europe* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2009).

In absence of vibrant and strong social and political alternatives ethnicity nevertheless remained a powerful way of defining identities and forging social categories. As such, it can stand in the way of creating stable democratic institutions, as argued by Josef Gugler:

> "Any urban dwellers bridge the gap between the city and the countryside: they remain deeply involved in what they see as their rural home. This connection reinforces the ties they have established with home people in the urban setting. The social networks reaching beyond this core tend to be delineated in terms of region of origin, language and culture. They constitute new ethnic identities that divide the urban populace - and pose a daunting obstacle to the efforts at democratization.".[123]

Following Mahmood Mamdani's distinction between subject and citizen, one might argue that postcolonial African states (and cities) have not succeeded in creating a true national or urban citizenship that supersedes ethnic ties.[124] Geschiere and Gugler are sympathetic to such an analytical distinction, but stress that many Africans can be both subjects *and* citizens, depending on the social and political context.[125] In the struggle over access to urban and rural resources – and also citizenship - politicians have started to emphasize the salience of (rural) origin. Notions of 'autochthony' and belonging have lead to an obsession with roots and origins in many African countries (like Cameroon) and make collective conceptions of village and region a powerful base for politics. Elite associations in cities that play the ethnic card increasingly crowd out political parties which are more based on notions of civil society and public sphere.

This tendency is not restricted to Africa, but can be seen in other continents as well, including Europe and the Americas. The populist backlash against migrants, especially the Muslims among them, have proved very successful in countries, like France, the Netherlands, Germany and most Eastern European states, such as Russia. The difference, however, is that in Europe this communitarian and nativist reflex has not lead to exclusion of migrants and their descendants on ethnic, religious or racial grounds, from urban or national institutions and welfare schemes. So far the civic, laïcist tradition has proved robust and is not likely to succumb to a regime change.

Conclusion

It seems undeniable that the process of urbanization will proceed in the coming decades and that the share of people living in cities (50% in 2010) will further increase.[126] Moreover, as Edward Glaeser argued, the decision of most migrants who leave the countryside is a rational one and the chances are considerable that they will indeed profit from such a move. What is less clear however, is how to explain the huge differences between parts of the globe when it comes to the levels of urbanization and the nature of the settlement process. This need not come as a surprise, because such encompassing

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[123] Josef Gugler, "Urbanization in Africa South of the Sahara: Identities in Conflict," in *The Urban Transformation of the Developing World*, ed. J. Gugler (Oxford Oxford University Press, 1996), 241.
[124] Mamdani, *Citizen and Subjec*.
[125] Peter Geschiere and Josef Gugler, "Introduction. The Urban-Rural Connection: Changing Issues of Belonging and Identification," *Africa* 68, no. 3 (1998), 312-314.
[126] United Nations Population Division, *World Urbanization Prospects: The 2001 Revision* (New York 2002).

global questions have not yet been posed. The main reason seems to be the disciplinary segmentation of our knowledge in disparate research traditions such as history, anthropology, geography, sociology, political science and area studies. Only by combining the research in these fields is it possible to develop a global research agenda. With this article, in which I have profited greatly from the work in the disciplines mentioned above, I hope to have set a first step on the interdisciplinary road that combines history and the social sciences, and more specifically urban and migration studies.

By doing so I have tried to offer a provisional theoretical framework which I hope enables us to understand better the decisions that migrants take and the way they shape their life in the city, in the era of national states since the beginning of the 19th century until the present. This still sketchy review of the literature on the Atlantic region, China, India and Sub-Saharan Africa shows the potential of a truly global and comparative approach and seems to confirm the conjecture that the institutional opportunity structure of cities largely determines the pace, extent and mode or rural-urban migrations. The forms of migration and settlement depend to a large extent on institutional arrangements in various parts of the world. Key questions are: what do cities have to offer to immigrants and how is urban membership defined?[127] These local opportunity structures interact with the rural institutions varying from family systems, legal arrangements, and the level of commercialization to cultural and spiritual practices. In other words, I hope to have shown that in order to understand changes over time this institutional and materialist approach has a greater explanatory power than religious and cultural factors that stress allegiances with village and family. To make sense of the bewildering variations throughout the world and within continents, regions and even countries, the typology proposed here has proved a useful analytical tool.

This conclusion, however, need not automatically lead to a Eurocentric fallacy that Bin Wong rightly warned against. I do not argue that there is a European or Atlantic master pattern that only gradually spread over the rest of the world and I fully agree with Adam McKeown who recently remarked:

> "Assumptions about the unity of world history approximate the universalizing methods of the social sciences. When applied to the understanding of migration, these methods (in the hands of nuanced practitioners) do not insist that all migration was the same, only that migrants should be expected to respond similarly to similar forces."[128]

The typology proposed in this article follows his maxim. Its strength is, I believe, its flexibility. Certain regions of the world do not easily coincide with a certain model. Instead it stipulates that when over times conditions change regions, states or cities may move through the typology. Furthermore, as we have seen geographical units should not

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[127] Seyla Benhabib, *The Rights of Others. Aliens, Residents and Citizens* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004). For a more limited test of these ideas see Leo Lucassen and Wim Willems, eds., *Living in the City. Urban Institutions in the Low Countries, 1200-2010* (New York: Routledge, forthcoming 2012).

[128] Adam McKeown, "Different Transitions: Comparing China and Europe, 1600-1900," *The Journal of Global History* 6, no. 2 (2011), 56.

be treated as homogenous units. Present day American cities only partly fulfill the criteria of the 'full citizenship model' and contain all kind of pockets that resemble more the realities of the 'empty citizenship' model. Cities in India or Africa on the other hand, that combine aspects of empty citizenship with a highly segregated civil society, nevertheless also developed a limited shared public sphere. Such a layered and open typology, based on a firm theoretical foundation, owns a lot to Weber's ideas about the European city in his famous treatise from 1921,[129] but at the same time rejects its binary assumptions and implications which privilege the (Western) European city as the master pattern waiting to be followed by the rest of the world.

[129] Max Weber, "Die Stadt. Eine Soziologische Untersuchung," *Archiv für Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik* 47(1921) 621-772.